Camouflage intent and effectiveness.

January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 22 01:29:22 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom1.ecnet.net: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 03:28:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom1
>To: seaways-shipmodeling-list@lists.best.com, mahan@microwrks.com,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca, milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu,
> consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>Subject: Camouflage intent and effectiveness.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>I’ve read reports of Japanese *and American* aircraft overflying
> U.S. task forces without seeing them … as long as there was
> no noticeable wake.
>
>Ellis (or Scott?) makes the point (in the old Almark ROYAL NAVY
> WARSHIP CAMOUFLAGE, 1939-45) that if you were defending against
> aircraft, you wanted an overall sea color. If you were
> defending against submarines, you wanted a stratified scheme
> blending the ship against the sea horizon and sky. If you had
> to concede the probability of being sighted, then you might
> want to try to confuse the enemy’s aim with disruptive or even
> dazzle camouflage.
>
>And, as I’ve said in other posts, light pastel blue-gray was effective
> even at night (when you would think *dark* (shadows) colors would be
> most effective).
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

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