From Fri May 23 11:58:34 1997
>From: mroberts@tfb.com (Michael Robertson)
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: USNI Naval History
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:46:56 -0800
>Organization: The Filebank BBS InterGate
>Reply-To: mroberts@tfb.com
>X-Mailer: Yarn 0.92 with YES 0.22 and QEdit 2.15
>Lines: 172
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>I am forwarding this article, please respond to usniwest@aol.com, not
>to my address. Mary Beth SK will be out of town next week, so any
>requests may take a while.
>
>—————————————————————–
>Please forgive such a long post, one of your list members (Michael Robertson)
>recommended that I post this to your group. He saw it on a Patrick O’Brian
>group and has taken advantage of it.
>
>I’ve combined three posts that I made to the original list I posted to, so
>bear with me, the first portion explains USNI and who I am, the second
>portion is the Mar/Apr. 97 table of contents and the 3rd portion is the
>May/June 97 table of contents.
>
> If you’d like the free sample copy (one per customer) please send me your
>mailing address via USNIWest@aol.com. Sorry, about the confusion, but I’m
>glad that Jim has sparked some interest!! 🙂 If anyone has questions about
>the U.S. Naval Institute and our other publications please e-mail me and I’ll
>do my best to answer your questions.
>
>Thank you for your time!
>
>Mary Beth Straight Kiss
>
>***********************************************************
>Mary Beth Straight Kiss
>U.S. Naval Institute Representative
>3485 Old Cobble Ct.
>San Diego, CA 92111-4045
>USNIWest@aol.com or (619) 874-8286
>***********************************************************
>
>Part I
>
> Just thought I’d inform the group that there is a magazine out there that
>is available for Naval and Maritime history buffs. Published by the U.S.
>Naval Institute, a non-profit private organization, it is the __Naval
>History__ magazine. It is bi-monthly and was created in 1988. The Naval
>Institute’s other magazine, __Proceedings__, was receiving so many good
>history articles that they decided to put them all together in one
>publication. It has been a big success. It can be subscribed to or bought
>at many major book stores. The U.S. Naval Institute is a non-profit
>professional organization for persons who have an interest in Naval and
>Maritime topics and concerns. It is the oldest private professional
>organization for the military and was established in 1873.
>
> I’d thought I try and list the titles of articles for each issue like so
>many other contributers have done on the list. That way if you are
>interested in a particular issue you can inquire about it or subscribe to
>the
>magazine itself. I’ll send that under separate heading.
>
> Subscriptions to the magazine are $20/yr for non-USNI members or $18/yr
>for members. International orders add $6 to the cost. (All US funds). Three
>year subscription rates are available too. If anyone is interested in
>seeing a sample copy please e-mail me with your address. One free copy per
>customer.
>
> I also am the indexer for the magazine, although the task is a bit behind
>because they just assigned me the backlog. I’ll let people know when the
>indices are available. The magazine and the index would be a great asset for
>any researcher’s library! I personally love the magazine and can’t wait to
>read it!
>
> I was the manager of the photo archives and reference library at USNI for
>over 9 years. I am now on the West Coast and am representing them here ( a
>trial run). I am responsible for garnering new members, new subscribers,
>selling USNI pubs, certificates, and photographs. As well informing people
>about our Oral History and reference services. Since it is such a new
>position, the East Coast office is tracking how beneficial it is. Please use
>the code MK7 whenever you order or request anything and they will know that
>you heard it from me! Thank you in advance.
>
>
>Part II
>
>Articles in the Mar./Apr. 97 issue of NAVAL HISTORY magazine by U.S. Naval
>Institute.
>
>__Burn Philadelphia__ by Major PHilip Wasielewski, USMC;
> IN what has been called one of the boldest strokes in U.S. Naval
>History, Captain Edward Preble determined to burn the 36-gun frigate rather
>than allow her to remain in the hands of the Tripoli’s Pahsa.
>
>__Constellation Goes Dry__ by Frank D. Roylance
> A Private Foundation in Baltimore has launched the first leg of a
>restoration effort intended to save and preserve one of the oldest U.S. naval
>vessels afloat. She’ll be high and dry for at least two years.
>
>__A Brave Band of Britons__ by Charles A. Steele
> Sailors and marines of the Royal Navy Division were deeply mired in the
>trenches of Ancre in 1916 as the soldiers of the British Fifth Army.
>
>__The Commodore Goes to Court__ by Suzanne B. Geissler
> Commodore Thomas Truxton was shocked that Aaron Burr had been arrested
>for treason and that he himself had been implicated in a conspiracy. But
>honor and integrity helped clear both names.
>
>__A Sad Day in the Cold War__ by Cdr. Robert C.M. Ottensmeyer, USN(Ret.)
> A routine intelligence-gathering mission–for the Cold War era, at
>least__ in 1952 turned sour near Cyprus. The hero of the day was the
>commander, who reentered the sinking aircraft to ensure all his crew had
>escaped.
>
>__Early Vietnam: Unwinnable?__ By Kenneth J. Hagan
> An expert corps of scholars, historians, and operators debated the hows
>and whys of the Vietnam War last spring at the Robert R. McCormick
>Foundation’s stately Cantigny First Division Museum in Illinois.
>
>__”No Men Like Him”__ By Jordan Vause
> A chronicler of German U-boat exploits in World War II illuminates one of
>the most intriguing of the U-boat commanders and author of the command
>manual, “Problems of Leadership,” Wolfgang Luth.
>
>In addition, the issue has our regular features: book reviews, reunion
>listings, historic fleet reports, museum reports, Navy Yarns, and letters to
>the editor.
>
>Part III
>
>Articles in the May/June 97 issue of NAVAL HISTORY magazine by U.S. Naval
>Institute.
>
>__The Ship that Launched a Nation__ by David C. Holly
> She had served sutifully from the Chesapeake Bay to Normandy, but the
>ultimate test for the President Warfield came 50 years ago when she became
>the Exodus 1947, transporting Holocaust Jews to the Promised Land.
>
>__Coming to Terms With the Old Foe__ by Rear Admiral Geroge R. Worthington,
>USN(Ret.)
> Having revisted Vietnam 30 years after he served as a Navy frogman there,
>the author has decided that normalization is the right policy.
>
>__The Truth About Kamikazes__ By D.M. Giangreco
> They were dreaded by every ship within striking distance of the Imperial
>Japanese Navy, but their success was largely psychological. According to an
>editor for “Military Review”, however, they were poised for a U.S. invasion.
>
>__Nelson’s Ten Years to Glory__ by RAdm. Joseph F. Callo, USN Reserve (Ret.)
> The last decade of his life made the legendary Admiral Lord Horatio
>Nelson “the focus of British identity and aspirations .”
>
>__Remembering Emma–and Others__ by Stephen Howarth
> The 1805 Club restores, preserves, and maintains Nelson-related
>monuments–including one to his mistress in Calais.
>
>__Torpedoed in the Celtic Sea__ by Adm. Worth Bagley, USN(ret.)
> In April 1917, the officers and crew of the destroyer Jacob Jones had the
>U-boat commander who had sunk the ship to thank for saving their lives.
>
>__Liberty Lost Pursing a Legend__ by Capt. Ira Dye, USN(Ret.)
> In summer 1937, NROTC students in the battleship USS Colorado helped with
>one of the most extensive search-and-rescue operations in naval history.
>
>__The Original Alphabet Soup__ by Michael J. Crowder
> You need a manual to decipher the evolutions and changes in the squadron
>designations of U.S. naval aviation. Here is a good place to start.
>
>In addition, the issue has our regular features: book reviews, reunion
>listings, historic fleet reports, museum reports, Navy Yarns, and letters to
>the editor.
>
> People interested in subscribing to __Naval History__ or finding out more
>about it can contact me at USNIWest@aol.com
>
>
>
>
>
>–
>Michael Robertson | | mroberts@tfb.com
>Oceanside, CA 92056 | |

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri May 23 13:39:17 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:38:06 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: seaways-shipmodeling-list@lists.best.com, mahan@microwrks.com,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca, consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>Subject: Re: MAHAN kit? Needed models. Tom Clancy.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>On Fri, 23 May 1997, JOHN WELIVER wrote:
> > Lou,
> > You wouldn’t happen to know if there is a kit in production that covers the
> > MAHAN class of DD’s.
>
>I’m certain there is not, unless there is an (expensive) resin kit, John.
> Ships are the least popular plastic models, and an obscure destroyer
> class isn’t going to make it into design and production, what with the
> prohibitive mastermold-making costs … even with CAD.
>
>For DECADES, I’ve petitioned (literally) the U.S. model manufacturers
> to put out cheap, simple 1:1200 Japanese and American WWII task force
> SETS. These would be ideal for kids to play with on the floor, for
> wargamers, and for WWII naval and marine history buffs — young and
> old. They would also undercut the Japanese monopoly of the (1:700)
> waterline WWII model warship market.
>
>TO NO AVAIL. American plastic model kit manufacturers are short-term-
> oriented business managers/majors with little or no sense of potential
> markets. (That is why the Japanese Pearl-Harbored them, in the first
> place, in this market sector.)
>
>TOM CLANCY is going to be at GenCon, the big wargaming convention in
> Milwaukee, this summer. (He is starting to invest in computer
> wargaming and graphics production.) I’ve already tried e-mailing
> him about my idea, but have gotten no response. (Could SOMEone
> forward this to him?)
>
>He and Larry Bond — the designer of the HARPOON and COMMAND AT SEA
> naval miniatures rules … my “Naval Action” rules are simpler,
> faster, better … 🙂 — are friends and collaborators. You would
> think that Larry would want cheap naval miniature sets available
> (via Toys R Us, etc.), so that kids would want to “regulate” their
> floorplay. (Back on Brittany Lane, the kid with the loudest voice
> and/or neatest models usually had his way. 🙂 )
>
>And World War II task forces are more desirable than “modern” TFs,
> simply because the WWII ships were in *battles* and are of
> historical importance. (In 100 years, which ENTERPRISE will be
> remembered most? … barring World War III, of course.)
>
>I trust you can sense what we are up against.
>
>Actually, 1:900 is the best floor scale, and I can build my cardstock
> models in any scale I want anyway.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri May 23 19:19:19 1997
>From: John Snyder
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 19:15:30 -0700
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: NAUTILUS 5th war patrol, part 4 – forwarded
>Organization: MacNexus, the Sacramento Macintosh User Group
>X-Mailer: TeleFinder BBS v5.5
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Here’s the long-awaited (by some of us) excerpt that went missing earlier.
>
> May 12, 1943
>
> Received message during night ordering us to Dutch Harbor and also to
> look for enemy shipping approaching ATTU from southwest which was
> heartily complied with.
>
> 0612 W Submerged as visibility increased somewhat.
>
> 1917 W Seas became so rough that periscope depth could not be
>maintained,
> increased depth to 90 feet.
>
> 2156 W Came to periscope depth, found sky completely overcast, low
> visibility, heavy seas.
>
> 2202 W surfaced.
>
> May 13, 1943
>
> 0841 W Early morning low visibility lifted and submerges. Could not
> maintain periscope due to high seas, rant at 100 feet.
>
> 2059 W Visibility reduced by fog, surfaces.
>
> May 14 to May 16, 1943
>
> Surface running. 1921 W May 14, 11943, crossed 180th meridian. 0544
>W
> submerged on sight plane contact and at 0624 W surfaces. 0315 W May
>16,
> 1943, received message altering routing and canceling speed
>restriction,
> immediately went ahead full speed. 15.5 knots in order to arrive
>DUTCH
> HARBOR before dark the 16th. At 1900 W May 16, 1943, arrived DUTCH
> HARBOR. The entire trip from the north coast of ATTU was made by dead
> reckoning except for one hazy sun fix obtained May 14, 1943.
>
> May 17 1943
>
> 1600 W Departed DUTCH HARBOR for PEARL HARBOR.
>
> May 18, 1943
>
> 1530 W Received message from Comsubpac to change course had head for
>MARE
> ISLAND immediately. Upon hearing this the morale of the crew
>increased
> one hundred percent.
>
> May 19, 1943
>
> Received message ordering us to go through a point through which we
>had
> already passed. So informed comsubpac giving my position, course and
> speed. In afternoon received message giving us a definite routing.
> Slowed to seven knots. This will cause us one day’s delay in arrival
>in
> port and commencement of overhaul. Made trim and training dive.
>
> May 20 to May 21, 1943
>
> Burned out bearing on turbo blower. On May 21, 1943 shifted to HPG
>and
> sent message requesting escort rendezvous at Point NAN at 0600 Zebra
> twenty fifth. This is four hours ahead of schedule but will assure
>our
> arrival MARE ISLAND prior darkness.
>
> May 22, 1943
>
> 0545 V Heavy fog set in, started SJ radar.
>
> 0645 V SJ radar contact bearing dead ahead, range 8,900 yards.
>Started
> TDC and got him on course 304 T. Speed 9. We were only 100 yards off
> track so changed course to open.
>
> 0654 V Sighted merchantman in fog range 800 yards; exchanged
>recognition
> signals.
>
> 0656 V In latitude 44-21N, longitude 139-45W passed him 350 yards
>abeam.
>
> May 23 to May 25, 1943
>
> On May 23 received message from Cominseafrom to Cominshore patrol, San
> Francisco, requesting destroyer rendezvous at 0600 Z May 25, 1943. At
> 0600 May 25, 1943, made rendezvous with escort and proceeded to MARE
> ISLAND. 1200 T May 25, 1943, arrived MARE ISLAND.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Mon May 26 20:08:12 1997
>Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:07:33 -0500
>From: Brooks A Rowlett
>Reply-To: brooksar@indy.net
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0 (Macintosh; I; PPC)
>To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: Light shipboard AA guns necessary? … and AA philsophies.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>TMO/TX wrote:
> in a long thread triggered by :
>
> > > >Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> > In regards to the British v. US experience…..
> > The US was led to maximizing the number of barrels of all calibers by a
> > simple (but so long ago as to have been forgotten) factor…the
> > potential number of attacking a/c arriving at the same time. Indelibly
> > marked by the Pearl Harbor experience, the tattoo even more deeply
> > colored in engagements against Japaneses carrier and landbased a/c in
> > substantial numbers thru ’42, we wanted “an impenetrable carpet of flak”
> > to steal a German concept. Dealing with fewer attackers (but more often
> > multi-engine or single engine a/c with some armor, both more damage
> > resistant than the lightly constructed Nipponese a/c), the British
> > perspective may have been quite different. The principal difference may
> > have been even more simply explained…a shortage of German a/c
> > carriers.
> > —
> > Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> > “Quid consilium cepit…”
>
>I think he’s put his finger on it. Secondly, I also think the RN was
>more sensitive to topweight. We should also point out that the average
>USN DD probably ran somewhat heavier than its RN counterpart expecially
>175 FLETCHER class (plus 100 or so BENSON/LIVERMORE/BRISTOL which are
>more directly comparable to the equivalent Britsh War Emergency type).
>And with more fleet oilers and more practice at UNREP the USN was
>willing to accept topweight that might not be compensated for in
>theroetical fuel – that is, because the US was able and willing to UNREP
>more often, they might have calculated stability always on the basis of
>assuming a certain % of fuel available which the RN might no9t have been
>willing to. In practice though, I don’t think that’s right, because i
>seem to recall something about the US trying to calculate stability with
>a LOWER fuel load than anyone else. At any rate, I strongly suspect
>that the numbers of individual attackers in the PAC being higher than
>was expected in Europe is the real key to this, with the stability
>factor that the USN chose to carry more – either being capable of at
>similar stability, or being willing to accept lower stability –
>contributing to the fact. Certainly late war AA fire control was still
>in the USN favor, with lots of small directors, including gyro sights on
>mount for the 20mm and individual directors for EVERY 40mm quad….the
>RN made a stabilized controlled 40mm single, the STAAG mounting.
>Another point possibly relevant is that the RN 2lbr octuple and quad
>were a shorter calibre than the 40mm Bofors which led to reduced range
>and accuracy and possibly more intent to use them in barrage mode.
>Certainly Martin Middlebrooks BATTLESHIP describes that the octuple 2
>pdrs on PRINCE OF WALES were unable to satisfactorily engage the IJNAF
>’Betty’ and ‘Nell” bombers before they dropped their torpedoes; they
>finally turned to using them in revenge mode against planes that had
>already dropped and were flying overhead, which is how they actually
>succeeded in shooting some down.
>
>Some Refs; Campbell’s NAVAL WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II, Friedman and Peter
>Hodges’ DESTOYER WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR 2.
>
>Some other points; The popular OTO Melara 76mm Compact mentioned is a
>
>62 calibre-long weapon. I can’t swear that the US did pay license fees
>to Bofors for manufacture of the 40mm during WWII – the History of the
>Bureau of Ordnance probably has that information – but they did get
>permission to manufacture and bought drawings from them so I presume
>the US did. (Original production was apparently reverse-engineered from
>samples on the Dutch cruiser JACOB VAN HEEMSKECK). The Japanese 40mm
>and also the Italian, were based on the Vickers 2 pdr, not the Bofors
>40. The late war German 40 was the Bofors, but I think I recall that
>the Germans may NOT have paid Bofors any license fees…unless that is
>postwar propaganda -“We Good Allies paid our license fees but the nasty
>Germans didn’t”.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Tue May 27 20:31:31 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 22:30:49 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.com
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney” , greggh@uiuc.edu
>Subject: 6-7 June ’97, IlliniCon’97, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois … CHEAP! 🙂
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>Weekend Badge $5.00 !! … at the Hedrick House, $20.00 a night!
>
>I’m going to try to be there … at *those* prices!
>
>I’m thinking about a 1:700 “Naval Action” naval miniatures game,
> a 1ST ALAMEIN tournament, and maybe a tournament-demo of my new
> Russian Front game? … assuming space and schedule permit.
>
>Sponsor is the Urbana Gaming House and the Hedrick House.
>
>Champaign-Urbana is the junction of I-57 (Chicago to St. Louis or
> Memphis) and I-74 (Iowa City or Quad Cities to Indianapolis).
>
>Check with Gregg Homerding … greggh@uiuc.edu … for details.
> 217-328-8000
>
>Hey, Gregg! Is there going to be an auction? … and when?
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> Would someone please put this up on rec.games.board.etc?

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Wed May 28 16:21:19 1997
>Comments: Authenticated sender is >From: “Patrick McSherry” >To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:22:27 +0000
>Subject: (Fwd) Re: CSS Hunley
>Priority: normal
>X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.01)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Hello Folks.
>
>This appeared on the Titanic List. I was not aware of an effort to
>raise the Hunley. Does anyone know anything else about it?
>
>
>——- Forwarded Message Follows ——-
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997
>From: JETINC1528@aol.com
>Subject: Re: Hunley
>
>
>yes there are plans to raise her, and I cant wait. I am a big fan of the
>hunley among other ships. That web site is great and there are also many
>more. just browse under c.s.s. hunley. i hope i can be there when they raise
>it. i’m thinking about catchin a bus down there and then watching them bring
>it into the harbor. There were two great documentaries on the ship. One
>about the ship itself was on the dscvry chnl and the other on raising her was
>on tlc.
>hope this helped.
>
>Tim

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Wed May 28 19:40:18 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 21:40:07 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: A&E
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Just saw a promo tonight for a special entitled “Sea Tails” to be shown
>Sunday night on A&E at 8 p.m. Eastern time.
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu May 29 14:16:14 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 16:09:42 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney” ,
> “William D. Anderson” , kerneks@ccmail.wiu.edu
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>But WHY was LIBERTY attacked?
>
>Possibilities: (?)
>
>1. Mistaken identity.
> Unlikely, from what we know from the crew. It seems to have been
> a thoroughly planned, premeditated air-sea massacre.
>
>2. Staged incident, to “frame” Egyptians.
> … rather like the “Polish attack” on the German Army on 1Sep39
> … or the “Finnish attack” on Soviet forces later that year?
>
> Weren’t the Israeli aircraft and boats clearly marked? Didn’t
> the Israelis know there would be other U.S. vessels in the area?
> Regardless of the markings, wouldn’t the Israelis know that trained
> intelligence people would readily identify them anyway? … if any
> survived, of course. I personally don’t think the Israelis are so
> inhumane — or *stupid* — as to attempt such a ghastly stunt.
>
>3. Reprisal for American injury to Israeli war effort?
>
> Did the Israelis think the Americans were “leaking” the intelligence
> we were gathering? Were we trying to restrain Israeli advances, and
> this was their way to msg “butt out”?
>
> Other things to consider: A number of French, Israeli, Soviet, and
> American subs began “not returning” at some time about then. Was there
> some relation?
>
> Moshe Dayan — Israeli Defence Minister — did penance for the attack
> by touring Vietnam and generally endorsing the Johnson Administration’s
> (incompetent) prosecution of the war … apparently.
>
>Fascinating. 🙂
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu May 29 11:53:00 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 13:52:04 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty … FYI, MilHst-L, >MarHst-L, ConSim-L (fwd)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>
>———- Forwarded message ———-
>Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 13:43:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>To: milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu, marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca,
> consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.net
>Cc: “Louis R. Coatney” ,
> “William D. Anderson” , kerneks@ccmail.wiu.edu
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty … FYI, MilHst-L, MarHst-L, ConSim-L
>
>
>Pat Hughes, the MilHst-L moderator, has told us he doesn’t want us
> talking about the Israeli massacre of the USS LIBERTY in 1967. As
> I remember, Pat is concerned there may still be security restrictions
> on the discussion of the incident. (And risks of legal prosecution?
> … loss of *pension*? … loss of academic access to agencies?)
>
>Someone has just posted an excellent article on the
> mahan@microwrks.net list. There have been some new
> developments in the case. And the coverup described rivals
> anything I found in the wartime gagging about the Katyn
> Massacre.
>
>So I would refer anyone interested in the LIBERTY to Mahan.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri May 30 10:02:57 1997
>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:02:59 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Reply-To: mike.potter@artecon.com
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: USS Liberty: draft article
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>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Last year I contacted a pro-Israeli partisan who supposedly could
>discuss USS =Liberty= (AGTR 5). He provided no information and assailed
>me personally as anti-Semitic for raising the issue. (I have,
>incidentally, a Jewish relative by marriage who perished in the
>Holocaust, probably at Auschwitz-Birkenau; his daughter is my aunt.) Try
>it: e-mail your questions to Prof Alan Stein at the University of
>Connecticut, stein@math.uconn.edu. His apparently publicly-funded web
>site, http://www.math.uconn.edu/~stein, also calls (or did last year)
>Jim Ennes an anti-Semite. I thought scholars were supposed to be
>open-minded. Anyway, this situation could explain why list masters might
>discourage discussion of the =Liberty= incident.
>
>Any Mahan List comments on this draft article? It needs style work but
>is the line of argument reasonable:
>
>In analyzing the =Liberty= incident from the Israeli angle, it is useful
>to distinguish intelligence collection and analysis (G2) from combat
>operations (G3). A major difficulty with Israel’s mistaken-identity
>excuse is that, if it were true, then the problem was simply a common G2
>failure. Israel then would have no reason to cover up why G3 operators,
>or more likely their boss, Moshe Dayan, ordered the sequential,
>multi-service attacks on the =Liberty=. Since Israel did and still does
>cover up their 1967 reasoning, the mistaken-identity excuse is at best
>inadequate.
>
>In =Assault on the Liberty= Jim Ennes hypothesized that Israel attempted
>to “dispatch” her so that she could not discover the plan to take the
>Golan Heights. Since communications interception is passive, Israel
>could be sure that =Liberty= was deaf only after her antennas were
>submerged. But Israeli forces ended their attack before that point.
>Either (a) after initial misjudgment, Dayan changed his mind in
>mid-stream about the need to dispatch =Liberty=; or (b) someone of great
>personal or political authority, perhaps his boss, prime minister Levi
>Eshkol, interceded to stop him.
>
>In either case, why cover it up today? Israel no longer asserts (if it
>ever did) that it seized the Golan Heights as an immediate defensive
>operation in 1967. And why is the U.S. Government still reluctant to
>investigate the attack?
>
>Israel must be protecting something extremely vital to it today. I
>suggest it is Israel’s nuclear strategy. In 1967 Israel was already
>building nuclear weapons, partially for deterrence and partially as
>weapons to punish the world should Israel face imminent destruction.
>This is what Seymour Hersch in his book of the title calls “the Sampson
>option:” punish the world by nuclear terror. Since it remains Israel’s
>current strategy, Israel has a vital interest in concealing its
>strategic decision process – especially since the strategy is deluded
>and operationally severely flawed. The fact that it is a long-standing
>strategy does not make it wise, tenable, or realistic.
>
>I suggest that Dayan in 1967 was not a calm hero but a panicky
>defeatist, and that the =Liberty= was the first pillar that he tried to
>pull down under a then pre-nuclear Sampson option. Probably Israel did
>not then have usable nuclear weapons so he used the weapons at hand
>against the first target within range. Dayan’s initiation of the
>national doomsday strategy obviously would be politically significant.
>Either he came to his senses or Eshkol, or someone, found out about it
>and stopped it. Dayan panicked again in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. =Time=
>magazine reported that during that war Israel assembled ten nuclear
>bombs for retaliatory (not tactical) use. A corollary could be that
>Dayan usurped or already had control of these weapons, a significant
>flaw in political control.
>
>Why the US role in the cover-up of the =Liberty= incident?
>
>Initially: probably because McNamara and Johnson regarded 34 dead as
>trivial and the risk from intervening as high. In a similar incident,
>early in 1968 they forbade rescue of a US Navy A-7 pilot who ditched off
>China’s Hainan island after his aircraft was hit by North Vietnamese
>AAA. His widow obtained the NSC transcript of the decision, confronted
>McNamara with it, and asked him to apologize. He sarcastically refused
>and implied she was lying. (Their meeting was recorded and broadcast on
>NPR’s Christian Science Monitor Radio program in November 1995.) To
>Johnson and McNamara US military casualties were unimportant compared to
>diplomatic inconvenience.
>
>After 1967: probably because the USA has been stupidly stuck to Israeli
>foreign policy and has chosen to protect Israel’s nuclear program. The
>USA long pretended that Israel had no nuclear weapons but blithely gave
>Israel huge amounts of satellite reconnaissance photos that Israel could
>use for targeting purposes. Israel has armed itself with US-built
>weapons, including the new Sa’ar-V corvettes, whose only combat
>capability is long-range attack. Many Israeli fighters, including all
>their F4 Phantom jets right from the first delivery, have no air-to-air
>capability and are fitted purely as long-range bombers.
>
>Today: For many politicians, exploring the =Liberty= incident would
>jeopardize contributions from bipartisan pro-Israel lobbyists. By 1994
>even Newt Gingrich adopted the 1984 Democrats’ plank of moving the US
>embassy to Jerusalem. Hearings would bring the USA face to face with
>Israel’s still-current Sampson-option strategy. Hearings might show that
>Israel’s political leaders have weak authority over its nuclear arsenal;
>that their low-level nuclear weapons custodians might respond to a
>lunatic, as Moshe Dayan could have become under pressure; and that high
>Israeli officials have made deluded errors in judging their strategic
>situation, errors that proved catastrophic for the =Liberty=.
>
>–

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