>
> Mr. Rowlett,
>
> Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
> continue to press an argument based on it?
>
> Chris Havern

Note my phrasing: The origin of how the British battlefleet came to be
created in the manner that it was. I was discussing, and I believe the
argument that I partly agree with was also discussing, the origin of
the First World War itself, with also reference to the FUNDING of the
British battle fleet (one of Sumida’s points being ‘affordable Imperial
defence’). That is a very different issue from the creation of the
DREADNOUGHT and the desire for battlecruisers being subsumed into repeat
dreadnought-type BB’s instead of BC’s. The conventional wisdom on
that subject, rather broader than Sumida’s topic, does still seem to
apply. To me it appears that the Kaiser & Tirpitz chose the wrong
answer to what I call ‘The US Naval War College Question*’ – “What do you
want the world to look like in ten years and what steps are you going to
take to make it turn out that way?”

* I call it that because it seems to have been a prominent question
offered by NWC moderators in political seminar games in the late 80’s.

And by the way, didn’t Mahan say the DREADNOUGHT was a mistake and the US
should not follow suit? The idea being that individually powerful ships
wre contrary to his thesis? Of course he said this before director
control and the advantages of all big guns combined with the produciton
rates to make dreadnought – style BB’s the new standard.

> > > >———-
> >From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
> >Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
> >To: mahan@microworks.net
> >Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
> >
> > Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
> >the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
> >However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
> >its
> >continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
> >discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
> >it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> > There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
> >a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
> >there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
> >that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
> >crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
> >toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
> >Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
> >publicly acceptable.
> >
> >Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
> >more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
> >about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
> >I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
> >to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
> >they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
> >cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
> >goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
> >more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
> >
> >I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
> >very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
> >the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
> >about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
> >Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
> >of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
> >accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
> >decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
> >not be true!
> >
> >- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> > – Brooks.
> >
> >
> >
>

Mr. Rowlett,

Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
continue to press an argument based on it?

Chris Havern

>———-
>From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
>Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
> Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
>the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
>However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
>its
>continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
>discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
>it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
>a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
>there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
>that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
>crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
>toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
>Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
>publicly acceptable.
>
>Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
>more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
>about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
>I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
>to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
>they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
>cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
>goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
>more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
>
>I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
>very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
>the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
>about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
>Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
>of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
>accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
>decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
>not be true!
>
>- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> – Brooks.
>
>
>

Brooks Rowlett wrote:
SNIP
>>>From that viewpoint, the remarks about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and
Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity. I would suggest, however, that they might
have found it more preferable to publicly declare the nature of the
‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while they didn’t necesarily think they could beat
the Royal Navy, they could cause it so much damage that Britain would
aquiesce to various German
goals….>>>
SNIP

An interesting parallel with one of the IJN concepts 40 years later–make it
so costly that the U.S. would sue for peace on terms favorable to Japan. It
didn’t work then, either, bringing to mind the old saws about those who
ignore history…and the cost of history going up every time it’s repeated.

John Snyder
John_Snyder@bbs.macnexus.org

Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and its
continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
publicly acceptable.

Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.

I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
not be true!

– A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
– Brooks.

Your first point reminds me of the old Anglophobe question, “What is it
about the British that gives them the ‘divine right’ to have the world’s
most powerful navy?”

The second point clarify’s your interpretation. All I can say is that
anyone who swallows Fischer’s socialist polemics needs to do some more
reading on the neutral nature of the “relative balance of power.” Paul
Kennedy’s “The Realities Behind Diplomacy” is a good place to start.

Fischer is an odd choice for you to use anyway, as the main victims of
expansionist wartime (I won’t even bring up Fischer’s retroactive
errors) German war aims were in Eastern Europe, not the British or
French overseas empires.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: rickt@cris.com[SMTP:rickt@cris.com]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 1998 8:53 PM
> To: mahan@microworks.net
> Subject: RE: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
>If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
>difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As
>Hegel reminds us, “quantity changes quality.”
[snip]
>In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
>dismiss the threat as simple paranoia.

In his response Mr. Bergerud engages in argument that I believe is
misguided because it is based on an incomplete knowledge of the latest
scholarship on the subject. The work of Jon Sumida and the
soon-to-be-published work of Nicholas Lambert make clear that the
British, while certainly wary of the burgeoning naval might of Germany,
were not consumed with countering the threat posed by the High Seas
Fleet. If they were obsessed with the Germans, then why build
battlecruisers? The answer is concern with imperial defense and the
countering of guerre de course along with having a vessel that was
capable of serving like a battleship, not because of its armor, but
because of its speed and ability to hit at greater range. This is what
Fisher intended. I make this point, because Mr. Bergerud states that we
cannot view the situation in 1914. I agree. Yet having said that, Mr.
Bergerud fails to have an appreciable sense of what British goals were
in the years of Fisher’s first stint as First Sea Lord. If he had, then
he would know that there were several important factors influencing
British policy that were totally unrelated to German building programs.
These include finance, technological developments, and domestic politics
vis a vis social spending.

Furthermore, his assessment of Tirpitz and Wilhelm II being fools that
essentially got what they deserved is unfortunate because it is not only
a gross generalization and misrepresentation, but it borders on
character assassination. If I may, I’d also like to point out that the
British declared war not because of the actions of the High Seas Fleet,
but because the Imperial Army violated the treaty safeguarding the
territorial integrity of Belgium. And as to the building of a
medium-sized navy to deal with “Russia or France”, it appears that the
treaty obligations of both aforementioned countries would have ensured
that the Germans would have had to have a navy capable of dealing with
both Russia and France. Finally I would like to say that “creating the
impression” that you are a threat, does not necessarily mean that an
actual threat is posed, at least as it is perceived by those who make
policy.

Chris Havern

>If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
>difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As Hegel
>reminds us, “quantity changes quality.” It appeared to the British
>government, and not a few German politicians, that the Germans wished to
>challenge British naval supremecy, not just challenge British interests. Any
>fleet would have been a possible “threat” to the UK, but only the German
>fleet as it appeared to be developing (not as it existed in 1914) could
>possibly have threatened the existence of the British Isles themselves. If
>one combines that with the common belief that the German Army was the
>strongest in Europe, it is simple to understand the powerful inducement for
>the immense change in British policy before WWI. The military symmetry of
>the European balance of power was put completely out of kilter by the
>possibility that one nation would be top dog on both land and sea. (The
>Brits, after all, had never attempted to be a dominant land power. When
>Bismarck quipped he’d have the British Army “arrested” if it landed in
>Pommerania, he wasn’t entirely off the mark.) Building the High Seas Fleet
>to the size and at the speed with which it was constructed was one of the
>biggest blunders in the history of modern politics. Had there been only a
>medium sized German fleet, appropriate to deal with France or Russia, I
>doubt that Britain would have declared war in 1914. Instead, the Germans had
>undoubtedly created the impression that they were a threat to Britain,
>France and Russia. In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
>dismiss the threat as simple paranoia. The Kaiser and Tirpitz were fools and
>their country paid the price.
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930
>
>
>

>Aside from the odd statement that “a North Sea force, [was] a direct and
>unambiguous threat to the United Kingdom,” (as if a trans-Atlantic
>force, like the Russian or French guerre de course cruisers, would be
>less of a threat to British interests?) the decision to make a North Sea
>force was deliberate.
>Timothy L. Francis
>Historian
>Naval Historical Center
>email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
>voice: (202) 433-6802
>
If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As Hegel
reminds us, “quantity changes quality.” It appeared to the British
government, and not a few German politicians, that the Germans wished to
challenge British naval supremecy, not just challenge British interests. Any
fleet would have been a possible “threat” to the UK, but only the German
fleet as it appeared to be developing (not as it existed in 1914) could
possibly have threatened the existence of the British Isles themselves. If
one combines that with the common belief that the German Army was the
strongest in Europe, it is simple to understand the powerful inducement for
the immense change in British policy before WWI. The military symmetry of
the European balance of power was put completely out of kilter by the
possibility that one nation would be top dog on both land and sea. (The
Brits, after all, had never attempted to be a dominant land power. When
Bismarck quipped he’d have the British Army “arrested” if it landed in
Pommerania, he wasn’t entirely off the mark.) Building the High Seas Fleet
to the size and at the speed with which it was constructed was one of the
biggest blunders in the history of modern politics. Had there been only a
medium sized German fleet, appropriate to deal with France or Russia, I
doubt that Britain would have declared war in 1914. Instead, the Germans had
undoubtedly created the impression that they were a threat to Britain,
France and Russia. In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
dismiss the threat as simple paranoia. The Kaiser and Tirpitz were fools and
their country paid the price.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

> My questions: What was it that so limited the German
fleet? (Inadequate
> bunker space … consumable storage … crew limits … ?) Did their
> designs vary so much from other navies? A deliberate design
compromise for
> some reason? A mistake?
>
> If some one has these answers off the top of their head, I
would like to
> hear them. Don’t put any effort into this … just the questions that
> occurred to me (and were not answered) while reading the book.
>
> Bill Riddle
>
Unless my recollection of long ago read Marder are wrong, the German Navy
chose to devote the weight saved to extra armor. At the time, after all,
there really weren’t very many places for a German dreadnaught to travel to,
so they were indeed designed as a North Sea fleet. Its worth pointing out
that naval engineers of that period still looked upon their creations as
temporary commodities. Advances in technology were coming so fast that a BB
was second class by the time it was launched. (Dreadnaught herself was not
suitable for front line action a mere decade after launch.) HMS Victory was
in service for nearly a century. The USS Enterprise may get close. (Wonder
if we will have a Turner to paint the E has she is towed to anchor for the
last time?) However, replacing whole fleets in the years before WWI was
taken for granted, hence, design specialization made a lot more sense that
it did before or since the first century of ironclads. Rich man’s game.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

You thought Nancy Reagan was a bit strange?

See:
http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/980121/wired/stories/charts_1.html

(Story deals with reports of astrological consultation by Russian armed
forces!)

-Brooks

Many thanks to Brooks for his fantastic postings to the list of late. The
Midway class tech history was great, one of the nuclear blast photos from
another posting is now by desktop wallpaper!