Mystery Quotation

January 29th, 2009

Fellow Naval Historians, (amateur, professional, and otherwise):

Attention bibliographic (and bibliophilic!) sleuths, in particular.

Please consider the following quotation. I original proferred it to the
Marhst-l almost a month ago, but no body bit. I’m hoping the Mahan list
might prove to be more fruitful ground.

“The tests to which the Admirals in high command are subjected during a
naval engagement are far more searching that those of Generals in a land
battle. The Admiral actually leads the Fleet in person and is probably
under as severe fire and in as great danger as any man in it; a General,
whatever his wishes, has no choice but to remain in his headquarters in
complete tranquillity, ten, fifteen, or even twenty miles away. The General
is forced to rely on the reports of others which flow upwards to him from
Brigades, Divisions, and Corps, and transmits his orders through the same
channel after consultation with his staff; the Admiral sees with his own
eyes, and with his own lips pronounces the orders which move the whole
mighty event. The phases of a naval action succeed one another at intervals
of two or three minutes; whereas in modern [land] battles two or three
hours, and sometimes even days, elapse before fresh decisions are required
from an Army Commander. Once the sea battle is joined, the whole event is
in the hands of the Admiral or his successor as long as he can signal;
whereas on land, after zero hour has struck, it escapes for the time being
almost entirely from control of the General. There are a hundred ways of
explaining a defeat on land and of obscuring the consequences of any
mistake. Of these the simplest is to continue the attack next day in a
different direction or under different conditions. But on the sea, no
chance returns. The enemy disappears for months and the battle is over.
The Admiral’s orders uttered from minute to minute are recorded forever in
the log-book of every vessel engaged. The great ships, unless their
mechanism ceases to function, obey punctually and inexorably the directions
they receive from human will. The course and speed of every vessel at every
moment are recorded. The value of every vessel sunk is known. Their names
are published. The charts and compasses are produced, and with almost exact
accuracy the position and movement of every ship can be fixed in relation to
each other. The battlefield is flat and almost unvarying. Exact
explanations can be required at every point, and the whole intense scene can
be reconstructed and analysed in the glare of history. This should always
be borne in mind in forming judgments.”

Well…pretty impressive, and — no doubt to many — controversial stuff!
However, if we can put aside, (at least for the moment), any debate on the
veracity of its substance, I would like to ask fellow list-members’ help
with regard to discovering its author.

This quotation was passed on to me by a kind old soul in New Delhi — in
fact, the official post-independence historian of the Indian Navy:
Rear-Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM, (Ret’d). It is obviously excerpted from
a much larger work. Unfortunately, Adm Singh overlooked noting the
bibliographical particulars of that work. It’s a wonderful quotation which
I would love to be able to cite on occasion. Does any one happen to have
any idea WHOSE words these are, as well as WHEN, and WHERE they were
written?; (ie., can anyone give me a full reference citation for it?).

I have the following additional evidence which hopefully will help along the
necessary deductive logic.

As mentioned, what Admiral Singh gave me is quite obviously a photocopy of a
page from a book. At the bottom it is marked p. “285”, and at the top
“Admirals in High Command”. What I don’t know, is whether this is the title
of the book from which the quotation is taken, or only the name of the
particular chapter/section of the book. As mentioned, I have no idea as to
the author, or the date of publication, (but from other internal clues, I
would assume he was a retired high ranking RN (Flag) Officer, who probably
served in some capacity in the RN during WWI. The book in question might
very well be his memoirs. In fact, a footnote to the above quotation says:
“These are the author’s comments and reflections on the action of the Dogger
Bank, 24 January 1915, written several years afterwards.”.

Much obliged for any/all assistance,

Glen

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Glen “I-was-a-teenage-fogey” Hodgins

A Medal Collector and Commonwealth/Empire Naval Historian
temporarily imprisoned at:

Her Canadian Majesty’s C/O Po Box 500 (CLMBO)
High Commission for Sri Lanka Station A
6 Gregory’s Road OTTAWA, Ontario, K1N 8T7
(PO Box 1006) Dominion of CANADA
Cinnamon Gardens
Colombo 7, Sri Lanka [still Canada’s OFFICIAL title!]

Fax, (from overseas): 94-1-687-815

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The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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