MUTSU’s true fate?

January 2nd, 2009

From Tue Aug 19 11:59:16 1997
>To: salvin@ocslink.com
>Subject: RE: Re: MUTSU’s true fate?
>Date: Tue, 19 Aug 97 18:59:44 GMT
>From: salvin@ocslink.com
>cc: mahan@microwrks.com
>X-Mailer: Quarterdeck Message Center [1.1]
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
> >
> > This does of course not help to explain why Yamamoto sat the > campaign out in
> > Truk on a brand new 70.000 ton, 27 knots battleship instead of sending it
> > south, as he did with Mutsu.
> > Thus you only explain why the old wagons were not used, and not > why the new
> > ships were simply left where they were. BTW, were was Nagato during
> > Guadalcanal?
> >
> > Tim
> >
>
>I think the simple reason was that to Yamamoto, the drive in the Solomons was
>not, in his mind, the main thrust of the American >counter-offensive. He still
>expected that to come through the Central Pacific to the Phillipines. The
>_Yamato_ and the other heavy battleships were to be reserved for the >”decisive
>battle” and not risked in the relatively restricted waters of the Solomons.
>—-
>
>Steve Alvin
>Department of Social Sciences
>Illinois Valley Community College
>
>salvin@ocslink.com
>
>—-
>
>Steve Alvin
>Department of Social Sciences
>Illinois Valley Community College
>
>salvin@ocslink.com

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