Japanese BBs/BCs, Aug-Dec42 … changing the thread
January 2nd, 2009 From
>Date: Tue, 29 Jul 1997 00:09:57 -0700
>From: TMO/TX
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/OAssoc
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: Eric Bergerud
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: Japanese BBs/BCs, Aug-Dec42 … changing the thread
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Eric Bergerud wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >Doing research for my Guadalcanal game, I have discovered that all 12
> > > Japanese battleships and battlecruisers were available to be used,
> > > if Yamamato had decided to use them.
> > >
>
> > >Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> > 1. Yamamoto at Guadalcanal: why Yamamoto has the reputation of being a
> > competent admiral is utterly beyond me. Pearl Harbor was extraordinary
> > folly. Midway was one of the stupidiest schemes in naval history. (If the
> > “greatest admiral since Nelson” [William Manchester] couldn’t see that a
> > massive move into the SOPAC in mid-42 would have forced CinPac into a
> > “decisive battle” in waters far more favorable than those off Hawaii,
> > someone should have given him glasses.)
>
>(Snipped, a lengthy but rewarding Bergurud discourse….)
>
>’Tis a pleasure to see someone prick at the time honored Yamamoto
>balloon and reputation. With the Krauts we could always use the excuse
>that the generals and feldmarschals were all certifiable geniuses while
>old Adolf was a looney. With the Nips, it was always those slant-eyed
>inscrutable oriental mensa types running the war.
>
>Let me propose a whole new approach, a emphatic “Horseshit!” to the
>legendary talents of legendary generals and admirals.
>
>Rule One of War:
>
>Every damn one of the enemy’s military leaders are absolute whizbanfg
>super smart, dern near infallible wise sachems.
>
>Why?
>’Cuz if we beat’em, then our admirals and generals is right smart, too!
>(and, perish the thought, if we lose, we’ve got a good excuse. We wuz
>out-smarted, tricked, fooled, whatever.)
>
>The bottom line….
>
>A careful examination of history reveals that an overwhelming majority
>of senior officers would have served their countries better by checking
>into the closest high security mental institution, leaving the conduct
>of war in the hands of more simple souls capable of comprehending their
>own short comings.
>
>On the use of the bayonet…
>
>(A) Bayonet charges should never be ordered without determining that the
>other side is almost out of bullets, cannon balls, powder, grape shot,
>large stones and, most important, morale.
>
>(B) It is well known and widely recorded thruout history that less than
>20% of those who ordered bayonet charges actually participated in them
>(and then often by mistake).
>
>And a naval collateral…
>Every boarding party should include a group of trustworthy sailors
>charged with lashing the ships together. Nothing is more embarassing
>and morale-destructive than the sight of one’s own ship falling off to
>leeward.
>
>Military cemeteries and the sea bottom are crowded with poor yoiks put
>there by the misadventures of stiffs suffering from advanced cases of
>megalomania and/or melancholia.
>
>Most military systems’ traditional organizational and promotional
>policies insure that that the highest ranks are filled by a group which
>can be characterized as only moderately skilled, to that point lucky,
>with the ethical qualities of three card monte dealers, and far from
>military genius (except in their own estimation).
>
>Most wars are best noted for continuing ineptitude and depraved
>indifference broken only sporadically by occasional moments of flawed
>genius, absolute bad luck, and the rarest flashes of competence.
>
>The old maxim that it is better to do something than to do nothing
>should be carefully reconsidered prior to any military operation. Often
>it is better to wait for the other side to do something damn foolish.
>Unfortunately, most military leaders are incapable of recognizing damn
>foolishness.
>
>The twin secrets to promotion are…
>Be at the right place at the right time, often!
>The Art of ass-kissing is more important than the art of war.
>
>Secrets to great military success include….
>The dead are always heroes.
>Like prostitutes, members of the media are easily bought, but are
>potentially fickle mistresses.
>Always keep a few dufflebutts around upon whom to place blame.
>The opposing commander combines the skill of Ceasar with the
>determination of Alexander.
>The opposing army, each seven feet tall and outnumbering us at least two
>to one, are the best trained, slickest talking bastards this side of the
>Vikings, and their weapons are technological marvels.
>
>The consumate military leader is capable of presenting his best profile
>to photographers, patting himself on the back and retreating
>simultaneously.
>
>The staffs of such leaders should always include one individual capable
>of providing an accurate count of the Indians. Generals and Admirals
>are a dime a f**kin’ dozen. Good indian counters are scarce. Ask
>Custer.
>
> >From one who having made O5, exceeded even the parameters of the Peter
>principle…
>–
>Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> “Quid consilium cepit…”