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>Date: Thu, 7 Aug 1997 15:18:39 -0400 (EDT)
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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
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>Resent-Date: Thu, 7 Aug 97 12:19:07 EST
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>
> >The development of a/c capable of effective weapons delivery made
> >monitors “inoperable” except within an air superiority envelope, vastly
> >and overwhelmingly increasing the “vulnerability” factor which must be
> >considered in the naval ship-development equation.
> >The diminution of fixed coastal defenses has removed a substantial
> >factor from the “need” side of any equation utilized to evalue the
> >development of monitor-type vessels.
>
> Since you have to have air anyway, the monitor becomes a
> >only a third rate asset requiring diversion of otherwise needed
> >resources to protect and supply for a low priority mission.
>
>
> >The reasons for such low priority are many, but the most substantial
> >among them is the estimation/realization/blinding conclusion that we and
> >all our potential allies pooling resources would be ill-equipped to
> >venture and unlikely to succeed in an “opposed” amphbious operation
> >against any possible enemy other than the occasional local warlord.
> >Certainly, even the curent and potentially available resources of NATO
> >in the Adriatic would be incapable of landing and maintaining a force
> >across a Dalmatian beach against active Serbian Army (or even Croatian
> >Army) opposition without accepting politically non-acceptable casualty
> >rates.
>
> Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE
>
>Mr. Sends’ point seems to be that if the US did not have air superiority in
>a hostile area we would not attempt amphibious operations there, and if we
>did have it, a “monitor” or BB would be irrelevent. In general, I would
>agree if matters were at the extreme edge of the scale either way. However,
>in past conflicts “air superiority” has usually been an difficult term to
>apply. Did the US have air superiority over Europe or the PTO in June 1944?
>Locally, yes. Nevertheless, some of the biggest air engagements of the war
>were still to come. Did we have it in Vietnam? Certainly over the South, but
>we never invaded the North. Had we done so it is safe to conclude that the
>North Vietnamese would have thrown what they had in the way of aircraft at
>us. The Gulf Conflict is a case in point. The USN was not very agressive at
>the outset about forward deployment of their carriers. No doubt our admirals
>knew the US could utterly blanket any given area, but a small, well
>conducted raid by the Iraqi AF with cruise missiles could have knocked one
>of the big tubs out of action. (I have been told that the Stark incident
>shook some people up inside the Navy. Cruise missiles, of course, do not
>have to launched from air.) The problem with our carriers is that we have
>invested so much PRESTIGE into them that the prospect of having one damaged
>(much less sunk) is very ugly. Which leads to a secondary point. A carrier
>task force is remarkably “muscle bound” if any opposition is feared. Not
>only are the escourts dedicated to protecting the CVN, but so is most of its
>aircraft. Now I think there is much to be said in favor of naval artillery.
>In artillery terms it is very heavy. You can disperse fire over a very large
>area in smaller amounts than you’d find in an air strike. If one has ground
>observers, artillery is extremely accurate. (The Army and Marines like
>artillery: I should think they’d like even heavier artillery if they could
>move it on land; or keep up the kind of sustained barrage that a destroyer
>could do in WWII). What I don’t understand is the Navy’s allergy to armor. I
>realize there are doubts about it’s relative importance in keeping a ship
>afloat. But I shouldn’t think there would be any doubt that an armored
>vessel would suffer far less damage/loss of life to a hit above the water
>line than a thin skinned ship would. Let’s face it, the US has grown use to
>fighting wars without paying a blood tax. Such political considerations
>should rank very highly for weapons procurement. This may be progress, it
>may be folly, but it’s the truth. How about a little smart neo-isolationism?
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

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