Archive for January, 2009

A&E

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed May 28 19:40:18 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 21:40:07 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: A&E
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Just saw a promo tonight for a special entitled “Sea Tails” to be shown
>Sunday night on A&E at 8 p.m. Eastern time.
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

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USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 29 14:16:14 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 16:09:42 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney” ,
> “William D. Anderson” , kerneks@ccmail.wiu.edu
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>But WHY was LIBERTY attacked?
>
>Possibilities: (?)
>
>1. Mistaken identity.
> Unlikely, from what we know from the crew. It seems to have been
> a thoroughly planned, premeditated air-sea massacre.
>
>2. Staged incident, to “frame” Egyptians.
> … rather like the “Polish attack” on the German Army on 1Sep39
> … or the “Finnish attack” on Soviet forces later that year?
>
> Weren’t the Israeli aircraft and boats clearly marked? Didn’t
> the Israelis know there would be other U.S. vessels in the area?
> Regardless of the markings, wouldn’t the Israelis know that trained
> intelligence people would readily identify them anyway? … if any
> survived, of course. I personally don’t think the Israelis are so
> inhumane — or *stupid* — as to attempt such a ghastly stunt.
>
>3. Reprisal for American injury to Israeli war effort?
>
> Did the Israelis think the Americans were “leaking” the intelligence
> we were gathering? Were we trying to restrain Israeli advances, and
> this was their way to msg “butt out”?
>
> Other things to consider: A number of French, Israeli, Soviet, and
> American subs began “not returning” at some time about then. Was there
> some relation?
>
> Moshe Dayan — Israeli Defence Minister — did penance for the attack
> by touring Vietnam and generally endorsing the Johnson Administration’s
> (incompetent) prosecution of the war … apparently.
>
>Fascinating. 🙂
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

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USS Amberjack & USS Liberty … FYI, MilHst-L, MarHst-L, ConSim-L (fwd)

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 29 11:53:00 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 13:52:04 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty … FYI, MilHst-L, >MarHst-L, ConSim-L (fwd)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>
>———- Forwarded message ———-
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 13:43:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>To: milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu, marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca,
> consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.net
>Cc: “Louis R. Coatney” ,
> “William D. Anderson” , kerneks@ccmail.wiu.edu
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty … FYI, MilHst-L, MarHst-L, ConSim-L
>
>
>Pat Hughes, the MilHst-L moderator, has told us he doesn’t want us
> talking about the Israeli massacre of the USS LIBERTY in 1967. As
> I remember, Pat is concerned there may still be security restrictions
> on the discussion of the incident. (And risks of legal prosecution?
> … loss of *pension*? … loss of academic access to agencies?)
>
>Someone has just posted an excellent article on the
> mahan@microwrks.net list. There have been some new
> developments in the case. And the coverup described rivals
> anything I found in the wartime gagging about the Katyn
> Massacre.
>
>So I would refer anyone interested in the LIBERTY to Mahan.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

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USS Liberty: draft article

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 30 10:02:57 1997
>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:02:59 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Reply-To: mike.potter@artecon.com
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: USS Liberty: draft article
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Last year I contacted a pro-Israeli partisan who supposedly could
>discuss USS =Liberty= (AGTR 5). He provided no information and assailed
>me personally as anti-Semitic for raising the issue. (I have,
>incidentally, a Jewish relative by marriage who perished in the
>Holocaust, probably at Auschwitz-Birkenau; his daughter is my aunt.) Try
>it: e-mail your questions to Prof Alan Stein at the University of
>Connecticut, stein@math.uconn.edu. His apparently publicly-funded web
>site, http://www.math.uconn.edu/~stein, also calls (or did last year)
>Jim Ennes an anti-Semite. I thought scholars were supposed to be
>open-minded. Anyway, this situation could explain why list masters might
>discourage discussion of the =Liberty= incident.
>
>Any Mahan List comments on this draft article? It needs style work but
>is the line of argument reasonable:
>
>In analyzing the =Liberty= incident from the Israeli angle, it is useful
>to distinguish intelligence collection and analysis (G2) from combat
>operations (G3). A major difficulty with Israel’s mistaken-identity
>excuse is that, if it were true, then the problem was simply a common G2
>failure. Israel then would have no reason to cover up why G3 operators,
>or more likely their boss, Moshe Dayan, ordered the sequential,
>multi-service attacks on the =Liberty=. Since Israel did and still does
>cover up their 1967 reasoning, the mistaken-identity excuse is at best
>inadequate.
>
>In =Assault on the Liberty= Jim Ennes hypothesized that Israel attempted
>to “dispatch” her so that she could not discover the plan to take the
>Golan Heights. Since communications interception is passive, Israel
>could be sure that =Liberty= was deaf only after her antennas were
>submerged. But Israeli forces ended their attack before that point.
>Either (a) after initial misjudgment, Dayan changed his mind in
>mid-stream about the need to dispatch =Liberty=; or (b) someone of great
>personal or political authority, perhaps his boss, prime minister Levi
>Eshkol, interceded to stop him.
>
>In either case, why cover it up today? Israel no longer asserts (if it
>ever did) that it seized the Golan Heights as an immediate defensive
>operation in 1967. And why is the U.S. Government still reluctant to
>investigate the attack?
>
>Israel must be protecting something extremely vital to it today. I
>suggest it is Israel’s nuclear strategy. In 1967 Israel was already
>building nuclear weapons, partially for deterrence and partially as
>weapons to punish the world should Israel face imminent destruction.
>This is what Seymour Hersch in his book of the title calls “the Sampson
>option:” punish the world by nuclear terror. Since it remains Israel’s
>current strategy, Israel has a vital interest in concealing its
>strategic decision process – especially since the strategy is deluded
>and operationally severely flawed. The fact that it is a long-standing
>strategy does not make it wise, tenable, or realistic.
>
>I suggest that Dayan in 1967 was not a calm hero but a panicky
>defeatist, and that the =Liberty= was the first pillar that he tried to
>pull down under a then pre-nuclear Sampson option. Probably Israel did
>not then have usable nuclear weapons so he used the weapons at hand
>against the first target within range. Dayan’s initiation of the
>national doomsday strategy obviously would be politically significant.
>Either he came to his senses or Eshkol, or someone, found out about it
>and stopped it. Dayan panicked again in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. =Time=
>magazine reported that during that war Israel assembled ten nuclear
>bombs for retaliatory (not tactical) use. A corollary could be that
>Dayan usurped or already had control of these weapons, a significant
>flaw in political control.
>
>Why the US role in the cover-up of the =Liberty= incident?
>
>Initially: probably because McNamara and Johnson regarded 34 dead as
>trivial and the risk from intervening as high. In a similar incident,
>early in 1968 they forbade rescue of a US Navy A-7 pilot who ditched off
>China’s Hainan island after his aircraft was hit by North Vietnamese
>AAA. His widow obtained the NSC transcript of the decision, confronted
>McNamara with it, and asked him to apologize. He sarcastically refused
>and implied she was lying. (Their meeting was recorded and broadcast on
>NPR’s Christian Science Monitor Radio program in November 1995.) To
>Johnson and McNamara US military casualties were unimportant compared to
>diplomatic inconvenience.
>
>After 1967: probably because the USA has been stupidly stuck to Israeli
>foreign policy and has chosen to protect Israel’s nuclear program. The
>USA long pretended that Israel had no nuclear weapons but blithely gave
>Israel huge amounts of satellite reconnaissance photos that Israel could
>use for targeting purposes. Israel has armed itself with US-built
>weapons, including the new Sa’ar-V corvettes, whose only combat
>capability is long-range attack. Many Israeli fighters, including all
>their F4 Phantom jets right from the first delivery, have no air-to-air
>capability and are fitted purely as long-range bombers.
>
>Today: For many politicians, exploring the =Liberty= incident would
>jeopardize contributions from bipartisan pro-Israel lobbyists. By 1994
>even Newt Gingrich adopted the 1984 Democrats’ plank of moving the US
>embassy to Jerusalem. Hearings would bring the USA face to face with
>Israel’s still-current Sampson-option strategy. Hearings might show that
>Israel’s political leaders have weak authority over its nuclear arsenal;
>that their low-level nuclear weapons custodians might respond to a
>lunatic, as Moshe Dayan could have become under pressure; and that high
>Israeli officials have made deluded errors in judging their strategic
>situation, errors that proved catastrophic for the =Liberty=.
>
>–

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 30 08:57:42 1997
>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:59:35 -0700
>From: TMO/TX
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/OAssoc
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>CC: “Louis R. Coatney”
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Louis R. Coatney wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 29 May 1997, Bill Riddle wrote:
> > > The best hypothesis I have seen is in Jim Ennes’ book. He > has a time
> > > line that puts Liberty’s arrival in context with IDF operations.
> > >
> > > Specifically the Golan Heights campaign which was actually > delayed for
> > > 24 hours, until AFTER Liberty was not available to monitor > events. He
> > > quotes LBJ’s book in which LBJ states that he told the Israeli
> > > ambassador that the US would stand with Israel ONLY if > Israel did not
> > > initiate hostilities. As the IDF was in fact going to occupy the
> > > Golan without waiting for a Syrian event to which they could react,
> > > Ennes’ assertion is that Israel did not want Liberty to provide LBJ
> > > with the evidence.
> >
> > I think I can remember this suggestion, from times past, but it
> > is literally crazy to think that an attack on an American ship
> > would somehow avert American protest/disapproval of an Israeli
> > attack on the heights. Could anyone be so tactically tunnel-
> > visioned (politically)? Is anyone suggesting Dayan was …
> > irrational?
> >
> > There *must* be something else.
> >
>Speaking privately (Ha!) and not for attribution (as if it mattered),
>I’ve always suspected that at some levels of Israeli political
>leadership/military command, there was (and likely still is) some
>perception/blief/suspicion that the US was actively passing INTEL to
>Arab states (the “Counterbalance” theory, the US as inheritors of 19th
>British hegemony playing the “Great Game”).
>
>Given his combative nature and his “position”, Dayan certainly seems a
>likely candidate as an advocate of that position, with an Israeli
>scenario of the Liberty passing real time info to Washington/Maryland?
>where it was piped to “Arabist” State Dept. officials who passed it on.
>
>The concept of “perception” requires assigning to the involved Israelis
>either hard INTEL confirming the scenario or, in my mind more likely, an
>not unreasonable level of “paranoia”. After all, in Israel more than
>anywhere else, there were politicians, military commanders and a
>populace who had recent reason to be somewhat distrustful of the designs
>and motives of the great powers.
>
>Did the scenario represent reality?
>
>I doubt it, not believing that the data which the Libery could rapidly
>pass back to the US could be so quickly pipelined to the “Arabists” (who
>certainly may have existed) and fed to Damascus/Cairo/Amman/etc.
>
>Why?
>
>I’m not sure that our communications capacity (even among the cloak and
>dagger set/BJs/etc.) was that good.
>
>I suspect that most of what Liberty collected was tactical junk,
>examples of our concentration on volume with the hope of panning a few
>grains of gold from a tub full of sand. Sure, there may have been some
>pearls, but it takes better evaluators than most of the Navy types I
>knew to quickly recognize pearls (and even then the pearls may be the
>sort to use for predictions of future methods and activities).
>
>I’m relatively sure that, given the Washington of the time, that the
>Liberty’s sort of INTEL data could be chewed, digested and communicated.
> either accurately or quickly enough to make the scenario operative.
>
>Dealing with a Washington in which paper and ideas move at a snail’s
>pace (as I do), the idea that info could move from NSA to the Executive
>Branch National Security structure to State to the legendary “Arabists”
>quickly enough to alter the course of events in the ME seems unlikely.
>
>What self-respecting Arab leader would have treated INTEL received by
>such a pipeline as credible without a bunch of corroboration? The stuff
>would have literally smelled of disinformation.
>
>But reality is not the cause of events, pereception is (especially the
>perceptions of those able to dispatch combat units). Mutual suspicion
>forms the keel of international relations (and rightly so).
>–
>Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> “Quid consilium cepit…”

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Internet

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 30 20:01:09 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 22:00:43 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Internet
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Yes, this is off topic. Forgive me, but you really ought to read this
>article…
>
>Do you think the Internet is a secure place to trust other folks with your
>credit card numbers, phone numbers, even your real name?
>
>Pick up the June 2 issue of U.S. NEWS and World Report, and read the
>article entitled “Cracker”, beginning on page 56.
>
>Prepare to be stunned.
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Purpose
The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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