From Fri Aug 15 07:03:41 1997
>Comments: Authenticated sender is
>From: “James H. E. Maugham”
>Organization: RST Environmental Services, Inc.
>To: sub-list@webcom.com, WWI-L@RAVEN.CC.UKANS.EDU
>Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 10:03:06 -0500
>Subject: Re: OFF-TOPIC: Virus Alert!!!
>Reply-to: CaptJHEM@waterw.com
>CC: MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM, MARHST-L@POST.QUEENSU.CA
>Priority: normal
>X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v2.53/R1)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>On 15 Aug 97 at 4:53, EDWARD WITTENBERG wrote:
>
> > Forward this A.S.A.P. to every single person you know!!!!!!!! >
>PLEASE DON’T!!!!!!
>
>This is a FRAUD!!!!! There ain’t no such animal as an E-Mail virus!
>
>James

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Mon Aug 18 15:18:15 1997
>Date: Mon, 18 Aug 1997 15:17:16 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Reply-To: mike.potter@artecon.com
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net, trooker@CAPACCESS.ORG
>Subject: DD 963 class upgrade intention (long)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>This analyzes an interesting note (snipped herein) that Tracy Johnson
>forwarded from the CONSIM-L list while I was on vacation . . .
>
>-snip #1-
>The Spruance was designed to take advantage of several programs then
>under development. All of these were part of the original plan. the
>Spruance was designed to have 2 8″/72 mounts replacing the 5″/54s.
>Although some people claim that only one was intended. I had a friend
>who was a gunnery officer on a DD963 and he told me the figures
>comparing the magazine loadout of 5″ shells on his ship. Considering the
>difference in size of the 8″ and 5″ rounds I believed him when he said
>they were supposed to have 2 8″ guns.
>-end snip-
>
>Comment: DD 963 spec was actually for just one 5″ mount to be replaced
>by an 8″ or 175mm mount. In Litton’s winning design, only the forward Mk
>45 5″ mount (Mt 51) location had enough hull depth beneath it for a Mk
>71 8″ mount. I doubt that the Navy would or could re-design the Mk 71
>mount to fit in the aft 5″ (Mt 52) location, because:
>- The 8″ mount would need more depth for the loading tray to swing down,
>and also would need a higher loader tube for the longer 8″ round. If the
>Mk 71 mount were raised to the 01 level, it would block the Sea Sparrow
>launcher.
>- Retaining a 5″ mount aft would still be valuable because it would hold
>more rounds (600 vs 250 in the forward-8″ plan), and because of the
>greater variety of 5″ ammunition types than of 8″.
> BTW: When VLS was installed on DD 963 ships, retaining the margins
>for Mk 71 or another mount was not required. The ships had to be
>ballasted to compensate for the VLS weight, making a heavier-weight gun
>mount forward unattractive since then.
>
>-snip #2-
>The ship was also designed for the VLS. It just wasn’t available when
>the original ships were built. That is also why the Shah got the Mk26
>(?) luanchers for SAMs, it was the only thing ready at the time. The
>DD963 VLS was intended to carry more than THAWK though. The were vague
>intentions for a vertically launched ASROC, possibly a VL Harpoon, and
>some SAM. I think the intention for the latter was to have a
>multi-channel FCS that could be used to gunfire or to guide 1 or 2
>missiles. Presumably this would have been some variation of the Standard
>missile. They only became Strike DDs when all the programs but THAWK
>lapsed.
>-end snip-
>
>Comment: The ships were designed (1968-69) for Mk 26 twin-arm launchers.
>Mk 41 VLS launchers were developed in the late 1970s and went into
>production in the early 1980s. Even had VLS been available for the
>Shah’s cruisers, Standard SM-1 missiles were not VLS-compatible.
>- Mk 41 VLS was designed to be compatible with Mk 26 so it was an easy
>retrofit in the Mk 26-compatible DD 963 design. In fact, the US Navy
>plans to replace the Mk 26 launchers on the first 5 Aegis (Baseline 1)
>cruisers with VLS.
>- The original VLS design was too shallow for Tomahawk. SecNav Lehman
>cancelled VL-Harpoon and pushed a deeper VLS to push the Navy toward
>Tomahawk. An early Tomahawk variant was an anti-ship missile (TASM), now
>withdrawn for reasons of obsolesence and policy.
>- VL-ASRocs exist and are issued to deploying VLS ships. They carry Mk
>46 torpedoes only, not Mk 50 or nuclear depth charges.
>- A VL SAM system for the DD 963 is technically feasible but
>development has never been considered cost-effective. Several DD 963s
>are getting rolling-airframe missile (RAM) launchers to upgrade their
>air defense capability. The launcher is installed on the starboard
>quarter.
>
>-snip #3-
>The beamy hull of the Burke class has little to do with future growth .
>. . The Soviets had consistently built ships that were much beamier,
>because there were some drag resistance benefits at high speeds.
>-end snip-
>
>Comment: It’s correct that the “broad waterplane” hull design of the DDG
>51 class is not primarily related to growth margins, but speed isn’t the
>advantage. The broader hull is theoretically fuel-inefficient at high
>speeds but with gas turbines you can’t achieve the theoretical ideal
>anyway so there’s no real loss. What’s important about the broad
>waterplane design is that it greatly improves seakeeping, which the Navy
>noticed in broad-waterplane Soviet warships. The Navy wanted an even
>wider hull (by 2 feet) than the DDG 51 actually has.
> BTW: Gibbs & Cox’s competing DD 963 design was beamier than Litton’s
>winning design with an identical power plant. A former Litton designer
>has stated that Litton’s narrow-hull design resulted from a towing-tank
>test interpretation error. OTOH Litton’s ships are faster than the Navy
>required.
>
>I have sources for all the above if anyone is interested. I liked seeing
>the post from trooker@CAPACCESS.ORG and am pleased at the interest in
>the DD 963 class.
>
>–
>Michael C. Potter, Mgr, TelCo/Govt Programs mike.potter@artecon.com
>Artecon, Inc. | | mail PO Box 9000
>6305 El Camino Real -|- _|_ Carlsbad CA
>Carlsbad CA 92009 >_|_( |/_>ph 760-431-4465 >_III_ V|/ _III_ |/|_o fx 760-931-5527
> =-| L/_| _|____L_/_|==
> ___ ________|____-===L|_LL| -==| .___ |
> ___. __I____|_[_]_______|_____[__||____[_]_|__|_=====_|\__–+====–/
>\_____/|_|__| == 963 /
>|

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Tue Aug 19 11:59:16 1997
>To: salvin@ocslink.com
>Subject: RE: Re: MUTSU’s true fate?
>Date: Tue, 19 Aug 97 18:59:44 GMT
>From: salvin@ocslink.com
>cc: mahan@microwrks.com
>X-Mailer: Quarterdeck Message Center [1.1]
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
> >
> > This does of course not help to explain why Yamamoto sat the > campaign out in
> > Truk on a brand new 70.000 ton, 27 knots battleship instead of sending it
> > south, as he did with Mutsu.
> > Thus you only explain why the old wagons were not used, and not > why the new
> > ships were simply left where they were. BTW, were was Nagato during
> > Guadalcanal?
> >
> > Tim
> >
>
>I think the simple reason was that to Yamamoto, the drive in the Solomons was
>not, in his mind, the main thrust of the American >counter-offensive. He still
>expected that to come through the Central Pacific to the Phillipines. The
>_Yamato_ and the other heavy battleships were to be reserved for the >”decisive
>battle” and not risked in the relatively restricted waters of the Solomons.
>—-
>
>Steve Alvin
>Department of Social Sciences
>Illinois Valley Community College
>
>salvin@ocslink.com
>
>—-
>
>Steve Alvin
>Department of Social Sciences
>Illinois Valley Community College
>
>salvin@ocslink.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Wed Aug 20 13:15:06 1997
>X-Errors-To:
>Date: Wed, 20 Aug 1997 16:14:23 -0400 (EDT)
>X-Sender: rickt@pop3.cris.com
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: Yamamoto & Guadalcanal
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Mark does an admirable job putting Japanese (and Yamamoto’s) strategy into
>perspective. And if Yamamoto wasn’t so highly rated by people that should
>know better I might be more merciful. But I respectfully must disagree and
>submit that the Japanese did a better job of squandering a tactical and
>strategic advantage than any major combatant in WWII (with the possible
>exception of the USSR in 1941.)
>
>Mark wrote:
> >That might be a little harsh. 1). Navies tend to think alkie in many
> >ways. The Rainbow plan called for just such an offensive and it’s not
> >unusual that Yamamoto might have been thinking along similar lines. 2).
> >The Japanese loved feints and possibly felt the US would do what they
> >would do. 3). Restricted waters favor the weaker Navy. 4). Probably
> >most important. The SW Pacific was, for the most part, an Army show.
> >The Japanese services were not known for their cooperation.
> >
>Replies:
>1. Yes armed services think alike. But look what happened in the USN after
>Pearl. The carrier became king, they made major changes in their building
>program shoving subs and CVs to the top of the list. When we lost a battle
>we LOOKED for lessons. The Japanese, as shown at Midway, didn’t examine
>defeat because it was unthinkable to deal with it: not smart.
>
>2. Feints were wasteful and stupid and were one of the things that got
>Yamamoto in trouble at Midway. I wonder if a US admiral defeated as badly as
>Yamamoto was at Midway would have kept his position. The fact that
>Yamamoto’s successors continued to divide their forces and get their teeth
>kicked in only highlights how deeply the disease had gone and how difficult
>it was for the Japanese to react to a changing condition. Maybe chess is
>better preparation for war than go.
>
>3. An all out effort at Guadalcanal would have brought the USN to battle: Im
>convinced we would not have abandoned the Marines. IF were were forced to
>evacuate (or try to evacuate) the garrison it would have been a real
>embarassment: losing the garrison would have been a calamity. A slugfest or
>series of slugfests would not necessarily have had to take place in
>Ironbottom Sound. And if they did, a combination of big guns and the Long
>Lance would have a good one. If Yamamoto had lost his confidence after
>Midway that was an excellent reason to make him an instructor at Japan’s
>naval academy.
>
>4. Mark is in error concerning the SOPAC being an Army show. The opposite
>was the case. The Navy was responsible for the SOPAC and the Army claimed
>New Guinea as its sandbox. (The Kokoda epic was taking place at the same
>time as Guadalcanal.) By the end of Guadalcanal the two serivces were ready
>for an open declaration of war against each other. I do admit it was not
>Yamamoto’s fault that the Army refused to see the great danger looming at
>Guadalcanal until the battle was lost. As my football coach used to say,
>losing 63-0 takes a team effort.
>
>5. Mark also points out that Australia & NZ could have served as US bases
>for a sustained showdown in the SOPAC. In reality neither did. We were
>smart/lucky enough in the first weeks of war to see the value of the New
>Hebrides and occupied Efate, Espiritu Santo & New Caledonia very early.
>Espiritu was a fine anchorage but not really a great base. Australia’s
>ports, much less NZ, were a long way off. Rabaul and Truk made a much better
>combination. Any geographic position would have had some disadvantages for a
>major battle. But given the time element involved I still argue that the
>SOPAC was the best possible place for Japan to fight in late 1942, and that
>late 1942 was a much better time to fight than mid-44.
>
>Obviously such things are unproveable. But I do believe that Japan’s
>significant tactical strengths and astounding individual bravery were not
>supported by decent leadership at the top.
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Aug 21 08:56:31 1997
>X-Sender: dave@microworks.net
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.1 (32)
>Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 08:31:12 -0700
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>From: Dave Riddle
>Subject: At the Navy Barbershop
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>This was forwarded to me off of a Funnies list that we have. Since it has a
>”Nautical” theme I thought I would share….
>
>
> >>From Thu Aug 21 08:46:15 1997
> >X-Sender: scott@microworks.net
> >Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 08:48:07 -0700
> >To: funnies@microwrks.com
> >From: Scott Holly
> >Subject: At the Navy Barbershop
> >Precendence: bulk
> >Sender: funnies-owner@microworks.net
> >
> >Yet another from geka…
> >
> >>>From Wed Aug 20 21:49:45 1997
> >>X-Sender: geka@popmail.millennianet.com
> >>Date: Wed, 20 Aug 1997 20:43:12
> >>To: scott@microworks.net
> >>From: Gisela Koestner
> >>Subject: At the Navy Barbershop
> >>
> >>A Navy Chief and an Admiral were sitting in the barber shop.
> >>They were both just getting finished with their shaves–the
> >>barbers were reaching for some aftershave to slap on their
> >>faces.
> >>
> >>The Admiral shouted, “Hey, don’t put that shit on me! My wife
> >>will think I’ve been in a whorehouse!”
> >>
> >>The Chief turned to his barber and said, “Go ahead and put it
> >>on. My wife doesn’t know what the inside of a whorehouse
> >>smells like.”
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Aug 21 13:50:51 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 15:50:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney”
>Subject: Re: Halsey and Ultra/Magic
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>On Thu, 21 Aug 1997 salvin@ocslink.com wrote:
> > I think no one has addressed the real reason why the Japanese > feints usually
> > failed to work (Leyte Gulf is an exception)–thanks to Magic and Ultra the
> > U. S. *knew* what were feints and what was the main attack. Midway is a
> > perfect example. Why would Halsey go “charging off to the north” to the
> > Aleutians when he and the American high command knew that it was > a diversion
> > and the main thrust was to be at Midway?
>
>I (still) disagree. 🙂
>
>Halsey was Halsey and very probably would have gone “charging off,” no
> matter what the situation or how much he knew.
>
>Look how he ordered (Kinkaid in) ENTERPRISE and HORNET “Attack! Repeat,
> ATTACK!” … which K. dutifully did, only to over-expose his TF and lose
> HORNET … and leave us with one carrier, hampered by a damaged elevator
> about which was said that even “Bull” Halsey wouldn’t dare to push the
> “Down” button, for fear it wouldn’t come back up!
>
>Don’t get me wrong: Halsey was the kind of tiger we NEEDED … *for
> Guadalcanal* … when/where we finally decided to turn and fight … but
> he could be an overaggressive disaster at critical moments, elsewhere.
>
>William Halsey fully deserved his 5 stars, but he was entirely human …
> and how fallibly/*dangerously* impulsive he could be must not be
> forgotten.
>
> > I do agree, however that after Midway and the Solomons the Japanese should
> have
> > learned that more often than not, thier eleborate plans were not working.
>
>And yet … again … a “Kamikaze” Imperial Navy massacre of the invasion
> fleet/anchorage might have caused significant/decisive domestic
> disillusionment in the U.S. … with the competence of our commanders
> as much as the size of the casualty lists … although the two were/are
> directly related. The Japanese HAD us … thanks to their “overly
> complex” planning.
>
>And Kurita certainly didn’t “save” the Imperial Fleet by his (exhausted)
> withdrawal from Samar: The only significant subsequent action by
> it was YAMATO’s pointless “Kamikaze” attack at Okinawa.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
>Incidentally, Robert didn’t lose 1 carrier, last night, … although he
> did lose N. CAROLINA, S. DAKOTA, INDIANA, COLORADO!, and MARYLAND! …
> among others … in a nocturnal Ironbottom Bay slug-out that left me
> with useless eleventh-hour possession of the Slot.
>
>OK … so I *did* happen to drop NAGATO, MUTSU, HYUGA, all 4 KONGOs,
> and assorted significant others (including 5 out of my 6 carriers)
> in my valiant (more than brilliant) resistance, but Hey! … I
> *didn’t* lose YAMATO or MUSASHI … 🙂 … barely. :-I
>
>I made a very small but significant rule adjustment which does WONDERS
> for realistic night combat results.
>
>AND there were couple of seismic tremors during the game to report.
> 😮 ??

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Aug 21 19:29:18 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 21:29:07 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Status of the Navy
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>NNS3519. Status of the Navy, 21 Aug 1997:
>Personnel:
>394,935 active duty
>56,725 officer
>334,210 enlisted
>4,000 midshipmen
>209,419 civilians
>226,003 Ready Reserve Force:
>96,340 SELRES/129,663 IRR
>Aircraft: 4,698
>Ships: 353
>Underway: 178 ships (50%)
>Deployed: 112 ships (32%)
> 50,485 personnel
>Exercises: 4
>Port Visits: 13
>SSNs at Sea 33 (45%)
>Carriers/Airwings at Sea:
> USS John F. Kennedy (CVW-8): ops, Red Sea
> USS Constellation (CVW-2): transit, Indian Ocean
> USS John C. Stennis: ops, west Atlantic
> USS Enterprise: ops, west Atlantic
> USS George Washington: JTFEX, Western Atlantic
> USS Dwight D. Eisenhower: ops, western Atlantic
>LHAs/LHDs/LPHs/MCS at Sea:
> USS Boxer/15th MEU: transit, Indian Ocean
> USS Kearsarge: port visit, Rota, Spain
> USS Tarawa: ops, east Pacific
> USS Wasp: ops, west Atlantic
> USS Nassau: ops, west Atlantic
> USS Guam: JTFEX, west Atlantic
> USS Inchon: transit, west Atlantic
>Ships assigned to the Middle East Force:
> USS Ardent, USS Dextrous, USS Thorn, USS Nicholas, USS
>Rentz, USS Stethem, USS David R. Ray
>Ships assigned to the South Atlantic Force:
> USS Comte De Grasse, USS DeWert, USS Whidbey Island,
>USS Zephyr, USS Squall, USS Sand Lance, USCGC Harriet Liane
>Other Exercises/Operations:
> UNIFIED SPIRIT, west Atlantic
> SOUTHERN WATCH/MIO, Arabian Gulf
> COUNTER DRUG OPS, Caribbean/East Pacific
> SHARK HUNT, Mediterranean
> RESCUE EAGLE, Black Sea
>Information source:
>OPNAV Staff; OCPM
> -USN-
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Aug 21 19:20:36 1997
>Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 22:20:03 EST
>From: EDWARD WITTENBERG
>To: MARHST-L@POST.QUEENSU.CA, MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM
>CC: wew@papa.uncp.edu
>Subject: HMS Hermes
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>I have just finished reading Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins’ book _The
>Battle For the Falklands_. A fairly comprehensive listing of the British
>task force which operated in the South Atlantic is provided. Two
>carriers (Hermes and Invincible) formed the core of this group. As far
>as I know, HMS Invincible (along with her sisters Ark Royal and
>Illustrious) are still in service with the Royal Navy. But what of
>HMS Hermes? Has she been decommissioned and placed in ‘mothballs’ or
>was she scrapped?
>
>Edward Wittenberg
>wew@papa.uncp.edu

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Sat Aug 23 11:59:36 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Sat, 23 Aug 1997 13:58:15 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom5.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca
>Subject: SubOps – Submarine Operators Mailing List (FWD)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>In case anyone is interested:
>
>subops via http://www.coollist.com Submarine Operators Mailing List
>
>This is to announce the creation of the Submarine Operators Mailing List.
>SUBOPS is being created to facilitate the many submarine people throughout
>the world. It is a place for past, present and future Submariners to
>exchange ideas, find old friends, learn about reunions, and just about
>anything that is related to Submarines.
>
>It is an open unmoderated discussion list that allows anyone interested in
>Submarines throughout the world. I am not limiting it to just present or
>ex-submariners. It is open to all. I have found that there are many people
>that are very interested in all aspects of submarine life and information.
>
>Also this is obviously an unclassified discussion list and any information
>will have to be just that, unclassified. There will be no questions or
>answers that would compromise the security of present or past submarine
>operations.
>
>To SUBSCRIBE log onto http://www.coollist.com and follow the directions
>for subscribing there. When asked for the list name, enter “subops” and
>then your email address. Then hit the submit key. I will be notified and
>you should receive notification that you are subscribed to subops. This is
>for subscribing only. The main discussion will be subops@coollist.com .
>
>Owner: Michael L. Acklin

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Sun Aug 24 02:45:26 1997
>Date: Sun, 24 Aug 97 11:46 +0100
>From: BWV_WIESBADEN@t-online.de (Tim Lanzendoerfer)
>X-Sender: 0611603955-0001@t-online.de (Silvia Lanzendoerfer)
>Subject: Location change
>To: harpoon@lists.stanford.edu, mahan@microwrks.com, >wwii-l@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Thanks to Dave Riddle of Microworks, I was just able to move my >enlargened and
>improved The United States Navy in the Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 pages to the
>address of
>
>http://www.microworks.net/pacific/pacific.net
>
>You are invited to view these pages and encouraged to tell me what >you think of
>them.
>
>Tim Lanzendoerfer

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