“monitor”
January 2nd, 2009Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 11:33:17 -0700
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>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: “monitor”
>Cc: mahan@microwrks.com
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>
>Well, since others are not objecting to continuation of this “monitor”
>thread, I will jump back into it myself.
>
>I agree that the VERY LARGE guns that I proposed would not likely be needed
>for penetration of hardened targets. These guns would NEVER be built. Which
>is why my proposal for the “monitor” is practically speaking, a fantasy. I
>will come back to the idea of larger guns.
>
>Whether or not the Spuance class could have stood up to repeated service
>fireing of automated rapid fire 8″ guns is something of a moot point, as
>these ships have been worn out over 20+ years of hard service, and are
>slated for decommissioning. These ships were not subjected to the test of
>firing these guns for 10-15 years, so we will never know what problems might
>have developed. It would be economically wasteful to refit one of these
>ships as a gunfire support ship just to try the experiment.
>
>One response to the idea that the Spruance was not strong enough to handle
>long term use of such a gun reminded me so much of a Monty Python skit: “No
>it isn’t” “Yes it is!” “No it isn’t” “Yes it IS!!!” “No it isn’t!” “That
>isn’t an argument, that’s just a CONTRADICTION! An argument is a logical…”
>…. …. “no it isn’t” …
>
>I don’t think that there will ever be enough Ticos and Burkes to any of
>them, or their successors, for a gunfire support role, even if they were
>upgunned to some common 155mm calibre multi-purpose gun. They are too
>valuable in their AAW and ASW roles. The dwindling numbers of these ships
>means that even less time can be alloted for practice with amphibious
>operations, if any has been in the last 15+ years. With no Knox or Perry
>class frigates arround to take over subsidiary surface warfare duties, and
>the considerable number of CVs and other ships left to protect, figure the
>odds of an amphib warfare role for a CG or DDG.
>
>One phase in the thread surprised me, “cannot afford specialised ships”
>(pardon me if I didn’t quote it correctly). Virtually all the Navy’s ships
>specialize in some task. I won’t even begin to list them. The fact that
>there is some overlap in the capabilities of the Ticos and Burkes for AAW
>and ASW does not mean that a role of amphibious warfare should be thrust on
>them as well. They are not the right ships for the job.
>
>For some reason, we continue to have many large carriers. This means that
>the US is still in the power projection business. We also have many
>dedicated amphibs including LHAs and LPHs, along with the Marine corps,
>Seals, and Seebees to use them. So as of now, the US retains the ability to
>project war onto an enemy coast, though not, admittedly, a heavilly defended
>one. I would suggest that a cheaper, less capable, but specialised ship is a
>better solution.
>
>One of the reasons that I think the ship should be a specialized amphib is
>for reasons of attitudes in the surface fleet. When I served in an amphib
>group long ago, I was always amazed at the number of times that some sailor
>would grumble about wanting to get back to the “real navy”. I would respond
>that canoes carrying warriors had to be the oldest and most basic warship
>function in history. In a number of amphibious exercises, I never remember
>seeing a USN surface combatant practicing indirect fire proceedures and
>communications in support of an amphib exercise. (Wasn’t lucky enough to
>practice with the New Jersey, though it was in commission for part of my
>hitch.) I do remember Thai and Korean surface combatants, and a rocket
>support ship (Korean). Maybe things have improved in the last 15+ years
>since I was at sea, but I doubt it. If I were a Marine who was heading for
>the beach, I would consider indirect fire support from a bunch of haughty
>surface warfare types who only thought they knew what they were doing to be
>a very dubious benefit. There would be a significant chance under such
>conditions that “friendly” fire would take a sad toll on our own Marines.
>
>In order for our small numbers of ready amphib forces to be effective, there
>is no substitute for steady training as a team at specialized tasks. This
>means using specialized equipment and techniques. If we cannot afford the
>specialized ships and soldiers for amphibious warfare, then we cannot
>sustain the naval function.
>
>Big guns have important advantages over smaller ones. One can be range, that
>is, range without the added complexity of the booster rockets already
>mentioned. Another is payload. Another is inherent stability of shell in
>flight and thus greater long range accuracy. I realize that this is
>annecdotal, but I wonder if any of you has also read the bit from “Curahee,
>We Stand Alone” in which the 101st airborne trooper watches a naval gunfire
>observer make a single correction after spotting heavy shell round and lands
>the next shell directly on a German held building. If we could demolish
>strong buildings after even 2-3 spotting rounds with heavy shell, without
>laser guidance, that would surely be cheaper than all the complex electronic
>gizmos used in missles and guided projectiles.
>
>OK, I know it isn’t going to happen. So I will just drop it…
>
>I really like the ideas about that 155mm gun. During my time in the USN, the
>Marines were just getting their first 155mm artillery. My gator (LST 1186,
>USS Cayuga) carried its share of the Marine’s old 105mm. Was glad to see the
>Marines get a little more firepower. The 155mm may be a fair compromise size
>for a gun that has an AAW role, as many of you seem to want. The thing will
>get more expensive (probably exponentially) as capabilities of AAW, ASW, and
>gunfire support are all layered into it. But I can see why one would want
>more bang from the barrel.
>
>I must ask though, what happened to the 8″ gun that the army had (I don’t
>keep up on these things). I thought there were some 8″ howitzers and long 8″
>guns (which could deliver the tactical nukes). If there is an 8″ long gun
>still in service, it might be a fine size for a specialised gunfire support
>ship. Some faster fire capability, but larger size for greater payload,
>range, and accuracy. I wonder if the army still has a number of specialized
>8″ shells. The tac nuke option would probably not fit in an amphib senario,
>but what if…
>
>A disadvantage would be that if the automated loading machinery broke down,
>8″ is not a comfortable shell size for manual loading (for anybody but
>Arnold S.), so continuation of slower rates of fire with individually
>spotted rounds would be more difficult. Note: I assume breakdowns, having
>seen the way the military goes with low bidders and obsolete technology.
>
>I would not want to see these “gunboats” overloaded with complicated sensors
>and electronics. Keep them cheaper, simpler, and expendable, in the true
>amphib tradition. Don’t make them something that could be diverted to any
>significant surface warfare task. Surface warfare types might not mind a
>tour of duty on one of these amphibs too much, as the nostalgia for guns
>might make the tour fun. Don’t make the “gunboat” deep draft. It needs to
>operate on beaches, shallow coasts, and river environments. By keeping them
>from having surface warfare roles, excessive wear and hard use can be
>avoided. The cost of the specialised ship can be better justified if a long
>50 year service life can be planned from the start, with sufficient
>provision for spare parts in the initial build.
>
>With 155mm, a gunfire support ship could carry 3 mounts, or 2 with space for
>some other kind of ordnance launcher, such as a long fixed tube for rocket
>assisted guided projectiles (or whatever). With 8″, I could only imagine 2
>mounts. In either case the ship could be much smaller than my projection of
>10,000 tons plus.
>
>Warren Bruhn