The Majestic Revolution
January 2nd, 2009 From
>Date: Tue, 23 Sep 97 07:58:35 CDT
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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: “Mark Hayes (Navy Historical Center)”
>Subject: Re: The Majestic Revolution
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>At 12:25 PM 9/17/97 -0700, Mike Potter wrote:
>
> >In HMS Majestic (entered service at end of 1895), the RN took advantage
> >of barbette height to increase hull freeboard and produced the first
> >battleships that could fight on the high seas. A very interesting pair
> >of articles in _Warship vol VII_ (USNI, about 1985) describes how HMS
> >=Majestic= created a “pre-Dreadnought revolution”:
> >
> >Previous warships, which the articles’ author types as armor-clads, had
> >an effective fighting range of about 2000 yards or less. In the 1890s
> >the RN applied technological advances in hydraulics, propellants,
> >metallurgy, and optics in the =Majestic= class. With better guns and
> >armor from these advances and their better seakeeping, the =Majestic=
> >class had an effective fighting range of about 7000 yards.
> >
> >Pre-dreadnoughts were the dominant ship type roughly from 1898 until
> >1911. The articles identify all the pre-dreadnoughts, as distinct to
> >armorclads. The first US pre-dreadnought was USS Maine (not the one that
> >blew up in Havana, the next one). Tsushima Strait featured a massacre of
> >Russian ironclads (and some pre-dreadnoughts) by a few Japanese
> >pre-dreadnoughts, a big contrast from the all-armorclad battle at
> >Santiago in 1898 where shellfire hits were few and damage minor.
> >
> >The first RN dreadnoughts were built to fight at the same medium range
> >as the pre-dreadnoughts, just with more penetrating shellfire. By 1911
> >enough RN dreadnoughts equipped with another advance,
> >director-controlled firing, existed for a battle line that could fight
> >effectively at 12000-14000 yards. This development made pre-dreadnoughts
> >obsolete, more than did the simple launching of HMS Dreadnought in 1906.
> >
> >
>The two-part article that Mike Potter refers to (by Karl Lautenschlager) is
>an interesting and fairly detailed examination of the transformation of
>battle fleets in the 1890s. I believe the author is successful in two of
>his stated goals: “This review is intended to illuminate little known but
>important details of [this] transformation. It also provides a case study
>in the way technology has been adopted to produce substantive change in
>warfighting capability.” MAJESTIC class BBs represent an important
>advancement in the development of early battleships particularly with regard
>to barbette height and increased freeboard, as Mike has pointed out.
>
>However, I seriously question the idea that they represent a REVOLUTION in
>naval technology, especially when applying Lautenschlager’s criteria to the
>early U.S. battleships that fought at Santiago (INDIANA, OREGON, and IOWA).
>The first technology that the author says makes predreadnoughts
>fundamentally different from armorclads (which includes the Santiago BBs) is
>high velocity, heavy ordnance. He rightly points out that the propellant
>was the key to improved performance. However, he implies that the ships he
>terms “armorclads” used black or brown powder, while the new predreadnoughts
>fired slower burning smokeless powder. U.S. ships in 1898, including the
>early BBs, used smokeless powder. Lautenschlager gives the muzzle velocity
>of the American 12in/35 MkII as 2100 feet/second as compared with MAJESTIC’s
>12in/35 at 2400 ft/sec. John Reilly’s book on U.S. battleships gives the
>muzzle velocity as 2250 ft./sec. Are Lautenschlager’s numbers based on the
>American gun firing brown powder?
>
>The author’s second criterion is “quick-firing, medium calibre guns.” The
>American INDIANA class had 6in QF and IOWA had 4in QF guns, albeit with a
>lower broadside weight than MAJESTIC. His third criterion is
>”face-hardened, alloy steel armour” and an armor belt running at least 60%
>of the ship’s length. Both MAJESTIC and the early American BBs used armor
>utilizing the Harvey hardening process. The 18in belt on the INDIANAs ran
>along 2/3 of the ships’ length and along 3/4 of IOWA’s length. The 9in belt
>on MAJESTIC was wider than on the American BBs, which was more appropriate
>for her high freeboard. Krupp cemented, chromium nickel steel provided
>improved protection, but this type of armor was NOT on the MAJESTICS.
>
>The biggest problem with Lautenschlager’s argument comes when applying his
>fourth criterion: “telescopic gunsights.” He states “The change from open
>sights to telescopic fire control gave predreadnought battleships the
>capability to shoot accurately out to about 7000 yds.” Throughout his
>discussion, the author appears to believe that the most important element in
>the gunfire control problem (indeed, the only one mentioned in the article)
>is seeing the target clearly. He implies that the reason the Americans shot
>so poorly at Santiago was because their open sights made it impossible for
>them to shoot accurately at over 3000 yards, where most of the firing
>occurred. What Lautenschlager ignores is the importance of range
>estimation, especially when the range changes in rapid and varying degrees.
>Chris Havern, a historian with the U.S. Coast Guard, has pointed out that
>the Americans began to hit the Spanish cruisers VIZCAYA and CRITOBAL COLON,
>not when the range closed, but when the ships achieved a parallel, or near
>parallel course, with the range and bearing remaining nearly constant.
>TEXAS began hitting VIZCAYA consistently at 4900 yards and OREGON began
>hitting CRISTOBAL COLON consistently at 8500 yards!
>
>Moreover, the British continued to conduct their battle practices at 1400 to
>1600 yards AFTER Percy Scott introduced telescopic gunsights. What pushed
>ranges out in the years following was technique, not technology. Continuous
>aim gunlaying and salvo firing allowed gunners to neutralize the effects of
>the ship’s motion and more accurately spot their fall of shot at the longer
>ranges. These advances were made largely independent of the technological
>advances of the late 1890s. For more on this subject I recommend IN DEFENCE
>OF NAVAL SUPREMACY by Jon T. Sumida.
>
>My point is that three of Lautenschlager’s criteria for judging a
>revolutionary ship design are seen in early American battleships. The
>fourth criterion is irrelevant. To me, the changes are evolutionary. If
>there is a revolution in the predreadnought era, it is in gunlaying, not
>ship construction, and in the 1900s not the 1890s. Still the article is
>useful for its detailed discussion of the issues and its clear, concise
>definitions of technical terms.
>
>Mark Hayes
>Naval Historical Center
>ncms1@navtap.navy.mil