Archive for the ‘1997’ Category

(Fwd) Re: 16 Dec 1914 bombardment

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu Aug 14 00:57:13 1997
>From: “Ian L. Buxton”
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 08:55:43 GMT0BST
>Subject: (Fwd) Re: 16 Dec 1914 bombardment
>Priority: normal
>X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.53/R1)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>——- Forwarded Message Follows ——-
>From: Self >To: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: Re: 16 Dec 1914 bombardment
>Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 08:54:09 GMT0BST
>
>I think James Goldrick’s book ‘The Kings Ships were at Sea’ has a
>detailed account. Published about 1990. James is currently
>commanding officer of HMAS Sydney.
>Ian Buxton
>
>
> > Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 13:58:37 -0700
> > To: WWI-L@ukans.edu
> > From: Warren Bruhn
> > Subject: 16 Dec 1914 bombardment
> > Cc: mahan@microwrks.com
>
> >
> > I am interested in the 16 Dec 1914 bombardment of Hartlepool and > Scarborough
> > by the German battlecruisers. I understand that the German High Seas fleet
> > was providing long range escort for the battlecruisers during this
> > operation, and that the British had dispatched battlecruisers and a single
> > battle squadron to intercept the raid, but missed. Does anyone have more
> > detailed information on the forces at sea in the North Sea on that date,
> > commanders, etc.???
> >
> > I would be very greatful for any information that you might have > on the topic.
> >
> > Warren Bruhn
> >
> >
> >
>
>

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16 Dec 1914 bombardment

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Aug 13 16:15:10 1997
>From: “John Forester”
>To:
>Cc:
>Subject: Re: 16 Dec 1914 bombardment
>Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 16:10:04 -0700
>X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet Mail 4.70.1161
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Donald Macintyre’s *Jutland* describes the actions of the day. Hipper was
>out with his battlecruisers, bombarding the British coast. Ingenohl with
>the High Seas Fleet was far to seawards, in position to fight any British
>force that might attempt to intercept and chase Hipper. The British had
>Beatty with four battle cruisers and light cruiser screen, moving
>southwards from Cromarty, to meet Adm. Warrender (base not stated, but
>presumably Scapa Flow, but if so, how had they got there so soon?) who had
>6 battleships of the KGV class, and Tyrwhitt’s Harwich force of light
>cruisers and destroyers. At daybreak, Beatty’s and Ingenohl’s destroyers
>and light cruisers made contact. Ingenohl, fearful of his emperor’s
>explicit instructions not to fight the whole British fleet and not knowing
>that only a part of that fleet opposed him, turned around, leaving Hipper
>to his fate. Hipper had few outlets through the coastal minefields, and
>Jellico ordered these to be closed by the forces at sea. Beatty’s screen
>met Hipper’s screen at an outlet, but Hipper, warned by radio, turned north
>in the mist and evaded Beatty.
>
>John Forester
>408-734-9426 726 Madrone Ave
>forester@johnforester.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086-3041

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starship troopers (fwd)

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Sat Aug 02 00:47:48 1997
>Date: Sat, 2 Aug 1997 00:47:36 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Tracy Johnson
>To: MAHAN-L
>Subject: Re: starship troopers (fwd)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>There was a discussion of Starship Troopers on the Conflict Simulation
>(CONSIM-L) list. During the course of thread, parts of Heinlein’s
>personal history came up. Speculative though it may be:
>
>Tracy Johnson
>tjohnson@adnetsol.com
>”Semper Pollus”
> ADC-2239-5531
>
>———- Forwarded message ———-
>Date: Thu, 31 Jul 1997 17:54:08 -0500
>From: Leonard R. Cleavelin
>To: Multiple recipients of list CONSIM-L
>Newgroups: bit.listserv.consim-l
>Subject: Re: starship troopers
>
>At 11:03 PM 7/30/97 -0400, Steve wrote:
>
> >Leonard R. Cleavelin wrote:
>
> >> Heinlein was a graduate of the Naval
> >> Academy, and probably would have retired a rear admiral (at least) had he
> >> not contracted tuberculosis (?) before WWII and gotten a medical > retirement.
> >
> >Interesting. What do you base that on? Not that I disagree with you,
> >but I’m just interested in what he may have had to say about Pre-WWII
> >naval tactics and strategy that would warrent such a statement.
>
>I’m basing it on wild assed speculation, based on what I thought was
>Heinlein’s seniority based on what I remember as his Academy graduation
>date. At the time I wrote this, I was under the impression that he’d have
>graduated in the late teens or early ’20s. That would have made him a fairly
>senior officer by ’41 (Commander at least and probably a Captain) which
>would have made him a shoo in for a couple stars during The Big One, given
>how the Navy expanded for WWII.
>
>I’ve since reviewed my sources, and I see he was born in 1907, and graduated
>from the Academy in 1929. Based on what little I know about probable
>promotion times in the between wars Navy (and to be honest it’s damned
>little), had he not gotten a medical retirement (in 1934) he’d probably have
>been a Lieutenant Commander by ’41. I think he’d still have picked up a
>star or two in WWII, but I don’t recall if the Navy was using temporary
>wartime ranks during that conflict. If so, there’s a good chance he’d have
>lost the stars once peace broke out (assuming, of course, he survived the
>war). As an Academy graduate with wartime experience, I still think that he
>would have a fair to good chance of having gotten a promotion to flag rank
>after the war (and to retire as such) unless he did something that was very
>”career-unenhancing” to screw up those chances.
>
>Best regards,
>
>–
>Leonard R. Cleavelin
>E-mail: leonard@inlink.com or lcleavelin@solutechinc.com(work related mail)
>WWW: http://www.inlink.com/~leonard/
>Never ascribe to malice that which can adequately be explained by stupidity.
>********Help stop Internet spam! Join CAUCE: ********

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Talbot-Booth 1930’s originals (fwd, FYI)

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon Aug 04 12:32:49 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom3.ecnet.net: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Mon, 4 Aug 1997 14:32:08 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom3
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>Subject: Talbot-Booth 1930’s originals (fwd, FYI)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>———- Forwarded message ———-
>Date: Mon, 4 Aug 1997 06:11:28 +0100
>From: Ron Streater
>To: MARHST-L@post.queensu.ca
>
>I have just had the first batch of original colour drawings of E C
>Talbot-Booth scanned. These were used in his 1932 and 1936 Merchant
>Ships books.
>
>The first 5 are:
>Achimota
>Aorangi
>Athenia
>Bayano
>Belgenland – as Columbia
>
>They have been posted to my web page http://www.junk1234.demon.co.uk
>
>Enjoy
>Ron
>
>–
>Ron Streater, Jasmine Lodge,
>jasmine@junk1234.demon.co.uk 1 Highfield Close,
>http://www.junk1234.demon.co.uk Blean,
>Telephone: 01227-780259 Canterbury, Kent,
>Fax: 01227-780259 CT2 9DX,
>Mobile: 0402-227270 U.K.

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“monitor”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

Date: Wed, 6 Aug 1997 14:07:17 -0700
>X-Sender: warpup@viser.net
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: “monitor”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Wed, 6 Aug 97 14:05:32 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>Mention on the consim list of the US Marine’s disappointment over the lack
>of guns on US Navy ships reminds me on one of my favorite ship ideas,
>inspired by Ian Buxton’s book, “Big Gun Monitors”.
>
>Try out this ship type in a modern naval game or game of modern small unit
>tactics that involves an amphibious invasion. If the game involves economics
>of producing the ships and delivering firepower to the beach, so much the
>better, because I think this ship would be economical to build and operate.
>
>”Amphibious Support Ship” [ASS]
>
>Displacement: 10,000 tons to 14,000 tons (naval architect out there???)
>Engines: diesel (economical and with long service life)
>Speed: 24-25 knots (more than enough to keep up amphibious task forces)
>Armament: 2 x 14″ (or 12″) in separately trainable barbettes
>Special features: laser guided shells
>Defenses: some anti-air and anti-missle point defenses, maybe a small gun
>Armor: none needed, but ship should be gas tight to defend against bio-chem
>Construction: very sturdy… to withstand the shock of these very heavy guns
>Electronics: also must be able to survive shock of own guns
>Special features: fairly broad beam for stability and to survive a torpedo
>Other feature: designed to survive grounding on beach (likely accident)
>Other feature: reasonably shallow draft to operate at beaches & estuaries
>Intended lifespan: 50 years of useful life with timely overhauls
>Number: 4 (2 on each coast… always expect one to be in overhaul)
>Spares: 3-4 spare barrels per gun to replace worn barrels (32-40 total)
>Other spares: two spare sets of diesel engines, some spare electronics
>Crew: 250-300 + Marine artillery staff (depends on level of ship automation)
>
>Advantages:
>(1) Much cheaper way to provide amphibious firepower than aircraft >or missiles.
>(2) More practical than reactivation of old 16″ battleships.
>(3) Military manpower requirements increased by only 1000-1500 people.
>(4) Economical addition to Marine amphibious firepower.
>(5) Constant readiness enhanced by having one fully ready unit on each coast.
>(6) 50+ years serviceability could be achieved with sturdy construction.
>(7) Experience with gun casting could help US metalurygy and steel mills.
>(8) Use of simple technology such as guns could provide political benefit.
>(9) Psychological impact good for Marines, bad for potential enemies >of Marines.
>
>Disadvantages:
>(1) Too economical for most military planners and politicians to comprehend.
>(2) Requires spending to help the Marines… which politician would do that???
>(3) US business wouldn’t build the ship sturdy enough to do its job long term.
>(4) Building big guns again would be really expensive.
>(5) Building big guns again would take considerable time.
>(6) These ships would appear to be clearly “imperialist” weapons.
>(7) Requires suffering through a right wing political period to get >these ships.
>(8) Politician will want these ships to fire at drug-lords’ airstrips.
>(9) Diesel exhaust is not nice for global warming or port city air quality.
>
>Speculative Use:
>(1) If all surface and air naval support failed, this big “ASS” could try to
>land a laser guided 14″ shell on speeding enemy missle boat.
>
>Personal Note:
>I am anti-imperialist and I applaud reduced military size & expenditure.
>However, navies are hard to build in a hurry, and a strong and potent
>amphibious capability is integral to strong naval power. This “ASS” is worth
>the consideration of Congress.
>
>If any of you try including this fantasy ship in a modern naval or land
>game, particularly one involving economical force, please let me know how
>the simulation turns out.
>
>Warren Bruhn

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“monitor”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

Date: Thu, 07 Aug 1997 09:22:20 -0700
>From: TMOliver
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/Oliver
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: Warren Bruhn
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Thu, 7 Aug 97 07:19:06 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>Warren Bruhn wrote:
> >
> > Mention on the consim list of the US Marine’s disappointment over the lack
> > of guns on US Navy ships reminds me on one of my favorite ship ideas,
> > inspired by Ian Buxton’s book, “Big Gun Monitors”.
> >
> >From one who has read and enjoyed to book (and noted that the old
>monitors mission-satisfaction level was less than orgasmic), when ideas
>transcend reality, they become fantasy….
>
>Though well thought out and developed in great detail, your “modern
>monitor” would be a striking but cumbersome and unhandy vessel of vast
>expense for which no realistic mission exists or might exist.
>
>Monitors (in the WWI British application) were developed to provide
>”cheap” (lesser cost/risk ratio) and/or rapidly available heavy
>artillery to attack coastal defenses and installations, little more than
>powered barges upon which to transport artillery barrels.
>
>The development of a/c capable of effective weapons delivery made
>monitors “inoperable” except within an air superiority envelope, vastly
>and overwhelmingly increasing the “vulnerability” factor which must be
>considered in the naval ship-development equation. Their limited
>employment and lack of further development in the WWII era provides
>fitting (and damning) evidence of naval leadership’s estimate of their
>real value.
>
>The diminution of fixed coastal defenses has removed a substantial
>factor from the “need” side of any equation utilized to evalue the
>development of monitor-type vessels.
>
>Even the most “gung ho” of Marines would be unlikely, even foolish, and
>certainly hastily retired for suggesting an “across the beach”
>amphibious operation against a coast defended by well led, mobile troops
>equipped with modern weapons, unless
>number/efficiency/morale/CCC/weapons had been substantially reduced by
>air attack carried out on a continuing basis for some period of time, a
>task far beyond the capability or the “safely deployable” envelope of
>your monitor. Since you have to have air anyway, the monitor becomes a
>only a third rate asset requiring diversion of otherwise needed
>resources to protect and supply for a low priority mission.
>
>My experience leads me to believe that you have vastly underestimated
>the cost to develop, construct, deploy and support monitors, while
>ignoring the existence (and prepaid nature of) a variety of aviation
>assets from attack a/c to CVs to fixed airbases. No, they’re not cheap
>to support/maintain/operate, but they are all ready on hand (and far,far
>more effective than the slow, limited, and no more accurate weapons
>delivery capability of a monitor.
>
>It’s fine to propose “high tech” munitions for the big guns of a
>monitor, but a greater knowledge of the limitations which must be
>applied to those munitions to deal with the breech/barrel pressures and
>other extreme forces inherent result in a big heavy package with
>relatively small destructive contents (fine for attacking concrete or
>armor plate within easy visual range, but “not worth the teats on a boar
>hog” against the vast majority of high priority targets, especially
>mobile ones).
>
>Unfortunately, all the discussion about NGFS and the Marines’ desire for
>same blithely ignores the reality that in any list of potential naval
>activities, NGFS occupies a low-priority position somewhere below
>dumpster maintenance, largely extraneous to projected operations and
>projected to be performed (if ever) as a “collateral” duty by existing
>ship types.
>
>The reasons for such low priority are many, but the most substantial
>among them is the estimation/realization/blinding conclusion that we and
>all our potential allies pooling resources would be ill-equipped to
>venture and unlikely to succeed in an “opposed” amphbious operation
>against any possible enemy other than the occasional local warlord.
>Certainly, even the curent and potentially available resources of NATO
>in the Adriatic would be incapable of landing and maintaining a force
>across a Dalmatian beach against active Serbian Army (or even Croatian
>Army) opposition without accepting politically non-acceptable casualty
>rates.
>
>And a monitor or two wouldn’t alter the equation….
>But a MRLS with a fire control data link mounted on the hull of an oil
>rig service boat, an existing highly developed inshore craft capable of
>high seas transit, would make an interesting, far less grandiose,
>cheaper, of far better cost/risk ratio, much more rapidly
>available/deployable/operable (utilizing on-hand munitions – everybody
>big’s army has such a system) and off-the-shelf components thruout its
>systems) trial horse for those fixated upon “Guns for Gators”, a modern
>manifestation of a WWII vessel type which did come in handy and was cost
>effective, the rocket-launching conversions on a variety of smaller
>amphib hulls culminating in the LSMR and the last version thereof, the
>Carronade.
>
>–
>Far too long for a sig, but personally compelling….
>Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
>existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
>breath close at hand, I sieze my rewards from the simplest of
>pleasures….
>The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
>ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
>carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
>beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
>tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek
>gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
>combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
>crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
>shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
>shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
>Woman”(not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
>lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
>of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
>Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
>inevitable misfortune and grief. Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE

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[Fwd: Re: Naval Warfare (was Japanese names)]

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

Date: Thu, 07 Aug 1997 07:51:35 -0700
>From: Tracy Johnson
>Reply-To: tjohnson@adnetsol.com
>Organization: adnetsol.com
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win95; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net, mike.potter@artecon.com
>CC: tjohnson@adnetsol.com
>Subject: [Fwd: Re: Naval Warfare (was Japanese names)]
>Precendence: bulk
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>
>An interesting conversation from the CONSIM-L list.
>–
>Tracy Johnson
>tjohnson@adnetsol.com
>”Semper Pollus”
> ADC-2239-5531
>Received: from listserv.uni-c.dk (listserv.uni-c.dk [130.228.3.7]) >by adnetsol.adnetsol.com (8.6.12/8.6.6) with ESMTP id DAA11061 for >; Thu, 7 Aug 1997 03:26:11 -0700
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>Date: Thu, 7 Aug 1997 06:30:46 -0400
>Reply-To: Conflict simulation Games
>Sender: Conflict simulation Games
>From: Terry Rooker >Subject: Re: Naval Warfare (was Japanese names)
>To: Multiple recipients of list CONSIM-L
>In-Reply-To: <33e9266a>
>
>On Wed, 6 Aug 1997, perrym wrote:
>
> > Most of that extra space we were talking about was in the hull. The
> > Navy was toying around with the MK 71 Lightweight 8″ gun. If you ever
> > saw it on the USS HULL (a FORREST SHERMAN DD) and then look at how much
> > room there is around the 5″ on a SPRUANCE, it doesn’t take much
> > imagination. If you’re going to have an 8″, you still need a magazine
> > with decent capacity. Anyway, at least one refit used that extra
> > space. As the vertical launch systems replaced the ASROC launchers, the
> > SPRU-cans became strike DDs with Tomahawk. Not part of the original
> > plan but it works.
> > >
>Sigh… The Spruance was designed to take advantage of several programs
>then under development. All of these where part of the original plan.
>the Spruance was designed to have 2 8″/72 mounts replacing the 5″/54s.
>Although some people claim that only one was intended. I had a friend
>who was a gunnery officer on a DD963 and he told me the figures comparing
>the magazine loadout of 5″ shells on his ship. Considering the
>difference in size of the 8″ and 5″ rounds I believed him when he said
>they were supposed to have 2 8″ guns. The ship was also designed for the
>VLS. It just wasn’t available when the original ships were built. That
>is also why the Shah got the Mk26 (?) luanchers for SAMs, it was the only
>thing ready at the time. The DD963 VLS was intended to carry more than
>THAWK though. The were vague intentions for a vertically launched ASROC,
>possibly a VL Harpoon, and some SAM. I think the intention for the
>latter was to have a multi-channel FCS that could be used to gunfire or
>to guide 1 or 2 missiles. Presumably this would have been some variation
>of the Standard missile. They only became Strike DDs when all the
>programs but THAWK lapsed.
>
>
> > You’re right about bigger hulls. That’s why the
> > ARLEIGH BURKE is so beamy.
>
>The beamy hull of the Burke class has little to do with future growth.
>The beamy hull was a deliberate design decision. There was an article in
>Proceddings as the program was just getting under way. Previous USN hull
>forms were optimized for efficient cruising, so they were long and
>narrow. The Soviets had consistently built ships that were much beamier,
>because there were some drag resistance benefits at high speeds.
>Ironically, if you look at some of the last Soviets designs they were
>moving towards the ‘cruising’ hull form, while the US with the Burke was
>moving towards the high speed hull form.
>
>Terry

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“monitor”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

X-Errors-To:
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>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
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>
>
> >The development of a/c capable of effective weapons delivery made
> >monitors “inoperable” except within an air superiority envelope, vastly
> >and overwhelmingly increasing the “vulnerability” factor which must be
> >considered in the naval ship-development equation.
> >The diminution of fixed coastal defenses has removed a substantial
> >factor from the “need” side of any equation utilized to evalue the
> >development of monitor-type vessels.
>
> Since you have to have air anyway, the monitor becomes a
> >only a third rate asset requiring diversion of otherwise needed
> >resources to protect and supply for a low priority mission.
>
>
> >The reasons for such low priority are many, but the most substantial
> >among them is the estimation/realization/blinding conclusion that we and
> >all our potential allies pooling resources would be ill-equipped to
> >venture and unlikely to succeed in an “opposed” amphbious operation
> >against any possible enemy other than the occasional local warlord.
> >Certainly, even the curent and potentially available resources of NATO
> >in the Adriatic would be incapable of landing and maintaining a force
> >across a Dalmatian beach against active Serbian Army (or even Croatian
> >Army) opposition without accepting politically non-acceptable casualty
> >rates.
>
> Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE
>
>Mr. Sends’ point seems to be that if the US did not have air superiority in
>a hostile area we would not attempt amphibious operations there, and if we
>did have it, a “monitor” or BB would be irrelevent. In general, I would
>agree if matters were at the extreme edge of the scale either way. However,
>in past conflicts “air superiority” has usually been an difficult term to
>apply. Did the US have air superiority over Europe or the PTO in June 1944?
>Locally, yes. Nevertheless, some of the biggest air engagements of the war
>were still to come. Did we have it in Vietnam? Certainly over the South, but
>we never invaded the North. Had we done so it is safe to conclude that the
>North Vietnamese would have thrown what they had in the way of aircraft at
>us. The Gulf Conflict is a case in point. The USN was not very agressive at
>the outset about forward deployment of their carriers. No doubt our admirals
>knew the US could utterly blanket any given area, but a small, well
>conducted raid by the Iraqi AF with cruise missiles could have knocked one
>of the big tubs out of action. (I have been told that the Stark incident
>shook some people up inside the Navy. Cruise missiles, of course, do not
>have to launched from air.) The problem with our carriers is that we have
>invested so much PRESTIGE into them that the prospect of having one damaged
>(much less sunk) is very ugly. Which leads to a secondary point. A carrier
>task force is remarkably “muscle bound” if any opposition is feared. Not
>only are the escourts dedicated to protecting the CVN, but so is most of its
>aircraft. Now I think there is much to be said in favor of naval artillery.
>In artillery terms it is very heavy. You can disperse fire over a very large
>area in smaller amounts than you’d find in an air strike. If one has ground
>observers, artillery is extremely accurate. (The Army and Marines like
>artillery: I should think they’d like even heavier artillery if they could
>move it on land; or keep up the kind of sustained barrage that a destroyer
>could do in WWII). What I don’t understand is the Navy’s allergy to armor. I
>realize there are doubts about it’s relative importance in keeping a ship
>afloat. But I shouldn’t think there would be any doubt that an armored
>vessel would suffer far less damage/loss of life to a hit above the water
>line than a thin skinned ship would. Let’s face it, the US has grown use to
>fighting wars without paying a blood tax. Such political considerations
>should rank very highly for weapons procurement. This may be progress, it
>may be folly, but it’s the truth. How about a little smart neo-isolationism?
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

what’s up???

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

Date: Thu, 7 Aug 1997 20:53:45 -0700
>X-Sender: warpup@viser.net
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: what’s up???
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Thu, 7 Aug 97 20:51:08 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>
>So, what’s up on this Mahan list??? [I’m new.]
>
>What are the parameters of discussion on this list??? How many people are on
>it??? I am on a number of other lists, and I am aquainted with list
>etiquette in general, but is there anything special that I should know about
>Mahan??? (besides the rest of his name and the titles of books that he wrote)
>
>Warren Bruhn
>Dallas, Oregon, USA
>6 year veteran USN
>25+ year veteran wargamer
>warpup@viser.net

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

“monitor”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 00:04:03 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Thu, 7 Aug 97 22:00:24 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>T.M. Oliver wrote:
>
> >Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
> >existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
> >breath close at hand, I sieze my rewards from the simplest of
> >pleasures….
> >The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
> >ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
> >carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
> >beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
> >tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek of
> >gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
> >combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
> >crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
> >shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
> >shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
> >Woman” (not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
> >lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
> >of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
> >Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
> >inevitable misfortune and grief.
>
>Assuming you wrote the above yourself, you are a poet, Sir. Where might I
>find more of your writings?
>
>If you did not pen this inspiring missive, pray, tell us who did.
>
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Purpose
The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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