The Titanic was not the only ship whose designers and their masters showed
such hubris that was properly rewarded. Two passenger ships were built to
the highest technology of the time to tie the British Empire together.
There were two, one designed and built in a government yard, the other in a
private yard, on the theory that the government’s design would show the
defects of the private enterprise system. Of course, the ships had to be
certified fit, which was done by the same experts who designed the
government’s ship. The private ship made its trials and its
intercontinental trial voyage with little problem, nothing that wasn’t
handled while afloat. The government’s ship, well. Despite all the
publicity that she was technologically advanced, she was enough overweight
that she couldn’t carry the fuel for the intercontinental trip. So they
spliced her in the middle to give additional capacity for fuel, and they
did that job in a hurry so she could carry the Minister in charge, the one
whose career depended on showing she was the better ship, to a conference
in India, accompanied by the chief designers, etc. She didn’t get very far.
Imagine a ship with the linear dimensions of the Titanic being sailed at
full speed through a dark, rainy, gusty storm only twice her length away
from French soil. She ran aground and killed almost all aboard. Peculiarly
enough, the survivors were mostly of the black gang, plus one design
engineer passenger.

The ship was R-101, an airship the size of an ocean liner built to carry
mail and important people around the British Empire in 1929. These ships
displaced only 150 tons (it takes a lot of air to weigh 150 tons). The
private ship was R-100, built of tubes made of spirally-wound and riveted
duralumium. The government ship had H-beam dural girders, or similar.
Vickers had decided that power steering engines were not necessary, but the
government ship had power controls, at some tons extra weight, so it was
said. Anyway, the government ship was overweight and couldn’t carry enough
fuel for the required intercontinental flight. So, after her trials, they
spliced an additional bay into the center to provide enough additional lift
for more fuel. Then they flew her for display purposes, without another
round of proper trials, loaded the Air Minister of the Labour Government
and his cronies and designers, etc., aboard, and set off for India.

They were crossing a range of 1,500 foot hills near the center of France,
flying at a maximum altitude of 3,000 feet. They couldn’t fly higher
because at that altitude the gas bags were fully inflated, so that if they
went higher the safety valves would open and spill the excess gas, so that
then they would have to drop ballast upon returning to normal altitudes,
and they had only so much hydrogen and only so much water ballast to lose
en route. The ballast question was so important that the engines had
condensers on the exhausts to condense the water in the exhaust to
compensate for the weight of the fuel burnt, so they would not have to
valve off hydrogen.

The ship was pitching in the storm, the helmsmen had just taken over the
wheels (one for steering, one for pitch). She got her nose down, the
planesman cranked the elevator hard up to stay away from the ground, and
the structure of the new bay buckled. The flying officers (all of whom
died) ordered the engines stopped, evidently hoping to bring her to ground
safely, but she hit hard and burst into flame. The engineers in the rear
engine cars jumped to the ground and ran, and the one surviving engineering
passenger broke out through the wreckage before the flames got to him.

The subsequent investigation was a whitewash of governmental policy. The
analysis by E. F. Spanner (The Tragedy of R-101) is probably a better
explanation, which I have followed here. Testimony showed that, with the
new bay inserted, the calculated factor of safety for the maximum nose-up
elevator position was only 1.0 with assumed 100% joint efficiency! And, of
course, the airworthiness of airships board who certified her were her
largely her own designers. Talk about hubris!

John Forester 408-734-9426
forester@johnforester.com 726 Madrone Ave
http://www.johnforester.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086-3041

This account appears in the Q&A column of the latest issue of WARSHIP
INTERNATIONAL. While not directly on topic for WWII in terms of the
events described, it deals with the fate of a USN WWII escort carrier
(CVE) and also the going price of F4F Wildcats in 1948…..

The Israeli Aircraft Carrier

Yehuda Arazi, the leading underground arms dealer for the Haganah,
conceived the idea of purchasing a carrier on 5 Dec 47, the day the US
State Dep.t announced an emargo of arms to the Mideast.

The carrier would have its hanger deck filled with armored vehicles and
the like. Fighters would be loaded on the flight deck. It could fly
them off, then come into port, elevate the vehicles to the FD to be
craned off – as much to protect the vessel during unloading as to
deliver them to the IAF.

The ATTU, CVE102, had been bought by Leonard Weisman for $125K from
whoever had earlier bought her from the US Gov. Weisman had established
the Pratt Steamship line already, listed in 1948 Lloyd’s Register as
owners of the ATTU, which was renamed SS FLYING W in tribute to Weisman.

Well, she had her catapults’ and arresting gear already removed for
demilitarization law conformance…but there is indication that they
were gonna acquire a cat’ out of scrap, to be installed overseas.

Pratt was to bid on a contract to ship locomotives to Turkey in ’48 as
part of the Truman doctrine. This was the rationale/cover for purchase
of the ship. In fact, after delivery of the train engines, the vessel
was to pick up its military cargo in France or Italy. An (unknown) DC
naval architect firm had done plans for the conversion – but there was
not enough domestic US steel available affordably for the conversion,
so there were delays. Then accidental exposure of Haganah munitions
smuggling involving explosives Weisman had legitiemately bought from
the US Army led to fear of an investigation of his role with the ATTU/
FLYING W, so he suspended all work and stopped paying bills.

Weisman never informed the Sonneborn Institute, the Haganah’s front for
the acquisition fo the vessel, and Arazi’s employer, and they assumed
all was well. On 19 Mar ’48 ten of the contractors performing work
filed liens totalling $48,595.02 against Weisman and the Pratt Steamship
Line.

After a complicated series of events, with the liens settled at $0.88
per dollar claimed, with the ship being removed from the pier at Norfolk
Army Base to an anchorage off Sewell’s Point to save $150/day fee,
Weisman’s attorney W.E. Kyle filed a lien aganst the vessel for his
attorney fee! The Sonneborn Inst. dispatched their trouble shooter Al
Robinson to Norfolk to pay Kyle’s bill. He reported there was no hope
of getting the ship out of the US. But as a member of the Sonn. Inst.,
who owned a scrap metal business in Baltimore, he took over the ship
and held it for over 90 days in the hope that some use could be found.
Nothing came up; she was scrapped by an unknown breaker in Boston in
’48-’49. The Sonneborn Inst. got about $50k for scrap sale, but this
did not cover legal fees, etc. How much of the original $125K if any
was bourn from the Institute and how much from Weisman’s personal $$ is
not stated in the ref. (Slater, THE PLEDGE is the only info given).

Also of interest – Weisman suggested buying Grumman Wildcats from the
War Assets Admin – at $300 each, their going price. Yes, $ three
hundred, period. No books on the ’48 Arab-Israeli War indicate any
attempt of the Haganah or agents or Israeli citizens to buy any
carrier-type aircraft from anybody anywhere.

The material in the magazien is a composite of info supplied by
Alvin H Grobmeier, CDR USN (Ret)
Guy C Hofschneider, and
George R Schneider.

– Brooks A Rowlett

I today received the latest issue of WARSHIP INTERNATIONAL, one of the
top three magazines in the world for naval vessel enthusiasts. There
was a slip enclosed, announcing that the International Naval Research
Organization (publishers of WI) now have a web site.

The URL:

http://www.primenet.com/~inro

Membership Info, and some articles are already on line with more
planned:

Warship International – Popular Articles already online:

No. 1, 1994: “Loss of H.M.S. Glorious”
No. 3, 1990: “German Prinz Eugen”

The following articles are in the process of being converted to
electronic format and will appear here
in the future.

No. 2, 1993: “Bismarck’s Final Battle”
No. 2, 1993: “Soviet Sovetskii Souiz Class Battleships”
No. 2, 1990: “The Ring of Truth – USS Iowa”
No. 1, 1986: “Loss of H.M.S. Repulse and Prince of Wales”
No. 2, 1987: “Loss of H.M.S. Hood”
No. 3, 1983: “Development of ‘A’ Class Cruisers in the Imperial
Japanese Navy”, Part VI
No. 3, 1984: “Development of ‘A’ Class Cruisers in the Imperial
Japanese Navy”, Part VII

Several photos are also already on line.

There is much growth yet to happen, but this is an important and long
awaited naval site. Also, they seem to be on a very slow server, so
patience is required when accessing this site.

-Brooks A Rowlett

>>. . . .records indicate that anthracite, not bituminous coal was stored in
the bunker adjacent to the reserve six-inch magazine. BTW, Wagner points out
that bituminous coal is NOT subject to spontaneous combustion but anthracite
coal IS.<< I need to correct my post from a few days ago. I reveresed the types of coal in these lines. Bituminous coal IS subject to spontaneous combustion and was stored next to the MAINE's magazine. An 1898 U.S. Navy study stated that there had never been a report of spontaneous combustion in anthracite coal. Mark Hayes Naval Historical Center

TMOliver wrote:

> [snip]As for the turning/taking the berg head on/turning the other
way debate,
> the legions of Monday Morning quarterbacks who participate have likely
> never had the personal experience of imminent/certain collision staring
> them in the face (especially at the conn of a large vessels at any
> speed). The conning officer and Captain folllowed the only viable
> couse, to turn away from danger as rapidly as possible, and almost
> succeeded, given the minimal nature of the damage sustained.
> Unfortunately, even “minimal damage area” is too much when it allows the
> flooding of one too many compartments in a vessel without longitudinal
> bulkheads or watertight bulheads extending up to the main deck.
>
> Would you have had the capacity to evaluate risk allowing you to hold
> course for a head on collision with a berg, insuring major damage and
> giving up any hope of avoiding collision/
>
> Would you have had the courage/foolhardiness to attempt to turn toward,
> an absolutely foolish choice insuring the likelihood of the worst
> possible damage, a broadside midhips blow at the ship’s most vulnerable
> pointm the fire and engine rooms?
> —

I would have to agree that turning directly toward an object is
highly unlikely for
any conning officer. However, there were other things that the
conning officer on
the Titanic could have done. The first order given, All Back Full,
did nothing to
aid the ship and certainly reduced the ship’s maneuverability. The
reciprocating
engines probably hadn’t even started to reverse by the time the ship
hit but there
was a corresponding reduction in wash over an already inadequate
rudder. I have
also read that the center screw was not capable of reversing, just
stopping which
would have deflected water away from the rudder. While the ship was making in
excess of 20 knots, direct wash from the screws to the rudder is
always the most
effective.

Mark Perry

I believe it was a *French* sub used in “Crimson Tide”‘s footage —
our Navy apparently not wanting to associate itself with some of
the attitudes depicted — so that might be why there are
“discrepancies” of one kind or another.

Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

>
>In total agreement here. Too much egalitarian “presentism” in that area
>of the film, a problem found not just in movies but in Americanist
>scholarship as well.
>
>Timothy L. Francis

I agree with Tim on the broader historical issues. However….it might be
worth pointing out that in 1912 Britain, France and Germany were having
wicked class conflict over the type of gross social distinctions Cameron
tried to depict. (They were – in fact – beginning to die out in this period.
But that was certainly not clear at the time because WWI had much to do with
it.) Making the 1st class types on the Titanic into the bad guys is not
such bad history – and a lot of people alive in 1912 would have been the
first to agree.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Being only an Army brat and not having served myself (unless you count
being a cadet LtC in the Civil Air Patrol) I was watching _Crimson Tide_
last night and found it a little strange that:

1. Torpedos were protrayed as being so ineffective and
2. I can not beleive the a missle boat would only have one VLF Radio for
communicating back to HQ and that the radioman had to breakout the solder
iron to fix it.

Dave R.
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>While the current
>_Titanic_ is well researched and fundfed at a level to allow the
>research to be converted into accurate details, it’s “social message”
is
>a bit blatant and overdone.
>–
>TMOliver AKA El Pelon Sinverguenza

In total agreement here. Too much egalitarian “presentism” in that area
of the film, a problem found not just in movies but in Americanist
scholarship as well.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> I think it’s the other way round – confusion typically resulted in higher
> losses.

That would mean that confusion was first (egg and hen thing, kinda), but it
usually wasn’t: at Tassafaronga, everything was quite okay until torpedoes
struck home; at First Guadalcanal (or third Savo…), the Allied formation was
also pretty much intact until losses from gunfire and torpedoes struck the
column and forced ships out of the line. At Cape Esperance, the confusion did
not create losses (Except for Duncan. She may be counted as a victim of
confusion, but less of Scott’s than of her own skipper’s.). At Savo,
the forces
were pretty much intact until Mikawa struck, and a Second Guadalcanal, Lee’s
line not only was intact until battle but indeed performed admirably well.

> And those Allied admirals who were aware of that problem tried to keep a
> tight
> rein (e.g., tying the destroyers to the cruisers, holding fire to have more
> time sorting out enemies and friends) whose inflexibility could also
> ultimately
> result in higher losses than on the Japanese side, but did prevent
piecemeal
> destruction.
>
> On the Japanese side, even in those cases where they were surprised (Cape
> Esperance, Tassafaronga), their doctrine and experience resulted in a
> coherent
> reaction and retreat, combined with a response that ranged from
reasonably to
> outstandingly effective. All the accounts that mention
communications agree
> that during the hot periods of many of these battles, TBS (Talk Between
> Ships)
> radio on the US side was virtually useless due to everybody
talking at once.
> If that’s not confusion…

Cape Esperance certainly was an example for good conduct durig a night battle,
but nevertheless, cohesion within the force was lost and Admiral Goto could as
well have remained at home, for he was unable to decide what to do.
The actions
of his vessels were the responsibilities of each individual officer, much like
at Guadalcanal 1, and Savo Island.

> It should be noted though that Abe had spent the previous seven (twelve?)
> hours moving blindly under the squall that covered his approach to
> Guadalcanal. Hara seems to rate the precision of the Japanese
> maneuvering during that time quite highly, even though the van destroyers
> slipped out of position. There is no doubt though that the First Battle
> of Guadalcanal was the one where both sides were confused. (But then,
> the Japanese had the additional disadvantage of their two big ships not
> being ready for a naval engagement.) In the Second Battle of Guadalcanal,
> the US task force was so small and the fighting power so concentrated that
> cohesion arguably played a smaller role there. Virtually all of the damage
> done to the Japanese in that battle was due to a single ship. Admiral Lee
> certainly does not come across as confused. 🙂

He certainly does not. His performance was probably the best of any Admiral
during the campaign, together with Mikawa’s at Savo.
I’m still unsure about Tanaka at Tassafaronga, partially because I do no know
what IJN doctrine said. Said simply, all Tanaka did was order a
torpedo attack.
The devastating effect was due to Captain Sato’s brilliant conduct.
I’ve ordered
Crenshaw’s Battle of Tassafaronga lately, I hope he will clear some of the
questions I have.
On Abe and Hara, quite right, I forgot (shortly…) why Abe’s
formation was out
of order.

Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
—————————————————————–
The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
http://www.microworks.net/pacific
Last Updated: 7th February 1998
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