Archive for the ‘1997’ Category

Another River Kwai kwiz

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Sep 22 12:34:16 1997
>Date: Mon, 22 Sep 1997 12:33:12 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Re: Another River Kwai kwiz
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>I must plead that I recalled the edition date from memory. What
>interested me was that JANE’s accurately described the loss of USS
>=Houston= in an edition clearly published before the war ended. It was
>an original edition, not a reprint, in the University of Michigan
>Engineering Library. If the 1943 edition appeared late in 1944, I might
>have recalled the 1943 edition. But 1944 sticks in my mind as the
>edition.
>
>It appears to me that JANE’s shifted to the 2-year date citation because
>the annuals appeared well into the subsequent year. If the 1944 edition
>appeared similarly late in 1945, then VJ Day could well have occurred
>before press time.
>
>
>Brooks A Rowlett wrote:
> >
> > On the question of the 1944 JANE’s and knowledge of HOUSTON’s exact
> > fate.
> >
> > I have the reprint of the >1944-45> > Jane’s. Is that exactly correct? A 1944 one as distinct from a
> > 1944-45 one? Is 44-45 the volume Jane’s started doing them by the
> > 44-45, 45-46, 46-47….95-96, 96-97, etc. scheme that still applies?
> >
> > That makes a difference, you see, because the collective information
> > in the 1944-45 Jane’s makes it obvious that it was not in fact
> > published until after VJ day. But if there was a 1944 one before the
> > 1944-45 one, then Mike’s question, and Peter Sinfield’s suggested
> > answer, apply.
> >
> > -Brooks A Rowlett
> > brooksar@indy.net

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Iraq wants planes back from Iran (Reuter)

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Sep 22 11:46:34 1997
>Date: Mon, 22 Sep 1997 11:45:45 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Iraq wants planes back from Iran (Reuter)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Iraq wants planes back from Iran
>________________________________
>Copyright © 1997 Nando.net
>Copyright © 1997 Reuter Information Service
>
>UNITED NATIONS (September 22, 1997 1:09 p.m. EDT) – Iraq has asked the
>United Nations to help secure the return of more than 140 Iraqi aircraft
>flown to Iran for safekeeping during the Persian Gulf war, saying Iran
>was now making use of the planes.
>
>In a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan circulated Monday, Iraqi
>Foreign Minister Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf protested “in the strongest
>terms against the use made by the Iranian government of property that
>does not belong to it.”
>
>”The Iranian authorities have repainted the 115 military aircraft and
>integrated them into Iranian air force formations, and the 27 Iraqi
>civil transport aircraft have been distributed to the Iranian civil
>aviation company and the transport command of the Iranian air force for
>use in internal transport operations,” he said.
>
>Al-Sahaf did not specifically refer to the circumstances in which the
>planes were flown to Iran to safeguard them from attack by the United
>States-led Gulf War coalition, but he said they had been “entrusted” to
>Iran, with its agreement, in 1991.
>
>He called Iran’s action in using the planes for its own purposes a
>”grave breach of the most elementary principles and norms of
>international law.”
>
>Iraq reserved the right to claim restitution for any damage to the
>aircraft, he said.
>
> -= END OF MESSAGE =-

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Another River Kwai kwiz

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Sep 22 13:05:20 1997
>Date: Mon, 22 Sep 97 15:50:07 EDT
>From: Gordon Hogg
>Subject: Re: Another River Kwai kwiz
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>X-Mailer: MailBook 96.02.327
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>I just raided the stacks here for the 46th, 47th, and 48th volumes of _Jane’s
>Fighting Ships_, which show, respectively, the following years on >the spine and
>title page: 1942, 1943-4, and 1944-5. On the 1942 title page in parentheses
>are the words “issued June, 1943”; on that of 1943-4 I find >”corrected to July,
>1944″, and 1944-5 shows “corrected to April, 1945.”
>
>The publishers’ foreword in the 1943-4, the first double-year issue, makes no
>mention of the change, crowing instead over the unprecedented number of addi-
>tional photographs included. What the heck.
> Gordon Hogg
>
>Gordon E. Hogg
>Special Collections and Archives
>University of Kentucky Libraries
>Lexington, KY 40506-0039
>606-257-9421

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Modeling (naval) history on computer.

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Sep 22 13:01:43 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom6.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Mon, 22 Sep 1997 15:00:10 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom6.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca,
> milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu, wwii-l@ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu
>Subject: Re: Modeling (naval) history on computer.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>
>Mahan, Marhst-L, Milhst-L, WWII-L,
> I don’t know if we should *pursue* this thread at all. However,
>I thought you might be interested in David Ferris’s depthy description
>of all the thinking that goes into creating a naval history games
>system … for miniature ships, in this case … for/on a computer.
>(His follows my comments.) David is the leader in this hobby field.
>(He also works with a Barne Strousdrup(sp?) who authored C++ ?? )
> Simulations are models … but of historical *events*, rather
>than the *physical* structure of the equipment/ships, themselves.
> Again, such gaming has done much to popularize (military and
>naval) history … to everyone’s benefit.
>
>Lou
> Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
>———- Forwarded message ———-
>Date: Mon, 22 Sep 1997 14:27:21 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>To: Conflict simulation Games
>Subject: Re: “Naval Action” UI( user interface)s
>
>Dave,
> Thanks for your thorough description of all the variables/input
>you include in SHIPBASE 3. Impressive. 🙂
> Computerized/Pascal “Naval Action” is *much* simpler … and it would
>probably be simpler for you to see it when I am finished than for me
>to try to describe it to you, here.
> I won’t be encrypting the code/programming, I don’t think.
> I would like people to be able to see for themselves how the
>program works … and be able to critique/modify it for their own
>personal use. … and Pascal *is* educational/readily readable in
>that respect. (If you remember, one of the criticisms of any computer
>game, generally, is that it’s just a “black box” whose variables
>cannot be seen/understood like a manual game’s.)
> Again, thanks for sharing all the thought that you have put in
>SHIPBASE 3.
>Lou
> Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
>On Mon, 22 Sep 1997, David Ferris wrote:
> > From: David Ferris
> > To: Multiple recipients of list CONSIM-L
> > Newsgroups: bit.listserv.consim-l
> >
> > Lou Coatney on his Pascal program to do computer-assist naval:
> >
> > > There are really only 3 inputs/outputs … excepting
> > > torpedoes: Speed changes, target allocation, and whether or not
> > > the shell hit … and I’m not explaining that one, until I’ve
> > > finished the program. 🙂
> >
> > Okay, you lost me completely.
> > Based on this paragraph from your previous message:
> >
> > > Hmm … Even with a 286, 10 outcomes a minute should be easy. Does
> > > SB3 input gunfire/torpedo allocations and resolve/output them
> > > one-at-a -time??
> >
> > I’m making the assumption (which might be completely incorrect) that you
> > have your program resolving gunnery one turret (or one gun) at a time.
> > SB3 is designed to do fleet actions (up to 300 ships per scenario, plus
> > up to 300 squadrons of aircraft each of which can have up to 200
> > airplanes etc. etc. etc.) so I have it resolve combat one ship at a
> > time, not one turret (or gun) at a time. You select the firing ship from
> > a menu that lists all the ships in the scenario, then you select the
> > target ship from the same menu. (This scrolling menu is where the older
> > 8088, 8086, and 80286 machines bog down with larger scenarios; they do
> > okay with 20 or 30 ships or so, but the 80+ ship scenarios like Jutland
> > take a long time to scroll on anything older than a 286/8.) Then you get
> > a parameter screen where you input the range (in inches), number of guns
> > firing from the primary/secondary/tertiary batteriesm, type of ammo,
> > smoke, target attitude, whether or not your gown is too tight for you to
> > walk up the stairs at the award ceremony (ooops, wrong e-mail) and all
> > that. Most of the time the settings for smoke/ammo/gown/etc. are the
> > same as the last target and default to the correct check boxes, so most
> > of the time all you have to do is enter the range and hit the fire
> > button. The program rolls for each shell fired and tells you the
> > results: number of hits, hit location, duds, amount of damage done, and
> > critical hits.
> >
> > If you’re resolving gunnery by turret (or by gun barrel) that’s fine,
> > but you shouldn’t expect to be doing large fleet actions if that’s your
> > scope. If you’re doing fleet actions, each player represents an admiral
> > in charge of a formation of ships. If you’re resolving by turret, each
> > player is doing the role of a gunnery officer. Different points of view
> > that IMO don’t work well when done simultaneously in large fleet games,
> > but some folks do play it that way.
> >
> > Either way, I assume you’re using arrays in your record structure.
> > Single dimension arrays are best if you’re trying to save memory, 2- or
> > even 3-dimension arrays are fine if you’re comfortable using them. (I
> > don’t recall if Pascal lets you use 3-d arrays. Never mind.) At any
> > rate, you should be indexing your data structure by ships (the Bismarck
> > is ship #1, the battleship formally known as Prince is #2, the Hood is
> > #3…) so the program can keep track of your ship data. You should have
> > record fields for the important stuff like number and type of guns,
> > amount of ammo, armour thicknesses. If you want to get fancy you can get
> > into turret configuration and clever armour layout info. Also make
> > yourself a field (or better yet, several fields) to keep track of which
> > target the firing ship shot at last. This serves at least two purposes:
> > the program then knows who to default to as your next target (saving you
> > lots of keystrokes) and it then automatically knows whether or not you
> > get the bonus for training your guns on the same target.
> >
> > You want your UI to do as much of the work for you as possible. Typing
> > is bad. If you have to type in ship names (or worse yet, ID codes) every
> > time you do a combat, the UI needs work. Menus are good. Check boxes are
> > good. Hot keys are good, just make sure you put a message somewhere on
> > the screen (as opposed to hidden deep in the instruction book that
> > nobody is going to read) what they are and what they do. Mousing is best
> > (sorry, you few surviving mouse haters out there.) If you can get the UI
> > to the point where you can process entire combats with just a few mouse
> > clicks, that’s very good. We almost got there with the current version
> > of SB3; you still have to type in the range, unless it’s the same range
> > as the previous combat, otherwise you can get all the way through with
> > just a few mouse clicks and some scrolling.
> >
> > If you intend for other people to use your program, reading the
> > instruction manual should not be required. (“Idiot-proofing”, or as we
> > called it in the military, “soldier-proofing”.) I evaluate software
> > packages as part of my “real” job. If I can’t figure out how to use a
> > program just by playing around with the menus, the package goes
> > instantly into the circular file. (By “figure out” I don’t mean being
> > able to understand every subtle nuance and knowing how to use every
> > single function, I mean I should be able to get a feel of what the
> > program does and get some rudimentary functionality out of it just by
> > poking around the screens and menus.) Having to type in ID codes or
> > arcane commands (especially if they’re not documented on the screen) is
> > fine for your personal use, but you’ll be hard pressed to find many
> > other people who are willing to use the program, no matter how powerful
> > and spiffy the underlying code is. As I said, the UI will make or break
> > the project. When I take a look at a new program and the first thing it
> > does is blank the screen and ask a single question: “ENTER SHIP NUMBER?”
> > it goes right into the recycling bin. Usually the programmer’s response
> > to this is “But you have to read the (100K+) documentation file before
> > you can run the program!” This is acceptable to some people, but my
> > response is usually either to go play Mechwarrior or to give a long
> > boring lecture on software interface design.
> >
> > Having said all that (at great length, mind you) there’s no “correct”
> > way to go about this, since in the final evaluation this is hobby stuff
> > we’re talking about. Following the old coders’ credo that any method
> > that delivers good results is a “good” method (they way the REAL gurus
> > work, not the way it’s taught in programming classes), whatever approach
> > works for you is the “right” one. At the moment, there’s a guy in
> > England who has his freebie “Salvo” computer-assist program up on the
> > web (I think he used Pascal too, judging from the look of his screens),
> > the guy in Phoenix who is giving away his naval program for CP/M and
> > DOS, and the small companies who sell computer-assist wargame sets in
> > the UK and Australia. Not to mention all the hobbyists who wrote their
> > own programs just for their personal use; somewhere I still have a copy
> > of Andy Eisenberg’s old Apple II rendition of Sea Power. (Seekrieg? One
> > of them.) Each of the ones I’ve seen took a completely different
> > approach, and each did what the author wanted them to do, so I can’t say
> > that any approach is more valid than another, other than to reiterate
> > the lesson that the amount of acceptance the program receives will be
> > directly related to the quality of the UI.
> >
> > DLF
> > dferris@research.att.com
>
>I should mention that Dave has a webpage devoted to SHIPBASE 3 which
> he usually lists at the end of his msgs.

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GREAT military/naval link webpage!

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Tue Sep 23 05:09:51 1997
>Date: Tue, 23 Sep 97 07:10:05 CDT
>X-Sender: ncms1@navtap-emh.navtap.navy.mil
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>From: “Mark Hayes (Navy Historical Center)”
>Subject: Re: GREAT military/naval link webpage!
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>The home page address of the Naval Historical Center is:
>http://www.history.navy.mil
>
>As of yet, we are not answering inquiries online. I recommend that you
>write, directing your W.W.II questions to the Navy Department Library at the
>Center. You may get an answer from our Operational Archives Branch, but
>they have sent their W.W.II records to the National Archives.
>
>Mark Hayes
>Naval Historical Center
>Early History Branch (pre-20th Century stuff)
>Washington, D.C.
>ncms1@navtap.navy.mil

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The Majestic Revolution

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Tue Sep 23 05:57:57 1997
>Date: Tue, 23 Sep 97 07:58:35 CDT
>X-Sender: ncms1@navtap-emh.navtap.navy.mil
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16)
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: “Mark Hayes (Navy Historical Center)”
>Subject: Re: The Majestic Revolution
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>At 12:25 PM 9/17/97 -0700, Mike Potter wrote:
>
> >In HMS Majestic (entered service at end of 1895), the RN took advantage
> >of barbette height to increase hull freeboard and produced the first
> >battleships that could fight on the high seas. A very interesting pair
> >of articles in _Warship vol VII_ (USNI, about 1985) describes how HMS
> >=Majestic= created a “pre-Dreadnought revolution”:
> >
> >Previous warships, which the articles’ author types as armor-clads, had
> >an effective fighting range of about 2000 yards or less. In the 1890s
> >the RN applied technological advances in hydraulics, propellants,
> >metallurgy, and optics in the =Majestic= class. With better guns and
> >armor from these advances and their better seakeeping, the =Majestic=
> >class had an effective fighting range of about 7000 yards.
> >
> >Pre-dreadnoughts were the dominant ship type roughly from 1898 until
> >1911. The articles identify all the pre-dreadnoughts, as distinct to
> >armorclads. The first US pre-dreadnought was USS Maine (not the one that
> >blew up in Havana, the next one). Tsushima Strait featured a massacre of
> >Russian ironclads (and some pre-dreadnoughts) by a few Japanese
> >pre-dreadnoughts, a big contrast from the all-armorclad battle at
> >Santiago in 1898 where shellfire hits were few and damage minor.
> >
> >The first RN dreadnoughts were built to fight at the same medium range
> >as the pre-dreadnoughts, just with more penetrating shellfire. By 1911
> >enough RN dreadnoughts equipped with another advance,
> >director-controlled firing, existed for a battle line that could fight
> >effectively at 12000-14000 yards. This development made pre-dreadnoughts
> >obsolete, more than did the simple launching of HMS Dreadnought in 1906.
> >
> >
>The two-part article that Mike Potter refers to (by Karl Lautenschlager) is
>an interesting and fairly detailed examination of the transformation of
>battle fleets in the 1890s. I believe the author is successful in two of
>his stated goals: “This review is intended to illuminate little known but
>important details of [this] transformation. It also provides a case study
>in the way technology has been adopted to produce substantive change in
>warfighting capability.” MAJESTIC class BBs represent an important
>advancement in the development of early battleships particularly with regard
>to barbette height and increased freeboard, as Mike has pointed out.
>
>However, I seriously question the idea that they represent a REVOLUTION in
>naval technology, especially when applying Lautenschlager’s criteria to the
>early U.S. battleships that fought at Santiago (INDIANA, OREGON, and IOWA).
>The first technology that the author says makes predreadnoughts
>fundamentally different from armorclads (which includes the Santiago BBs) is
>high velocity, heavy ordnance. He rightly points out that the propellant
>was the key to improved performance. However, he implies that the ships he
>terms “armorclads” used black or brown powder, while the new predreadnoughts
>fired slower burning smokeless powder. U.S. ships in 1898, including the
>early BBs, used smokeless powder. Lautenschlager gives the muzzle velocity
>of the American 12in/35 MkII as 2100 feet/second as compared with MAJESTIC’s
>12in/35 at 2400 ft/sec. John Reilly’s book on U.S. battleships gives the
>muzzle velocity as 2250 ft./sec. Are Lautenschlager’s numbers based on the
>American gun firing brown powder?
>
>The author’s second criterion is “quick-firing, medium calibre guns.” The
>American INDIANA class had 6in QF and IOWA had 4in QF guns, albeit with a
>lower broadside weight than MAJESTIC. His third criterion is
>”face-hardened, alloy steel armour” and an armor belt running at least 60%
>of the ship’s length. Both MAJESTIC and the early American BBs used armor
>utilizing the Harvey hardening process. The 18in belt on the INDIANAs ran
>along 2/3 of the ships’ length and along 3/4 of IOWA’s length. The 9in belt
>on MAJESTIC was wider than on the American BBs, which was more appropriate
>for her high freeboard. Krupp cemented, chromium nickel steel provided
>improved protection, but this type of armor was NOT on the MAJESTICS.
>
>The biggest problem with Lautenschlager’s argument comes when applying his
>fourth criterion: “telescopic gunsights.” He states “The change from open
>sights to telescopic fire control gave predreadnought battleships the
>capability to shoot accurately out to about 7000 yds.” Throughout his
>discussion, the author appears to believe that the most important element in
>the gunfire control problem (indeed, the only one mentioned in the article)
>is seeing the target clearly. He implies that the reason the Americans shot
>so poorly at Santiago was because their open sights made it impossible for
>them to shoot accurately at over 3000 yards, where most of the firing
>occurred. What Lautenschlager ignores is the importance of range
>estimation, especially when the range changes in rapid and varying degrees.
>Chris Havern, a historian with the U.S. Coast Guard, has pointed out that
>the Americans began to hit the Spanish cruisers VIZCAYA and CRITOBAL COLON,
>not when the range closed, but when the ships achieved a parallel, or near
>parallel course, with the range and bearing remaining nearly constant.
>TEXAS began hitting VIZCAYA consistently at 4900 yards and OREGON began
>hitting CRISTOBAL COLON consistently at 8500 yards!
>
>Moreover, the British continued to conduct their battle practices at 1400 to
>1600 yards AFTER Percy Scott introduced telescopic gunsights. What pushed
>ranges out in the years following was technique, not technology. Continuous
>aim gunlaying and salvo firing allowed gunners to neutralize the effects of
>the ship’s motion and more accurately spot their fall of shot at the longer
>ranges. These advances were made largely independent of the technological
>advances of the late 1890s. For more on this subject I recommend IN DEFENCE
>OF NAVAL SUPREMACY by Jon T. Sumida.
>
>My point is that three of Lautenschlager’s criteria for judging a
>revolutionary ship design are seen in early American battleships. The
>fourth criterion is irrelevant. To me, the changes are evolutionary. If
>there is a revolution in the predreadnought era, it is in gunlaying, not
>ship construction, and in the 1900s not the 1890s. Still the article is
>useful for its detailed discussion of the issues and its clear, concise
>definitions of technical terms.
>
>Mark Hayes
>Naval Historical Center
>ncms1@navtap.navy.mil

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Another River Kwai kwiz

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Sep 22 14:45:36 1997
>X-Mailer: SuperTCP Internet for Windows Version 5.1 (Mailer Version 1.02)
>From: Peter Sinfield
>Date: Tue, 23 Sep 1997 07:48:38 cst
>Subject: Re: Another River Kwai kwiz
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Gordon Hogg wrote re: Jane’s:
>
> >On the 1942 title page in parentheses are the words “issued June,
> >1943″; on that of 1943-4 I find “corrected to July, 1944”, and 1944-5
> >shows “corrected to April, 1945.”
> >
>
>indicating that both the “1944” editions were at least compiled (if not
>actually published) before war’s end.
>
>I have deleted Mike’s original post, but IIRC it suggested Jane’s only
>contained the barest details – 28 February 1942″ (in fact, very early
>in the morning of 1 Mar 42). I’m surprised that the location – Bantam
>Bay, Java – is not also given; surely even wartime censorship wouldn’t
>be concerned about events three years earlier? In any case, the minimal
>detail would be consistent with the report of eyewitnesses not actually
>aboard – ie, Bancroft (and no doubt the other PERTH survivors picked up
>after the sinking of RAKUYO MARU), as quoted in my post yesterday.
>
>Peter
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Peter Sinfield
>Canberra ACT AUSTRALIA
>email: sinfip@anao.gov.au
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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“Col Bogey ” march

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Tue Sep 23 09:47:32 1997
>Date: Tue, 23 Sep 1997 09:46:21 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: “Col Bogey ” march
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>These web pages give the origin of the whistling march from =The Bridge
>over the River Kwai” and also give its title’s connection with golf.
>Evidently whistling was always the expected musical instrument or
>technique so any lyrics must have been added later.
>
>http://icons.net/~hjoneit/featured/featured.html: Identifies “Colonel
>Bogey” composer as Kenneth J. Alford – pseudonym of Major Fredrick
>Joseph Ricketts, Royal Marines.
>
>http://www.magic.ca/~lanced/kja-mrch.htm (This page created by Lance C
>Dutchak, Secretary of The IMMS of Canada):
>COLONEL BOGEY (1914) One of the most probable explanations for the
>creation of this march was that Alford was a keen walker and regularly
>took his walks on the golf course at Fort George in North-East Scotland
>nine miles from Inverness. During this time, Alford was serving with the
>93rd Highlanders preparing for the call to arms in mainland Europe. In
>May of 1958, Alford’s Widow wrote a note to the Publishers of the march
>in question: “While playing golf on the Fort George course, one of the
>members whistled the first two notes (B flat and G) instead of calling
>’Fore!’, and with impish spontaneity was answered by Alford with the
>next few notes. There was little sauntering – Moray Firth’s stiff
>breezes encouraged a good crisp stride. These little scraps of whistling
>appeared to ‘catch on’ with the players, and from that beginning the
>Quick March was built up.”
>
>Another Alford tune was used in the movie “Lawrence of Arabia.”
>
>–

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Book

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri Sep 26 08:58:32 1997
>Date: Fri, 26 Sep 97 11:43:10 EDT
>From: JOHN SZALAY
>X-To: “mahan@microworks.net
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: RE: Book
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> >
> > It did put one nagging question in the back of my mind: Were > other
> > rescued Naval Aviators awarded the sub War Patrol > Badge?
> > >
> > Bill > Riddle
> >
>Also makes one wonder about the 20+ flyers picked-up by the TANG on its
>patrols, according to the skipper’s book, he put those qualified as deck
>watch personal on the duty roster for the rest of the patrol, officers
>and radiomen…
>
> (Clear the Bridge)
>

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Book

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri Sep 26 10:50:23 1997
>Date: Fri, 26 Sep 97 19:36 MET DST
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Re: Book
>X-Mailer: T-Online eMail 2.0
>X-Sender: 0611603955-0001@t-online.de (Silvia Lanzendoerfer)
>From: BWV_WIESBADEN@t-online.de (Tim Lanzendoerfer)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Bill Riddle schrieb:
> > I sent this note out to Tim Lanzendoerfer the other day. In light of
> > comments on the list about “liking first person accounts” I thought I
> > would post it.
>
>BTW, thanks for the suggestion – sorry it took me so long to say that.
>
>Tim
>
>Tim Lanzendörfer | “Lebt der Herr Reichskanzler noch?
>Amateur Naval Historian | Und wenn ja, was gedenkt er dagegen
>Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | zu tun?” – Private letter, 1905
>
> The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
> http://www.microworks.net/pacific/index.htm
> The ships, the men, the battles

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Purpose
The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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