Strategy or honor

January 2nd, 2009

From Tue May 20 13:30:21 1997
>Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:29:21 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Reply-To: mike.potter@artecon.com
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Strategy or honor
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>MacArthur was fully aware from his service as US Army Chief of Staff in
>the early 1930s that any real defense of the Philippines was
>unaffordable. US strategy was to mobilize if and when war broke out, and
>then to drive across the central Pacific to defeat Japan by siege.
>Victory would liberate all Japanese-occupied areas.
>
>FDR thought MacArthur might lead a fascist movement in the US and wanted
>to keep him inside the tent. He had been retired for years before FDR
>recalled him. I don’t know about Marshall’s regard for MacArthur.
>
>Simply fighting per se didn’t help either the US or the Philippines, as
>US actions in 1941-42 at Bataan and Corregidor proved. Strategists must
>choose where to fight so as to attain strategic objectives and to avoid
>futile actions. Honor is nice and you need “some” for motivation. But
>fighting is costly, so that eventually fighting for the sake of honor
>becomes dangerously costly.
>
>MacArthur’s southwest Pacific front was almost irrelevant because action
>there contributed to US strategic objectives only to the degree that it
>diverted Japanese forces from the central Pacific front. MacArthur had
>more resources than his front required for defense, its only strategic
>mission. It would be interesting to analyze whether diverting Army
>resources from MacArthur’s front to Europe would have helped there.
>
>
> > >IMHO: MacArthur’s appointment was pure politics by FDR to keep the GOP’s
> > >right wing behind the war effort. His strategic contribution was minor,
> > >which was inevitable since his theater was almost irrelevant. He was
> > >there to keep him on the team in a position where he could not damage
> > >things too badly.
> >
> > Well, the theatre was only irrelevant if one feels that American national
> > honour isn’t worth preserving. The ONLY inhabited major American
> > possession occupied for a significant period of time during the War was the
> > Philippines. MacArthur argued that the recovery of these islands should be
> > our primary war aim, and argued this well. He had inadequate resources and
> > poor support from all but Marshall (who was terrified of MacArthur) and
> > Leahy.
> >
> > Still, he DID liberate the Philippines. And, for this, he is owed the
> > thanks of two nations.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Purpose
The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
Links