Date: Thu, 07 Aug 1997 09:22:20 -0700
>From: TMOliver
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>To: Warren Bruhn
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
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>Warren Bruhn wrote:
> >
> > Mention on the consim list of the US Marine’s disappointment over the lack
> > of guns on US Navy ships reminds me on one of my favorite ship ideas,
> > inspired by Ian Buxton’s book, “Big Gun Monitors”.
> >
> >From one who has read and enjoyed to book (and noted that the old
>monitors mission-satisfaction level was less than orgasmic), when ideas
>transcend reality, they become fantasy….
>
>Though well thought out and developed in great detail, your “modern
>monitor” would be a striking but cumbersome and unhandy vessel of vast
>expense for which no realistic mission exists or might exist.
>
>Monitors (in the WWI British application) were developed to provide
>”cheap” (lesser cost/risk ratio) and/or rapidly available heavy
>artillery to attack coastal defenses and installations, little more than
>powered barges upon which to transport artillery barrels.
>
>The development of a/c capable of effective weapons delivery made
>monitors “inoperable” except within an air superiority envelope, vastly
>and overwhelmingly increasing the “vulnerability” factor which must be
>considered in the naval ship-development equation. Their limited
>employment and lack of further development in the WWII era provides
>fitting (and damning) evidence of naval leadership’s estimate of their
>real value.
>
>The diminution of fixed coastal defenses has removed a substantial
>factor from the “need” side of any equation utilized to evalue the
>development of monitor-type vessels.
>
>Even the most “gung ho” of Marines would be unlikely, even foolish, and
>certainly hastily retired for suggesting an “across the beach”
>amphibious operation against a coast defended by well led, mobile troops
>equipped with modern weapons, unless
>number/efficiency/morale/CCC/weapons had been substantially reduced by
>air attack carried out on a continuing basis for some period of time, a
>task far beyond the capability or the “safely deployable” envelope of
>your monitor. Since you have to have air anyway, the monitor becomes a
>only a third rate asset requiring diversion of otherwise needed
>resources to protect and supply for a low priority mission.
>
>My experience leads me to believe that you have vastly underestimated
>the cost to develop, construct, deploy and support monitors, while
>ignoring the existence (and prepaid nature of) a variety of aviation
>assets from attack a/c to CVs to fixed airbases. No, they’re not cheap
>to support/maintain/operate, but they are all ready on hand (and far,far
>more effective than the slow, limited, and no more accurate weapons
>delivery capability of a monitor.
>
>It’s fine to propose “high tech” munitions for the big guns of a
>monitor, but a greater knowledge of the limitations which must be
>applied to those munitions to deal with the breech/barrel pressures and
>other extreme forces inherent result in a big heavy package with
>relatively small destructive contents (fine for attacking concrete or
>armor plate within easy visual range, but “not worth the teats on a boar
>hog” against the vast majority of high priority targets, especially
>mobile ones).
>
>Unfortunately, all the discussion about NGFS and the Marines’ desire for
>same blithely ignores the reality that in any list of potential naval
>activities, NGFS occupies a low-priority position somewhere below
>dumpster maintenance, largely extraneous to projected operations and
>projected to be performed (if ever) as a “collateral” duty by existing
>ship types.
>
>The reasons for such low priority are many, but the most substantial
>among them is the estimation/realization/blinding conclusion that we and
>all our potential allies pooling resources would be ill-equipped to
>venture and unlikely to succeed in an “opposed” amphbious operation
>against any possible enemy other than the occasional local warlord.
>Certainly, even the curent and potentially available resources of NATO
>in the Adriatic would be incapable of landing and maintaining a force
>across a Dalmatian beach against active Serbian Army (or even Croatian
>Army) opposition without accepting politically non-acceptable casualty
>rates.
>
>And a monitor or two wouldn’t alter the equation….
>But a MRLS with a fire control data link mounted on the hull of an oil
>rig service boat, an existing highly developed inshore craft capable of
>high seas transit, would make an interesting, far less grandiose,
>cheaper, of far better cost/risk ratio, much more rapidly
>available/deployable/operable (utilizing on-hand munitions – everybody
>big’s army has such a system) and off-the-shelf components thruout its
>systems) trial horse for those fixated upon “Guns for Gators”, a modern
>manifestation of a WWII vessel type which did come in handy and was cost
>effective, the rocket-launching conversions on a variety of smaller
>amphib hulls culminating in the LSMR and the last version thereof, the
>Carronade.
>
>–
>Far too long for a sig, but personally compelling….
>Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
>existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
>breath close at hand, I sieze my rewards from the simplest of
>pleasures….
>The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
>ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
>carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
>beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
>tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek
>gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
>combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
>crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
>shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
>shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
>Woman”(not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
>lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
>of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
>Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
>inevitable misfortune and grief. Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

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>
> >The development of a/c capable of effective weapons delivery made
> >monitors “inoperable” except within an air superiority envelope, vastly
> >and overwhelmingly increasing the “vulnerability” factor which must be
> >considered in the naval ship-development equation.
> >The diminution of fixed coastal defenses has removed a substantial
> >factor from the “need” side of any equation utilized to evalue the
> >development of monitor-type vessels.
>
> Since you have to have air anyway, the monitor becomes a
> >only a third rate asset requiring diversion of otherwise needed
> >resources to protect and supply for a low priority mission.
>
>
> >The reasons for such low priority are many, but the most substantial
> >among them is the estimation/realization/blinding conclusion that we and
> >all our potential allies pooling resources would be ill-equipped to
> >venture and unlikely to succeed in an “opposed” amphbious operation
> >against any possible enemy other than the occasional local warlord.
> >Certainly, even the curent and potentially available resources of NATO
> >in the Adriatic would be incapable of landing and maintaining a force
> >across a Dalmatian beach against active Serbian Army (or even Croatian
> >Army) opposition without accepting politically non-acceptable casualty
> >rates.
>
> Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE
>
>Mr. Sends’ point seems to be that if the US did not have air superiority in
>a hostile area we would not attempt amphibious operations there, and if we
>did have it, a “monitor” or BB would be irrelevent. In general, I would
>agree if matters were at the extreme edge of the scale either way. However,
>in past conflicts “air superiority” has usually been an difficult term to
>apply. Did the US have air superiority over Europe or the PTO in June 1944?
>Locally, yes. Nevertheless, some of the biggest air engagements of the war
>were still to come. Did we have it in Vietnam? Certainly over the South, but
>we never invaded the North. Had we done so it is safe to conclude that the
>North Vietnamese would have thrown what they had in the way of aircraft at
>us. The Gulf Conflict is a case in point. The USN was not very agressive at
>the outset about forward deployment of their carriers. No doubt our admirals
>knew the US could utterly blanket any given area, but a small, well
>conducted raid by the Iraqi AF with cruise missiles could have knocked one
>of the big tubs out of action. (I have been told that the Stark incident
>shook some people up inside the Navy. Cruise missiles, of course, do not
>have to launched from air.) The problem with our carriers is that we have
>invested so much PRESTIGE into them that the prospect of having one damaged
>(much less sunk) is very ugly. Which leads to a secondary point. A carrier
>task force is remarkably “muscle bound” if any opposition is feared. Not
>only are the escourts dedicated to protecting the CVN, but so is most of its
>aircraft. Now I think there is much to be said in favor of naval artillery.
>In artillery terms it is very heavy. You can disperse fire over a very large
>area in smaller amounts than you’d find in an air strike. If one has ground
>observers, artillery is extremely accurate. (The Army and Marines like
>artillery: I should think they’d like even heavier artillery if they could
>move it on land; or keep up the kind of sustained barrage that a destroyer
>could do in WWII). What I don’t understand is the Navy’s allergy to armor. I
>realize there are doubts about it’s relative importance in keeping a ship
>afloat. But I shouldn’t think there would be any doubt that an armored
>vessel would suffer far less damage/loss of life to a hit above the water
>line than a thin skinned ship would. Let’s face it, the US has grown use to
>fighting wars without paying a blood tax. Such political considerations
>should rank very highly for weapons procurement. This may be progress, it
>may be folly, but it’s the truth. How about a little smart neo-isolationism?
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Date: Thu, 7 Aug 1997 20:53:45 -0700
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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: what’s up???
>Precendence: bulk
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>
>So, what’s up on this Mahan list??? [I’m new.]
>
>What are the parameters of discussion on this list??? How many people are on
>it??? I am on a number of other lists, and I am aquainted with list
>etiquette in general, but is there anything special that I should know about
>Mahan??? (besides the rest of his name and the titles of books that he wrote)
>
>Warren Bruhn
>Dallas, Oregon, USA
>6 year veteran USN
>25+ year veteran wargamer
>warpup@viser.net

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 00:04:03 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
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>T.M. Oliver wrote:
>
> >Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
> >existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
> >breath close at hand, I sieze my rewards from the simplest of
> >pleasures….
> >The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
> >ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
> >carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
> >beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
> >tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek of
> >gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
> >combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
> >crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
> >shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
> >shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
> >Woman” (not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
> >lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
> >of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
> >Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
> >inevitable misfortune and grief.
>
>Assuming you wrote the above yourself, you are a poet, Sir. Where might I
>find more of your writings?
>
>If you did not pen this inspiring missive, pray, tell us who did.
>
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

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>Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 00:04:03 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Re: c4i-pro Author Unknown
>Precendence: bulk
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>
>Bill Riddle wrote:
>
> > Here is a little sarcastic humor forwarded from the C4I-Pro list …
> >
> > THE BOOK OF JOINTNESS
> >
> >The generations of Command and Control Warfare, as told by the prophet
> >Toffler.
>
> >snip for brevity>
>LOL, Bill! As an employee of a major military electronics company, “The
>Book Of Jointness” sure hits home. I think the person who wrote that must
>be in the cubicle next to mine.
>
>What with all the wise men coming to “know” technology, I guess it’s true
>that every new system is a real bastard.
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 11:33:17 -0700
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>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: “monitor”
>Cc: mahan@microwrks.com
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>
>
>Well, since others are not objecting to continuation of this “monitor”
>thread, I will jump back into it myself.
>
>I agree that the VERY LARGE guns that I proposed would not likely be needed
>for penetration of hardened targets. These guns would NEVER be built. Which
>is why my proposal for the “monitor” is practically speaking, a fantasy. I
>will come back to the idea of larger guns.
>
>Whether or not the Spuance class could have stood up to repeated service
>fireing of automated rapid fire 8″ guns is something of a moot point, as
>these ships have been worn out over 20+ years of hard service, and are
>slated for decommissioning. These ships were not subjected to the test of
>firing these guns for 10-15 years, so we will never know what problems might
>have developed. It would be economically wasteful to refit one of these
>ships as a gunfire support ship just to try the experiment.
>
>One response to the idea that the Spruance was not strong enough to handle
>long term use of such a gun reminded me so much of a Monty Python skit: “No
>it isn’t” “Yes it is!” “No it isn’t” “Yes it IS!!!” “No it isn’t!” “That
>isn’t an argument, that’s just a CONTRADICTION! An argument is a logical…”
>…. …. “no it isn’t” …
>
>I don’t think that there will ever be enough Ticos and Burkes to any of
>them, or their successors, for a gunfire support role, even if they were
>upgunned to some common 155mm calibre multi-purpose gun. They are too
>valuable in their AAW and ASW roles. The dwindling numbers of these ships
>means that even less time can be alloted for practice with amphibious
>operations, if any has been in the last 15+ years. With no Knox or Perry
>class frigates arround to take over subsidiary surface warfare duties, and
>the considerable number of CVs and other ships left to protect, figure the
>odds of an amphib warfare role for a CG or DDG.
>
>One phase in the thread surprised me, “cannot afford specialised ships”
>(pardon me if I didn’t quote it correctly). Virtually all the Navy’s ships
>specialize in some task. I won’t even begin to list them. The fact that
>there is some overlap in the capabilities of the Ticos and Burkes for AAW
>and ASW does not mean that a role of amphibious warfare should be thrust on
>them as well. They are not the right ships for the job.
>
>For some reason, we continue to have many large carriers. This means that
>the US is still in the power projection business. We also have many
>dedicated amphibs including LHAs and LPHs, along with the Marine corps,
>Seals, and Seebees to use them. So as of now, the US retains the ability to
>project war onto an enemy coast, though not, admittedly, a heavilly defended
>one. I would suggest that a cheaper, less capable, but specialised ship is a
>better solution.
>
>One of the reasons that I think the ship should be a specialized amphib is
>for reasons of attitudes in the surface fleet. When I served in an amphib
>group long ago, I was always amazed at the number of times that some sailor
>would grumble about wanting to get back to the “real navy”. I would respond
>that canoes carrying warriors had to be the oldest and most basic warship
>function in history. In a number of amphibious exercises, I never remember
>seeing a USN surface combatant practicing indirect fire proceedures and
>communications in support of an amphib exercise. (Wasn’t lucky enough to
>practice with the New Jersey, though it was in commission for part of my
>hitch.) I do remember Thai and Korean surface combatants, and a rocket
>support ship (Korean). Maybe things have improved in the last 15+ years
>since I was at sea, but I doubt it. If I were a Marine who was heading for
>the beach, I would consider indirect fire support from a bunch of haughty
>surface warfare types who only thought they knew what they were doing to be
>a very dubious benefit. There would be a significant chance under such
>conditions that “friendly” fire would take a sad toll on our own Marines.
>
>In order for our small numbers of ready amphib forces to be effective, there
>is no substitute for steady training as a team at specialized tasks. This
>means using specialized equipment and techniques. If we cannot afford the
>specialized ships and soldiers for amphibious warfare, then we cannot
>sustain the naval function.
>
>Big guns have important advantages over smaller ones. One can be range, that
>is, range without the added complexity of the booster rockets already
>mentioned. Another is payload. Another is inherent stability of shell in
>flight and thus greater long range accuracy. I realize that this is
>annecdotal, but I wonder if any of you has also read the bit from “Curahee,
>We Stand Alone” in which the 101st airborne trooper watches a naval gunfire
>observer make a single correction after spotting heavy shell round and lands
>the next shell directly on a German held building. If we could demolish
>strong buildings after even 2-3 spotting rounds with heavy shell, without
>laser guidance, that would surely be cheaper than all the complex electronic
>gizmos used in missles and guided projectiles.
>
>OK, I know it isn’t going to happen. So I will just drop it…
>
>I really like the ideas about that 155mm gun. During my time in the USN, the
>Marines were just getting their first 155mm artillery. My gator (LST 1186,
>USS Cayuga) carried its share of the Marine’s old 105mm. Was glad to see the
>Marines get a little more firepower. The 155mm may be a fair compromise size
>for a gun that has an AAW role, as many of you seem to want. The thing will
>get more expensive (probably exponentially) as capabilities of AAW, ASW, and
>gunfire support are all layered into it. But I can see why one would want
>more bang from the barrel.
>
>I must ask though, what happened to the 8″ gun that the army had (I don’t
>keep up on these things). I thought there were some 8″ howitzers and long 8″
>guns (which could deliver the tactical nukes). If there is an 8″ long gun
>still in service, it might be a fine size for a specialised gunfire support
>ship. Some faster fire capability, but larger size for greater payload,
>range, and accuracy. I wonder if the army still has a number of specialized
>8″ shells. The tac nuke option would probably not fit in an amphib senario,
>but what if…
>
>A disadvantage would be that if the automated loading machinery broke down,
>8″ is not a comfortable shell size for manual loading (for anybody but
>Arnold S.), so continuation of slower rates of fire with individually
>spotted rounds would be more difficult. Note: I assume breakdowns, having
>seen the way the military goes with low bidders and obsolete technology.
>
>I would not want to see these “gunboats” overloaded with complicated sensors
>and electronics. Keep them cheaper, simpler, and expendable, in the true
>amphib tradition. Don’t make them something that could be diverted to any
>significant surface warfare task. Surface warfare types might not mind a
>tour of duty on one of these amphibs too much, as the nostalgia for guns
>might make the tour fun. Don’t make the “gunboat” deep draft. It needs to
>operate on beaches, shallow coasts, and river environments. By keeping them
>from having surface warfare roles, excessive wear and hard use can be
>avoided. The cost of the specialised ship can be better justified if a long
>50 year service life can be planned from the start, with sufficient
>provision for spare parts in the initial build.
>
>With 155mm, a gunfire support ship could carry 3 mounts, or 2 with space for
>some other kind of ordnance launcher, such as a long fixed tube for rocket
>assisted guided projectiles (or whatever). With 8″, I could only imagine 2
>mounts. In either case the ship could be much smaller than my projection of
>10,000 tons plus.
>
>Warren Bruhn

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

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>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: what’s up???
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> >To: Warren Bruhn
> >From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
> >Subject: Re: what’s up???
> >
> >I am on a number of other lists, and I am aquainted with list
> >>etiquette in general, but is there anything special that I should > know about
> >>Mahan???
> >>Warren Bruhn
> >
> >You must prove that you can properly pronounce Mahan’s name.
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Date: Fri, 8 Aug 1997 16:31:37 -0700
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>From: Warren Bruhn
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
>Cc: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
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>
> >Your adherence to armor is traditional, …
>
>Hey, don’t pin the armor thing on me! I never said anything in support of
>armor. In my description of a fantasy monitor, I specifically said that the
>ship should not be armored. Other people have been writing about >armor, not me.
>
>I can’t disagree with any of the rest of what you said. Though I would not
>be surprised if we eventually had a 155mm calibre for ship guns. That idea
>is somebody else’s baby though. Let them defend the idea.
>
>Now, I will get back to the age of black powder where I belong. Just
>thinking about modern naval combat, with nukes, nasty chemicals that get in
>through exposed skin, and biological agents that incapacitate and lead to a
>slow and painful death gives me the shakes. Somehow, having my arm slashed
>off by a cutlass while a bit of grapeshot takes off half my face seems more
>pleasant.
>
>Warren Bruhn

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Date: Fri, 08 Aug 1997 18:03:01 -0700
>From: TMOliver
>Reply-To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>Organization: Kestrel/SWRC/Oliver
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win16; I)
>To: Warren Bruhn
>CC: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: “monitor”
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>
>Warren Bruhn wrote:
> >
> > Well, since others are not objecting to continuation of this “monitor”
> > thread, I will jump back into it myself.
> >
> > I agree that the VERY LARGE guns that I proposed would not likely be needed
> > for penetration of hardened targets. These guns would NEVER be built. Which
> > is why my proposal for the “monitor” is practically speaking, a > fantasy….(vast snipping)
>
>I’m convinced that we’re looped into a cart before the horse agument.
>Large naval guns were used for support of amphibious ops because the
>ships and guns already existed, having been developed for missions
>against other ships and a/c. Aside from the BBs which had very limited
>mission capability (and no other BBs to shoot at very often), NGFS was a
>”collateral” assignment.
>
>Guns were used because guns existed.
>
>The development of the naval gun mature (even gray-headed) by the WWII
>era even with its succeeding large bore AAW manifestations represents
>technology on the back side of the power curve, and is always subject
>to a near-finite limitation, the destructive power of warheads limited
>by small size, thick casings (to provide for pressure/velocity
>protection), and relatively tiny detonating charges.
>
>In over 90% of its historic NGFS applications, range was of minimal
>consideration. Most shoots were “within the horizon”, with many even
>for small boys at “point blank” range. Extended range applications are
>certainly possible (and exist today), but 2000lb projectile with a tiny
>bursting charge and no terminal guidance represents little more than a
>big bang. Over 55 years ago, the Japanese found an optimum use for
>those “big” projectiles. Dropped from a/c, they were hell on the deck
>armor of old BBs (and given fins a great deal more accurate than when
>fired).
>
>As for the comparison of 5″ (127mm), 6″ (155mm) or even 8″ guns, the 8″
>will never more exist, and the 6′ offers no substantial quantitative or
>qualitative advantages over existing 5″ guns in US Naval service, a sort
>of “Why reinvent the wheel?” equation.
>
>In the US Army inventory, the “big guns’, 8” and 240mm, have been
>replaced by long ranged, more mobile, faster firing, easier to supply
>155mm models, both tracked and towed, and the MRLS launchers and their
>ubiquitous companions in other armies(all a great deal better than
>Congreve’s rockets, Stalin organs, Nebelwerfers and Korean LSMRs).
>
>Given a mission of demonstrably low priority (neither the Navy, JCs and
>Congress are enamored of it), minimal if any budget allocations today or
>in the future (unless there’s a drawn out shooting war), and likely to
>only be addressed by some “make-do” adaptations and combinations of
>”off-the-shelf” equipment and available vehicles, I wish you would put
>your talented mind to a realistic project. Parameters for such might
>include “bolt-ons” to current amphib ships to provide NGFS or the
>adaptation of existing smaller hulls of other types (such as my oil
>field service craft or the current generation of MCM vessels).
>
>The retired Sprucan concept (ahh, the “sizzle” inherent calling them
>APDs to get the votes of old guys) overlooks a critical
>financial/political consideration. If the Navy can’t afford to
>modernize them and operate them as surface combatants, it’s not likely
>to spend a dollar reconfiguring and paying the operating costs to use
>them as glamorized ferries for elite assault troops.
>
>But back to the cart before the horse.
>
>A substantial expenditure for the development of a ship optimized for
>NGFS support implies that anybody inside the Beltway (or in the Fleet)
>realistically envisions an opposed landing across a beach or any sort of
>operation against a coastline defended in depth by modern weapons
>systems unless the threat of such opposition has been largely
>eliminated.
>
>I’m no fan of carriers having lived and served long in one (as a black
>shoe), but the inherent and inescapable difference remains. 100 or even
>200 miles at sea, a carrier can still perform its mission with the
>limitation of reduced weapons loads on strike a/c. The ship can refuel,
>rearm, operate and defend itself (with the help of its entourage). To
>be effective in the NGFS role, any vessel must be able operate inshore,
>well within the response area of numerous enemy weapons systems. Some
>at least token comprehension of the risk factors involved should make it
>clear that even an old Sprucan might be to high-priced to risk (Now, one
>of those museum, Greek, Turkish or Taiwanese Gearings might make a
>different story.). It must emerge to the open sea to rearm and refuel
>(more often than you think), substantially diminishing the time it may
>spend on station.
>
>As for your comment about the 2nd round falling on the target…
>Even a blind pig is gonna find an acorn now and then.
>
>Your adherence to armor is traditional, but armor represents another
>descending footpath leading to the same dead end as the trail of big
>naval guns. We ain’t figured out how to armor sensors or to conduct
>modern naval warfare without electronic communications. Without them,
>any ship is dead on arrival, and they are just as vulnerable on an
>armored vessel as they are on a barge.
>
>Could it be that a significant factor in the development of early gators
>was not just the ability to beach but a pragnatic desire not to put too
>many eggs in any one basket? Our current amphibs are certainly not
>designed to close the beach.
>
>–
>Far too long for a sig, but personally compelling….
>Having been to see the elephant, contemplated the impermanence of
>existence, gazed upon the Apocalypse, and smelled Death’s rotting
>breath close at hand, I seize my rewards from the simplest of
>pleasures….
>The gentle rip of surf on sand, the cool, musty bite of a well-brewed
>ale, the briny tang imparted by a fresh oyster, the dark heart of
>carefully aged whisky, the incomparable savor of the first slash of rare
>beef, the aggressive impact of a powerful pinot, Summer’s first real
>tomato, the smoky complex fire of chipotle sauce, the combined reek
>gunpowder and working dogs across an Autumn pasture, the blessed
>combination of green chile and tomatillo, the ectasy of lump or backfin
>crabmeat (from blues), fresh Gulf Snapper or the season’s first inshore
>shrimp, all prepared with Spartan simplicity, the secret glimpse of a
>shadowed nipple within the gap of a loose blouse, the “Scent of a
>Woman”(not the movie, the experience), the astringent bite of
>lime-dosed gin and tonic in a tropical twilight, the lung-filling tingle
>of the first drag on a post-coital Camel, smoked salmon and a good
>Sunday newspaper….among these are found ample joys to counter
>inevitable misfortune and grief. Oliver Sends/OPIMMEDIATE

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

Date: Sat, 09 Aug 1997 00:58:30 EST
>From: EDWARD WITTENBERG
>To: MARHST-L@POST.QUEENSU.CA, MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM
>CC: wew@papa.uncp.edu
>Subject: I.N.S. Dakar
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Resent-From:
>Resent-Date: Fri, 8 Aug 97 22:00:15 EST
>Resent-To: dave@openlines.com
>X-Status:
>
>The following excerpt is taken from World Maritime News –
> Steve Schultz (sschultz@execpc.com), Ed.
>
> >U.S. Navy’s NR-1 searching for Israeli submarine missing almost 30
>years
>
> The U.S. Navy’s nuclear research submarine NR-1 has spent
> the last three weeks searching for an Israeli Navy attack
> submarine that sank off Egypt in January 1968. The search is
> reportedly outside Egyptian territorial waters, but with the
> cooperation of the Egyptian government. The NR-1 has been
> searching for the I.N.S. Dakar, originally the British Royal Navy’s
> H.M.S. Totem, built in 1944. Israel bought two submarines,
> including the H.M.S. Totem, in June 1965. On 9 Jan., 1968, the
> I.N.S. Dakar sailed from Portsmouth, England, for Haifa, Israel,
> with 69 crewmembers. On 24 Jan., south of Crete, Greece, the
> I.N.S. Dakar radioed the Israeli Navy headquarters, seeking
> permission to dock early. The request was denied and it never
> arrived. On 4 Feb., the I.N.S. Dakar was declared sunk and its
> crew missing. On 9 Feb., 1969, the submarine’s emergency buoy
> was found by a fisherman off Khan Yunis in Gaza. The NR-1 is
> operating from the Carolyn Chouest (U.S.-registry 2,110-dwt
> offshore supply vessel built in 1994), chartered from Edison
> Chouest Offshore Inc. This is the second major search for the
> I.N.S. Dakar since it was listed as missing. In 1986, Israel and the
> United States sought the submarine during Operation Challenge
> Express. >
>
>I am not sure, but I think this incident was the inspiration for Dr.
>Robert D. Ballard’s book _BRIGHT SHARK_, which deals with the sinking
>of an Israeli submarine in the Aegean. The submarine was engaged in
>transporting Russian Jews to Israel, in addition to certain military
>supplies that Israel had obtained from the Soviet Union. In the book,
>the Israeli government pulled out all the stops to ensure that no
>information was retrieved from the wreckage by the American
>oceanographers which discovered her.
>
>Edward Wittenberg
>wew@papa.uncp.edu

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous