Halsey and Ultra/Magic
January 2nd, 2009 From
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 15:50:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney”
>Subject: Re: Halsey and Ultra/Magic
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>On Thu, 21 Aug 1997 salvin@ocslink.com wrote:
> > I think no one has addressed the real reason why the Japanese > feints usually
> > failed to work (Leyte Gulf is an exception)–thanks to Magic and Ultra the
> > U. S. *knew* what were feints and what was the main attack. Midway is a
> > perfect example. Why would Halsey go “charging off to the north” to the
> > Aleutians when he and the American high command knew that it was > a diversion
> > and the main thrust was to be at Midway?
>
>I (still) disagree. 🙂
>
>Halsey was Halsey and very probably would have gone “charging off,” no
> matter what the situation or how much he knew.
>
>Look how he ordered (Kinkaid in) ENTERPRISE and HORNET “Attack! Repeat,
> ATTACK!” … which K. dutifully did, only to over-expose his TF and lose
> HORNET … and leave us with one carrier, hampered by a damaged elevator
> about which was said that even “Bull” Halsey wouldn’t dare to push the
> “Down” button, for fear it wouldn’t come back up!
>
>Don’t get me wrong: Halsey was the kind of tiger we NEEDED … *for
> Guadalcanal* … when/where we finally decided to turn and fight … but
> he could be an overaggressive disaster at critical moments, elsewhere.
>
>William Halsey fully deserved his 5 stars, but he was entirely human …
> and how fallibly/*dangerously* impulsive he could be must not be
> forgotten.
>
> > I do agree, however that after Midway and the Solomons the Japanese should
> have
> > learned that more often than not, thier eleborate plans were not working.
>
>And yet … again … a “Kamikaze” Imperial Navy massacre of the invasion
> fleet/anchorage might have caused significant/decisive domestic
> disillusionment in the U.S. … with the competence of our commanders
> as much as the size of the casualty lists … although the two were/are
> directly related. The Japanese HAD us … thanks to their “overly
> complex” planning.
>
>And Kurita certainly didn’t “save” the Imperial Fleet by his (exhausted)
> withdrawal from Samar: The only significant subsequent action by
> it was YAMATO’s pointless “Kamikaze” attack at Okinawa.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
>Incidentally, Robert didn’t lose 1 carrier, last night, … although he
> did lose N. CAROLINA, S. DAKOTA, INDIANA, COLORADO!, and MARYLAND! …
> among others … in a nocturnal Ironbottom Bay slug-out that left me
> with useless eleventh-hour possession of the Slot.
>
>OK … so I *did* happen to drop NAGATO, MUTSU, HYUGA, all 4 KONGOs,
> and assorted significant others (including 5 out of my 6 carriers)
> in my valiant (more than brilliant) resistance, but Hey! … I
> *didn’t* lose YAMATO or MUSASHI … 🙂 … barely. :-I
>
>I made a very small but significant rule adjustment which does WONDERS
> for realistic night combat results.
>
>AND there were couple of seismic tremors during the game to report.
> 😮 ??