Yamamoto & Guadalcanal
January 2nd, 2009 From
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>Date: Wed, 20 Aug 1997 16:14:23 -0400 (EDT)
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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: Yamamoto & Guadalcanal
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>Mark does an admirable job putting Japanese (and Yamamoto’s) strategy into
>perspective. And if Yamamoto wasn’t so highly rated by people that should
>know better I might be more merciful. But I respectfully must disagree and
>submit that the Japanese did a better job of squandering a tactical and
>strategic advantage than any major combatant in WWII (with the possible
>exception of the USSR in 1941.)
>
>Mark wrote:
> >That might be a little harsh. 1). Navies tend to think alkie in many
> >ways. The Rainbow plan called for just such an offensive and it’s not
> >unusual that Yamamoto might have been thinking along similar lines. 2).
> >The Japanese loved feints and possibly felt the US would do what they
> >would do. 3). Restricted waters favor the weaker Navy. 4). Probably
> >most important. The SW Pacific was, for the most part, an Army show.
> >The Japanese services were not known for their cooperation.
> >
>Replies:
>1. Yes armed services think alike. But look what happened in the USN after
>Pearl. The carrier became king, they made major changes in their building
>program shoving subs and CVs to the top of the list. When we lost a battle
>we LOOKED for lessons. The Japanese, as shown at Midway, didn’t examine
>defeat because it was unthinkable to deal with it: not smart.
>
>2. Feints were wasteful and stupid and were one of the things that got
>Yamamoto in trouble at Midway. I wonder if a US admiral defeated as badly as
>Yamamoto was at Midway would have kept his position. The fact that
>Yamamoto’s successors continued to divide their forces and get their teeth
>kicked in only highlights how deeply the disease had gone and how difficult
>it was for the Japanese to react to a changing condition. Maybe chess is
>better preparation for war than go.
>
>3. An all out effort at Guadalcanal would have brought the USN to battle: Im
>convinced we would not have abandoned the Marines. IF were were forced to
>evacuate (or try to evacuate) the garrison it would have been a real
>embarassment: losing the garrison would have been a calamity. A slugfest or
>series of slugfests would not necessarily have had to take place in
>Ironbottom Sound. And if they did, a combination of big guns and the Long
>Lance would have a good one. If Yamamoto had lost his confidence after
>Midway that was an excellent reason to make him an instructor at Japan’s
>naval academy.
>
>4. Mark is in error concerning the SOPAC being an Army show. The opposite
>was the case. The Navy was responsible for the SOPAC and the Army claimed
>New Guinea as its sandbox. (The Kokoda epic was taking place at the same
>time as Guadalcanal.) By the end of Guadalcanal the two serivces were ready
>for an open declaration of war against each other. I do admit it was not
>Yamamoto’s fault that the Army refused to see the great danger looming at
>Guadalcanal until the battle was lost. As my football coach used to say,
>losing 63-0 takes a team effort.
>
>5. Mark also points out that Australia & NZ could have served as US bases
>for a sustained showdown in the SOPAC. In reality neither did. We were
>smart/lucky enough in the first weeks of war to see the value of the New
>Hebrides and occupied Efate, Espiritu Santo & New Caledonia very early.
>Espiritu was a fine anchorage but not really a great base. Australia’s
>ports, much less NZ, were a long way off. Rabaul and Truk made a much better
>combination. Any geographic position would have had some disadvantages for a
>major battle. But given the time element involved I still argue that the
>SOPAC was the best possible place for Japan to fight in late 1942, and that
>late 1942 was a much better time to fight than mid-44.
>
>Obviously such things are unproveable. But I do believe that Japan’s
>significant tactical strengths and astounding individual bravery were not
>supported by decent leadership at the top.
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930