Was Vietnam a class war?
January 2nd, 2009 From
>Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 10:01:23 -0700
>From: TMO/TX
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/OAssoc
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: “Louis R. Coatney”
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: Was Vietnam a class war?
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Louis R. Coatney wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, 25 Jul 1997, James H. E. Maugham wrote:
> > > While I’ve already applauded Lou for his efforts, upon > reflection I have to
> > > wonder what the findings would be if broken down by MOS.
> > >
> > > My personal recollection is that amongst those of us who were actually
> > humping
> > > the Boonies, the socio-economic demographics were generally > blue collar or
> > > lower. I’m excluding LTs from this as, personally, we never > kept an LT around
> > > long enough for him to be statistically significant.
> >
> > James,
> > This is why *death* statistics are the most important indicator
> > … and 2 out of my 3 RIHS’64 classmates killed in VN had fathers who
> > owned their own businesses.
> > And LTs *should* be included, of course.
> >
> > > I anchored one end of the bell curve for this group by being > “middle class”
> > and
> > > having a college background. My “peers” were most often to be > found back in
> > > base camp or amongst the Saigon Rangers pushing papers.
> >
> > Which gets us to another crucial point: *What* is “middle class”?
>
> > > Sorry for ranting.
> >
> > You weren’t. It’s a valid discussion point motivated by strong
> > beliefs from personal experience/remembrance … which is what motivated
> > *me* to get into this, in the first place.
> >
>
>Just as current and future historians (will) study the “Vietn Nam (old
>guy/two word preference) Experience” exhaustively (read: “to death”), US
>military demographics, a subject worthy of substantial research and
>comment, will receive short shrift from inquiring academics. All too
>often, the perspective and “subjective gloss” will be in support of one
>or another sociological or political purpose, in Viet Nam’s case, the
>”War of the Poor” having been established as the politically correct
>position by the Left (while the Right, with not much greater
>justification, takes great comfort in the “Misfought by Politicians/High
>Command” view, not unlike the “Betrayed” syndrome widespread in post WWI
>Germany).
>
>While those at either end of the political spectrum can take potshots,
>cheap and real, at the conduct of affairs/operations/commitment/the
>whole schmeer, and those of us who fall into the “a pox on both your
>camps” middle are left with little but sadness, the loss of friends and
>contemporaries and a lot of guessing as to “what might have been”, the
>harsh reality of the conflict seems to support James’s position, “line”
>units filled with a steady stream of draftees/recruits less than
>representative of a “cross-section” of society (What the Hell ever that
>may have been), rear echelons better able to read and write (and less
>”poor”), grad students/draft dodgers/etc. lazing at home/Canada/Sweden,
>and too many “otherwise eligible” young males staying ahead of the draft
>board in a myriad of approaches, from waiting outside maternity wards to
>enlisting in special naval rerserve units (like one I commanded) which
>”creamed” available talent, promising a year of weekends followed by a 2
>year tour (50/50 chance of a “haze gray and underway” environment).
>
>James’s view does reflect a traditional “American” blue collar
>perspective of officers, although he gives LTs a bum wrap, forgeting the
>greater sin of Viet Nam, the piss-poor puking practice of “ticket
>punching” among field grade ranks which guaranteed an absence of unit
>morale, esprit d’corps and accomplishment.
>
>He, however, missed the greatest pitfall which guarantees for the future
>justification for the “poor man’s” war perspective. The failure
>(entirely political/fear of retribution at the ballot box) to call to
>the colors National Guard and Reserve units in near total numbers
>(including me, perish the thought!) goes down in history as a great sin
>of commission, far more damaging to this country than any other factors
>in the prosecution of the war (with the possible exception of 12 month
>tours, a device insuring poor unit performance). Win, lose or draw, the
>American experience in Viet Nam would have been far briefer, and the
>demographics of the troops involved wohave better mirrored our society
>in general.
>
>There’s nothing new about the perspective of a “class war”. Americans
>have clamored about the subject in nearly every conflict including the
>Revolution. A quaint portion of the “bottom line”, however, is to be
>found among the long lists of “blue collar” or even “societally
>deprived” Americans for whom wars and commissions obtained in a variety
>of fashions including unit attrition, election, OCS, aviation training,
>etc., became to launching platform for amazing social and economic
>mobility (along with a political career or two).
>
>The US experience seems quite different that that of our British
>neighbors (who seem almost if not more class conscious and position
>immobile today than they were in 1800). The new PM certainly appears as
>a “Gentleman” (traditional? self-made? imitation with good tailor?)
>whose career never included the wearing of overalls, while our current
>guy in the White House is but a few steps removed from the skirtless
>abode of a sharecropper, with the ethics of a mule-trader and somewhat
>lecherous sexual proclivities (although it turns out that even old Abe
>Lincoln was somewhat less the country bumpkin than his image-makers
>would have had us believe and as politically opportunistic as any modern
>figure).
>
>In the final analysis, Vietnam may have promoted the
>social/economic/political mobility of a number of “poor men”, just as
>had happened in previous American wars. Certainly, the war protests
>povided a similar avenue for ambitious, skilled or manipulative younkers
>to get ahead.
>
>As an aside on social mobility…
>
>Where else but the US could we invent our closest thing to a Royal
>Family only a couple of generations removed from Boston wardheelers with
>good connections in the whisky business, evidence of the short route up
>from no curtains (and no windows) to lace curtains to the sad and silly
>chronicles of the sexual and marital misadventures of the younger
>progeny who all seem capable of being elected to a group of safer seats
>than any of the famous “rotten boroughs”?
>
>In retrospect (and sadly), too many of us may have initially viewed Viet
>Nam through imprecise and out of date tinted spectacles, another “Good
>Little War” or “The Only War We Had” as had been Mexico in 1846 or the
>Spanish Conflict in 1898, misunderstanding and poorly appreciating
>earlier lessons of land conflict in Asia, and all too willing to ride
>down the freeway of both guns and butter (a road which turned out to
>have an awfully high toll). To top off the pit of our misperceptions,
>we became possessed of an insufferable vice, the belief that having
>occasionally changed history, we were now so powerful and all-wise as to
>be able to alter it at will.
>
>And then there were those gems of naval/military tactics and strategy…
>
>Who remembers that day when the main batteries of the 8″ gun cruisers
>haveing proved ineffective against Charley, we brought back a battleship
>to demonstrate that 16″ guns could be less/equally/even more
>ineffective?
>–
>Tom Oliver
>Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> “Quid consilium cepit…”