Light shipboard AA guns necessary? … and AA philsophies.
January 2nd, 2009 From
>Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:07:33 -0500
>From: Brooks A Rowlett
>Reply-To: brooksar@indy.net
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>To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: Light shipboard AA guns necessary? … and AA philsophies.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>TMO/TX wrote:
> in a long thread triggered by :
>
> > > >Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> > In regards to the British v. US experience…..
> > The US was led to maximizing the number of barrels of all calibers by a
> > simple (but so long ago as to have been forgotten) factor…the
> > potential number of attacking a/c arriving at the same time. Indelibly
> > marked by the Pearl Harbor experience, the tattoo even more deeply
> > colored in engagements against Japaneses carrier and landbased a/c in
> > substantial numbers thru ’42, we wanted “an impenetrable carpet of flak”
> > to steal a German concept. Dealing with fewer attackers (but more often
> > multi-engine or single engine a/c with some armor, both more damage
> > resistant than the lightly constructed Nipponese a/c), the British
> > perspective may have been quite different. The principal difference may
> > have been even more simply explained…a shortage of German a/c
> > carriers.
> > —
> > Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> > “Quid consilium cepit…”
>
>I think he’s put his finger on it. Secondly, I also think the RN was
>more sensitive to topweight. We should also point out that the average
>USN DD probably ran somewhat heavier than its RN counterpart expecially
>175 FLETCHER class (plus 100 or so BENSON/LIVERMORE/BRISTOL which are
>more directly comparable to the equivalent Britsh War Emergency type).
>And with more fleet oilers and more practice at UNREP the USN was
>willing to accept topweight that might not be compensated for in
>theroetical fuel – that is, because the US was able and willing to UNREP
>more often, they might have calculated stability always on the basis of
>assuming a certain % of fuel available which the RN might no9t have been
>willing to. In practice though, I don’t think that’s right, because i
>seem to recall something about the US trying to calculate stability with
>a LOWER fuel load than anyone else. At any rate, I strongly suspect
>that the numbers of individual attackers in the PAC being higher than
>was expected in Europe is the real key to this, with the stability
>factor that the USN chose to carry more – either being capable of at
>similar stability, or being willing to accept lower stability –
>contributing to the fact. Certainly late war AA fire control was still
>in the USN favor, with lots of small directors, including gyro sights on
>mount for the 20mm and individual directors for EVERY 40mm quad….the
>RN made a stabilized controlled 40mm single, the STAAG mounting.
>Another point possibly relevant is that the RN 2lbr octuple and quad
>were a shorter calibre than the 40mm Bofors which led to reduced range
>and accuracy and possibly more intent to use them in barrage mode.
>Certainly Martin Middlebrooks BATTLESHIP describes that the octuple 2
>pdrs on PRINCE OF WALES were unable to satisfactorily engage the IJNAF
>’Betty’ and ‘Nell” bombers before they dropped their torpedoes; they
>finally turned to using them in revenge mode against planes that had
>already dropped and were flying overhead, which is how they actually
>succeeded in shooting some down.
>
>Some Refs; Campbell’s NAVAL WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II, Friedman and Peter
>Hodges’ DESTOYER WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR 2.
>
>Some other points; The popular OTO Melara 76mm Compact mentioned is a
>
>62 calibre-long weapon. I can’t swear that the US did pay license fees
>to Bofors for manufacture of the 40mm during WWII – the History of the
>Bureau of Ordnance probably has that information – but they did get
>permission to manufacture and bought drawings from them so I presume
>the US did. (Original production was apparently reverse-engineered from
>samples on the Dutch cruiser JACOB VAN HEEMSKECK). The Japanese 40mm
>and also the Italian, were based on the Vickers 2 pdr, not the Bofors
>40. The late war German 40 was the Bofors, but I think I recall that
>the Germans may NOT have paid Bofors any license fees…unless that is
>postwar propaganda -“We Good Allies paid our license fees but the nasty
>Germans didn’t”.