“monitor”

January 2nd, 2009

Date: Fri, 08 Aug 1997 18:03:01 -0700
>From: TMOliver
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/Oliver
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: Warren Bruhn
>CC: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Fri, 8 Aug 97 16:01:12 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>Warren Bruhn wrote:
> >
> > Well, since others are not objecting to continuation of this “monitor”
> > thread, I will jump back into it myself.
> >
> > I agree that the VERY LARGE guns that I proposed would not likely be needed
> > for penetration of hardened targets. These guns would NEVER be built. Which
> > is why my proposal for the “monitor” is practically speaking, a > fantasy….(vast snipping)
>
>I’m convinced that we’re looped into a cart before the horse agument.
>Large naval guns were used for support of amphibious ops because the
>ships and guns already existed, having been developed for missions
>against other ships and a/c. Aside from the BBs which had very limited
>mission capability (and no other BBs to shoot at very often), NGFS was a
>”collateral” assignment.
>
>Guns were used because guns existed.
>
>The development of the naval gun mature (even gray-headed) by the WWII
>era even with its succeeding large bore AAW manifestations represents
>technology on the back side of the power curve, and is always subject
>to a near-finite limitation, the destructive power of warheads limited
>by small size, thick casings (to provide for pressure/velocity
>protection), and relatively tiny detonating charges.
>
>In over 90% of its historic NGFS applications, range was of minimal
>consideration. Most shoots were “within the horizon”, with many even
>for small boys at “point blank” range. Extended range applications are
>certainly possible (and exist today), but 2000lb projectile with a tiny
>bursting charge and no terminal guidance represents little more than a
>big bang. Over 55 years ago, the Japanese found an optimum use for
>those “big” projectiles. Dropped from a/c, they were hell on the deck
>armor of old BBs (and given fins a great deal more accurate than when
>fired).
>
>As for the comparison of 5″ (127mm), 6″ (155mm) or even 8″ guns, the 8″
>will never more exist, and the 6′ offers no substantial quantitative or
>qualitative advantages over existing 5″ guns in US Naval service, a sort
>of “Why reinvent the wheel?” equation.
>
>In the US Army inventory, the “big guns’, 8” and 240mm, have been
>replaced by long ranged, more mobile, faster firing, easier to supply
>155mm models, both tracked and towed, and the MRLS launchers and their
>ubiquitous companions in other armies(all a great deal better than
>Congreve’s rockets, Stalin organs, Nebelwerfers and Korean LSMRs).
>
>Given a mission of demonstrably low priority (neither the Navy, JCs and
>Congress are enamored of it), minimal if any budget allocations today or
>in the future (unless there’s a drawn out shooting war), and likely to
>only be addressed by some “make-do” adaptations and combinations of
>”off-the-shelf” equipment and available vehicles, I wish you would put
>your talented mind to a realistic project. Parameters for such might
>include “bolt-ons” to current amphib ships to provide NGFS or the
>adaptation of existing smaller hulls of other types (such as my oil
>field service craft or the current generation of MCM vessels).
>
>The retired Sprucan concept (ahh, the “sizzle” inherent calling them
>APDs to get the votes of old guys) overlooks a critical
>financial/political consideration. If the Navy can’t afford to
>modernize them and operate them as surface combatants, it’s not likely
>to spend a dollar reconfiguring and paying the operating costs to use
>them as glamorized ferries for elite assault troops.
>
>But back to the cart before the horse.
>
>A substantial expenditure for the development of a ship optimized for
>NGFS support implies that anybody inside the Beltway (or in the Fleet)
>realistically envisions an opposed landing across a beach or any sort of
>operation against a coastline defended in depth by modern weapons
>systems unless the threat of such opposition has been largely
>eliminated.
>
>I’m no fan of carriers having lived and served long in one (as a black
>shoe), but the inherent and inescapable difference remains. 100 or even
>200 miles at sea, a carrier can still perform its mission with the
>limitation of reduced weapons loads on strike a/c. The ship can refuel,
>rearm, operate and defend itself (with the help of its entourage). To
>be effective in the NGFS role, any vessel must be able operate inshore,
>well within the response area of numerous enemy weapons systems. Some
>at least token comprehension of the risk factors involved should make it
>clear that even an old Sprucan might be to high-priced to risk (Now, one
>of those museum, Greek, Turkish or Taiwanese Gearings might make a
>different story.). It must emerge to the open sea to rearm and refuel
>(more often than you think), substantially diminishing the time it may
>spend on station.
>
>As for your comment about the 2nd round falling on the target…
>Even a blind pig is gonna find an acorn now and then.
>
>Your adherence to armor is traditional, but armor represents another
>descending footpath leading to the same dead end as the trail of big
>naval guns. We ain’t figured out how to armor sensors or to conduct
>modern naval warfare without electronic communications. Without them,
>any ship is dead on arrival, and they are just as vulnerable on an
>armored vessel as they are on a barge.
>
>Could it be that a significant factor in the development of early gators
>was not just the ability to beach but a pragnatic desire not to put too
>many eggs in any one basket? Our current amphibs are certainly not
>designed to close the beach.
>
>–
>Far too long for a sig, but personally compelling….
>Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
>existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
>breath close at hand, I seize my rewards from the simplest of
>pleasures….
>The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
>ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
>carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
>beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
>tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek
>gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
>combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
>crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
>shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
>shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
>Woman”(not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
>lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
>of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
>Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
>inevitable misfortune and grief. Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Purpose
The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
Links