Was Vietnam a class war?

January 2nd, 2009

From Fri Jul 25 12:03:44 1997
>Comments: Authenticated sender is
>From: “James H. E. Maugham”
>Organization: RST Environmental Services, Inc.
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 15:03:00 -0500
>Subject: Re: Was Vietnam a class war?
>Reply-to: CaptJHEM@waterw.com
>Priority: normal
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>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>On 25 Jul 97 at 10:01, Tom Oliver wrote:
>
> > James’s view does reflect a traditional “American” blue collar
> > perspective of officers, although he gives LTs a bum wrap,
>
>Not really Tom. My total of 19 months in country was all spent with “special”
>units and the REPO/DEPOT never failed to send us totally inexperienced 2LTs
>fresh out of OCS with life spans akin to a fruit fly. As an OCS >dropout, I can
>state categorically that we were never given the best advice we could have
>received with regard to longevity, to wit:
>
>Sit down, shut up and LISTEN!!!!
>
> > forgetting the greater sin of Viet Nam, the piss-poor puking practice of
> > “ticket punching” among field grade ranks which guaranteed an > absence of unit
> > morale, esprit d’corps and accomplishment.
>
>With a few minor exceptions, Field Grade officers were NEVER seen in >the field,
>unless you include orbiting at 5K feet in a Huey. Col. Hackworth was a rare
>exception, with whom I was very fortunate to work once, and who gave >me my most
>treasured award by referring to me as a warrior.
>
> > He, however, missed the greatest pitfall which guarantees for the future
> > justification for the “poor man’s” war perspective. The failure (entirely
> > political/fear of retribution at the ballot box) to call to the colors
> > National Guard and Reserve units in near total numbers (including > me, perish
> > the thought!) goes down in history as a great sin of commission, far more
> > damaging to this country than any other factors in the prosecution of the
> > war (with the possible exception of 12 month tours, a device insuring poor
> > unit performance). Win, lose or draw, the American experience in Viet Nam
> > would have been far briefer, and the demographics of the troops involved
> > wohave better mirrored our society in general.
>
>Yes, but you have to remember that the war was primarily a training >ground for
>officers and men who would soon be sent into the Fulda Gap! Nixon >and MacNamara
>were of the firm belief that we would very possibly have to face Soviet tanks
>in Europe during the late 60’s.
>
>As to Slick Willy, better to have him screwing a few fillies than >having Tricky
>Dick screwing me! 🙂
>
>James
>
>”Who wishes to give himself an abundance of trouble,
>let him equip these two things, a Ship and a Woman.
>No two things involve more bother, for neither is sufficiently adorned!”

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