Archive for January, 2009

Camouflage intent and effectiveness.

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 22 01:29:22 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom1.ecnet.net: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 03:28:11 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom1
>To: seaways-shipmodeling-list@lists.best.com, mahan@microwrks.com,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca, milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu,
> consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>Subject: Camouflage intent and effectiveness.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>I’ve read reports of Japanese *and American* aircraft overflying
> U.S. task forces without seeing them … as long as there was
> no noticeable wake.
>
>Ellis (or Scott?) makes the point (in the old Almark ROYAL NAVY
> WARSHIP CAMOUFLAGE, 1939-45) that if you were defending against
> aircraft, you wanted an overall sea color. If you were
> defending against submarines, you wanted a stratified scheme
> blending the ship against the sea horizon and sky. If you had
> to concede the probability of being sighted, then you might
> want to try to confuse the enemy’s aim with disruptive or even
> dazzle camouflage.
>
>And, as I’ve said in other posts, light pastel blue-gray was effective
> even at night (when you would think *dark* (shadows) colors would be
> most effective).
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

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USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 30 10:14:22 1997
>X-Sender: jim@mail.halcyon.com
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.1 (32)
>Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 10:06:42 -0700
>To: swrctmo@iamerica.net, mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Jim Ennes
>Subject: Re: USS Amberjack & USS Liberty Why? WHY??
>Cc: “Louis R. Coatney”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>At 10:59 AM 5/30/97 -0700, TMO/TX wrote:
> >
> >I suspect that most of what Liberty collected was tactical junk,
> >examples of our concentration on volume with the hope of panning a few
> >grains of gold from a tub full of sand. Sure, there may have been some
> >pearls, but it takes better evaluators than most of the Navy types I
> >knew to quickly recognize pearls (and even then the pearls may be the
> >sort to use for predictions of future methods and activities).
>
>The fact is, we had only been on station for about five hours when we
>were attacked. This was not sufficient time to develop the sort of
>database that is needed. Consequently, we had collected almost
>nothing at all. For instance, we sent about five CRITICS that morning,
>but they were all reports intercepted from CAIRO COMMERICAL
>RADIO! No doubt the CIA had the same stuff sooner from FBIS.
>
>Jim

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THE MIGHTY ‘OOD — OFF-LINE

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 22 08:42:42 1997
>X-Sender: msmall@roanoke.infi.net
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.1 (32)
>Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 11:42:14 -0400
>To: fostergh@ix.netcom.com
>From: Marc James Small
>Subject: THE MIGHTY ‘OOD — OFF-LINE
>Cc: mahan@microwrks.com
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Your query concerning Hood was reposted to the Mahan List.
>
>Hood was one of a class of four battlecruisers which were redesigned in
>light of the British experience at Jutland. Following the end of the War,
>the other three were cancelled. She was launched 22nd August 1918 and
>completed 3rd March 1920, so she didn’t come, directly, under the
>Washington Treaty provisions save as part of the overall RN limit of 12
>battleships (five R’s, five QE’s, Nelson and Rodney) and three
>battlecruisers (Repulse, Renown, and Hood).
>
>She was a superb ship, a magnificent example of what the British are
>capable of when they think before they build. She could make more than 30
>knots (31.07 on trials), and her bulk, at speed, was an inspirational
>delight to a generation of Imperial subjects, to whom she came to represent
>the Empire and British might.
>
>She was due for a rebuild in the late 1930’s — the British had updated
>Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite, and Renown, and had similar overhauls
>scheduled for their remaining ships. But so vital was Hood that the
>British never were able to spare her during those days of crises, and so
>the modernization never took place. Had it done so, she would have had
>substantially increased deck armor and a much improved power plant, as well
>as a ‘tower’ bridge, along with an updated secondary armament.
>
>Hood was of a design dating from a time when battle ranges were anticipated
>to be relatively close, 10,000 yards or so. After the First War — where
>Jutland did little to change this, as it was a close-range action due to
>the weather — it became apparent that battle ranges were opening out to
>20,000 yards or more (Warspite hit an Italian BB at 25,000 yards at one
>point during the Second War). The result of this increase in range was to
>change the anticipated point at which the shells would hit the ship: close
>range actions mean flat trajectories, with the shells striking side armour,
>while longer ranges mean plunging fire which hits the deck. Thus, Hood had
>deck armour more than adequate for a Jutland engagement but inadequate for
>action at longer ranges. Bismarck engaged Hood at, I recall, 14,000 yards,
>and her shells thus hit the relatively light deck armour, with a total
>thickness of 8″ or so in several layers. (There are alternate theories but
>plunging fire from Bismarck striking through the armoured decks and hitting
>a magazine seems the likeliest cause of Hood’s demise. This was ONE lucky
>hit!)
>
>The causes of Hood’s explosion are not closely akin to that which led to
>the loss of the three RN BC’s at Jutland. They were lost through unstable
>ammunition, poorly shielded ammunition hoists, and weak side armour.
>
>I have a good friend who was a King’s Messenger for VADM Sir Lancelot
>Holland, the TF commander. When Hood refuelled at Scapa on her last
>voyage, Holland ordered my friend ashore for a spot of leave, telling him,
>”I don’t believe I’ll be needing a confidential messenger on this run!” It
>saved Tim’s life!
>
>Marc
>
>
>msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
>Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!

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Camouflage intent and effectiveness.

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu May 22 09:47:44 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 11:45:48 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: Conflict simulation Games ,
> mahan@microwrks.com, marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca,
> seaways-shipmodeling-list@lists.best.com, > milhst-l@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu
>Subject: Re: Camouflage intent and effectiveness.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>On Thu, 22 May 1997, Les Howie wrote:
> > I few years ago I had a chat with a gentleman who served in the > RCAF coastal
> > service during the war, and asked him about camouflage > patterns. He claimed
> > that, no matter how ships had been painted, by the time they had > been at sea
> > for any length time they were all rust brown from the air.
> > For what its worth. He may have been pulling my leg but I don’t think so.
>
>As foul and rusted a condition as most of the Commonwealth ships were, in
> the first 3-4 years of the war, I don’t think he was pulling your leg,
> Les, particularly since convoy ships would have lowest painting
> priority.
>
>On the other hand, the fast minelayers that went into Malta were painted
> and repainted … to resemble Vichy ships, etc.
>
>There is this one photo of KING GEORGE V looking … there is no other
> word for it … *decrepit* … in 1942! ๐Ÿ™‚
>
>One big Lend-Lease service the U.S. provided, before and during our
> entry in the war, was refitting British warships in American shipyards
> … well beyond the range of the bombers that sank SUSSEX in her
> drydock, for example.
>
>And we not only repaired, cleaned, and mechanically upgraded the British
> ships … we *repainted* them … according to British specs with
> paint colors in acutely short supply back in the isles. (Thus, we
> tried for ourselves schemes like “Mountbatten Pink,” discussed a
> few weeks ago.)
>
>However, in higher priority theaters, there does seem to have been
> paint available and used. Look at the photos of the Malta Striking
> Forces victoriously parading back into harbor, their light gray
> upperworks positively beaming.
>
>Lou
> Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu

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USNI Naval History

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 23 11:58:34 1997
>From: mroberts@tfb.com (Michael Robertson)
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: USNI Naval History
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:46:56 -0800
>Organization: The Filebank BBS InterGate
>Reply-To: mroberts@tfb.com
>X-Mailer: Yarn 0.92 with YES 0.22 and QEdit 2.15
>Lines: 172
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>I am forwarding this article, please respond to usniwest@aol.com, not
>to my address. Mary Beth SK will be out of town next week, so any
>requests may take a while.
>
>—————————————————————–
>Please forgive such a long post, one of your list members (Michael Robertson)
>recommended that I post this to your group. He saw it on a Patrick O’Brian
>group and has taken advantage of it.
>
>I’ve combined three posts that I made to the original list I posted to, so
>bear with me, the first portion explains USNI and who I am, the second
>portion is the Mar/Apr. 97 table of contents and the 3rd portion is the
>May/June 97 table of contents.
>
> If you’d like the free sample copy (one per customer) please send me your
>mailing address via USNIWest@aol.com. Sorry, about the confusion, but I’m
>glad that Jim has sparked some interest!! ๐Ÿ™‚ If anyone has questions about
>the U.S. Naval Institute and our other publications please e-mail me and I’ll
>do my best to answer your questions.
>
>Thank you for your time!
>
>Mary Beth Straight Kiss
>
>***********************************************************
>Mary Beth Straight Kiss
>U.S. Naval Institute Representative
>3485 Old Cobble Ct.
>San Diego, CA 92111-4045
>USNIWest@aol.com or (619) 874-8286
>***********************************************************
>
>Part I
>
> Just thought I’d inform the group that there is a magazine out there that
>is available for Naval and Maritime history buffs. Published by the U.S.
>Naval Institute, a non-profit private organization, it is the __Naval
>History__ magazine. It is bi-monthly and was created in 1988. The Naval
>Institute’s other magazine, __Proceedings__, was receiving so many good
>history articles that they decided to put them all together in one
>publication. It has been a big success. It can be subscribed to or bought
>at many major book stores. The U.S. Naval Institute is a non-profit
>professional organization for persons who have an interest in Naval and
>Maritime topics and concerns. It is the oldest private professional
>organization for the military and was established in 1873.
>
> I’d thought I try and list the titles of articles for each issue like so
>many other contributers have done on the list. That way if you are
>interested in a particular issue you can inquire about it or subscribe to
>the
>magazine itself. I’ll send that under separate heading.
>
> Subscriptions to the magazine are $20/yr for non-USNI members or $18/yr
>for members. International orders add $6 to the cost. (All US funds). Three
>year subscription rates are available too. If anyone is interested in
>seeing a sample copy please e-mail me with your address. One free copy per
>customer.
>
> I also am the indexer for the magazine, although the task is a bit behind
>because they just assigned me the backlog. I’ll let people know when the
>indices are available. The magazine and the index would be a great asset for
>any researcher’s library! I personally love the magazine and can’t wait to
>read it!
>
> I was the manager of the photo archives and reference library at USNI for
>over 9 years. I am now on the West Coast and am representing them here ( a
>trial run). I am responsible for garnering new members, new subscribers,
>selling USNI pubs, certificates, and photographs. As well informing people
>about our Oral History and reference services. Since it is such a new
>position, the East Coast office is tracking how beneficial it is. Please use
>the code MK7 whenever you order or request anything and they will know that
>you heard it from me! Thank you in advance.
>
>
>Part II
>
>Articles in the Mar./Apr. 97 issue of NAVAL HISTORY magazine by U.S. Naval
>Institute.
>
>__Burn Philadelphia__ by Major PHilip Wasielewski, USMC;
> IN what has been called one of the boldest strokes in U.S. Naval
>History, Captain Edward Preble determined to burn the 36-gun frigate rather
>than allow her to remain in the hands of the Tripoli’s Pahsa.
>
>__Constellation Goes Dry__ by Frank D. Roylance
> A Private Foundation in Baltimore has launched the first leg of a
>restoration effort intended to save and preserve one of the oldest U.S. naval
>vessels afloat. She’ll be high and dry for at least two years.
>
>__A Brave Band of Britons__ by Charles A. Steele
> Sailors and marines of the Royal Navy Division were deeply mired in the
>trenches of Ancre in 1916 as the soldiers of the British Fifth Army.
>
>__The Commodore Goes to Court__ by Suzanne B. Geissler
> Commodore Thomas Truxton was shocked that Aaron Burr had been arrested
>for treason and that he himself had been implicated in a conspiracy. But
>honor and integrity helped clear both names.
>
>__A Sad Day in the Cold War__ by Cdr. Robert C.M. Ottensmeyer, USN(Ret.)
> A routine intelligence-gathering mission–for the Cold War era, at
>least__ in 1952 turned sour near Cyprus. The hero of the day was the
>commander, who reentered the sinking aircraft to ensure all his crew had
>escaped.
>
>__Early Vietnam: Unwinnable?__ By Kenneth J. Hagan
> An expert corps of scholars, historians, and operators debated the hows
>and whys of the Vietnam War last spring at the Robert R. McCormick
>Foundation’s stately Cantigny First Division Museum in Illinois.
>
>__”No Men Like Him”__ By Jordan Vause
> A chronicler of German U-boat exploits in World War II illuminates one of
>the most intriguing of the U-boat commanders and author of the command
>manual, “Problems of Leadership,” Wolfgang Luth.
>
>In addition, the issue has our regular features: book reviews, reunion
>listings, historic fleet reports, museum reports, Navy Yarns, and letters to
>the editor.
>
>Part III
>
>Articles in the May/June 97 issue of NAVAL HISTORY magazine by U.S. Naval
>Institute.
>
>__The Ship that Launched a Nation__ by David C. Holly
> She had served sutifully from the Chesapeake Bay to Normandy, but the
>ultimate test for the President Warfield came 50 years ago when she became
>the Exodus 1947, transporting Holocaust Jews to the Promised Land.
>
>__Coming to Terms With the Old Foe__ by Rear Admiral Geroge R. Worthington,
>USN(Ret.)
> Having revisted Vietnam 30 years after he served as a Navy frogman there,
>the author has decided that normalization is the right policy.
>
>__The Truth About Kamikazes__ By D.M. Giangreco
> They were dreaded by every ship within striking distance of the Imperial
>Japanese Navy, but their success was largely psychological. According to an
>editor for “Military Review”, however, they were poised for a U.S. invasion.
>
>__Nelson’s Ten Years to Glory__ by RAdm. Joseph F. Callo, USN Reserve (Ret.)
> The last decade of his life made the legendary Admiral Lord Horatio
>Nelson “the focus of British identity and aspirations .”
>
>__Remembering Emma–and Others__ by Stephen Howarth
> The 1805 Club restores, preserves, and maintains Nelson-related
>monuments–including one to his mistress in Calais.
>
>__Torpedoed in the Celtic Sea__ by Adm. Worth Bagley, USN(ret.)
> In April 1917, the officers and crew of the destroyer Jacob Jones had the
>U-boat commander who had sunk the ship to thank for saving their lives.
>
>__Liberty Lost Pursing a Legend__ by Capt. Ira Dye, USN(Ret.)
> In summer 1937, NROTC students in the battleship USS Colorado helped with
>one of the most extensive search-and-rescue operations in naval history.
>
>__The Original Alphabet Soup__ by Michael J. Crowder
> You need a manual to decipher the evolutions and changes in the squadron
>designations of U.S. naval aviation. Here is a good place to start.
>
>In addition, the issue has our regular features: book reviews, reunion
>listings, historic fleet reports, museum reports, Navy Yarns, and letters to
>the editor.
>
> People interested in subscribing to __Naval History__ or finding out more
>about it can contact me at USNIWest@aol.com
>
>
>
>
>
>–
>Michael Robertson | | mroberts@tfb.com
>Oceanside, CA 92056 | |

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MAHAN kit? Needed models. Tom Clancy.

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 23 13:39:17 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:38:06 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom2.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: seaways-shipmodeling-list@lists.best.com, mahan@microwrks.com,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca, consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk
>Subject: Re: MAHAN kit? Needed models. Tom Clancy.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>On Fri, 23 May 1997, JOHN WELIVER wrote:
> > Lou,
> > You wouldn’t happen to know if there is a kit in production that covers the
> > MAHAN class of DD’s.
>
>I’m certain there is not, unless there is an (expensive) resin kit, John.
> Ships are the least popular plastic models, and an obscure destroyer
> class isn’t going to make it into design and production, what with the
> prohibitive mastermold-making costs … even with CAD.
>
>For DECADES, I’ve petitioned (literally) the U.S. model manufacturers
> to put out cheap, simple 1:1200 Japanese and American WWII task force
> SETS. These would be ideal for kids to play with on the floor, for
> wargamers, and for WWII naval and marine history buffs — young and
> old. They would also undercut the Japanese monopoly of the (1:700)
> waterline WWII model warship market.
>
>TO NO AVAIL. American plastic model kit manufacturers are short-term-
> oriented business managers/majors with little or no sense of potential
> markets. (That is why the Japanese Pearl-Harbored them, in the first
> place, in this market sector.)
>
>TOM CLANCY is going to be at GenCon, the big wargaming convention in
> Milwaukee, this summer. (He is starting to invest in computer
> wargaming and graphics production.) I’ve already tried e-mailing
> him about my idea, but have gotten no response. (Could SOMEone
> forward this to him?)
>
>He and Larry Bond — the designer of the HARPOON and COMMAND AT SEA
> naval miniatures rules … my “Naval Action” rules are simpler,
> faster, better … ๐Ÿ™‚ — are friends and collaborators. You would
> think that Larry would want cheap naval miniature sets available
> (via Toys R Us, etc.), so that kids would want to “regulate” their
> floorplay. (Back on Brittany Lane, the kid with the loudest voice
> and/or neatest models usually had his way. ๐Ÿ™‚ )
>
>And World War II task forces are more desirable than “modern” TFs,
> simply because the WWII ships were in *battles* and are of
> historical importance. (In 100 years, which ENTERPRISE will be
> remembered most? … barring World War III, of course.)
>
>I trust you can sense what we are up against.
>
>Actually, 1:900 is the best floor scale, and I can build my cardstock
> models in any scale I want anyway.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>

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NAUTILUS 5th war patrol, part 4 – forwarded

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Fri May 23 19:19:19 1997
>From: John Snyder
>Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 19:15:30 -0700
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: NAUTILUS 5th war patrol, part 4 – forwarded
>Organization: MacNexus, the Sacramento Macintosh User Group
>X-Mailer: TeleFinder BBS v5.5
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Here’s the long-awaited (by some of us) excerpt that went missing earlier.
>
> May 12, 1943
>
> Received message during night ordering us to Dutch Harbor and also to
> look for enemy shipping approaching ATTU from southwest which was
> heartily complied with.
>
> 0612 W Submerged as visibility increased somewhat.
>
> 1917 W Seas became so rough that periscope depth could not be
>maintained,
> increased depth to 90 feet.
>
> 2156 W Came to periscope depth, found sky completely overcast, low
> visibility, heavy seas.
>
> 2202 W surfaced.
>
> May 13, 1943
>
> 0841 W Early morning low visibility lifted and submerges. Could not
> maintain periscope due to high seas, rant at 100 feet.
>
> 2059 W Visibility reduced by fog, surfaces.
>
> May 14 to May 16, 1943
>
> Surface running. 1921 W May 14, 11943, crossed 180th meridian. 0544
>W
> submerged on sight plane contact and at 0624 W surfaces. 0315 W May
>16,
> 1943, received message altering routing and canceling speed
>restriction,
> immediately went ahead full speed. 15.5 knots in order to arrive
>DUTCH
> HARBOR before dark the 16th. At 1900 W May 16, 1943, arrived DUTCH
> HARBOR. The entire trip from the north coast of ATTU was made by dead
> reckoning except for one hazy sun fix obtained May 14, 1943.
>
> May 17 1943
>
> 1600 W Departed DUTCH HARBOR for PEARL HARBOR.
>
> May 18, 1943
>
> 1530 W Received message from Comsubpac to change course had head for
>MARE
> ISLAND immediately. Upon hearing this the morale of the crew
>increased
> one hundred percent.
>
> May 19, 1943
>
> Received message ordering us to go through a point through which we
>had
> already passed. So informed comsubpac giving my position, course and
> speed. In afternoon received message giving us a definite routing.
> Slowed to seven knots. This will cause us one day’s delay in arrival
>in
> port and commencement of overhaul. Made trim and training dive.
>
> May 20 to May 21, 1943
>
> Burned out bearing on turbo blower. On May 21, 1943 shifted to HPG
>and
> sent message requesting escort rendezvous at Point NAN at 0600 Zebra
> twenty fifth. This is four hours ahead of schedule but will assure
>our
> arrival MARE ISLAND prior darkness.
>
> May 22, 1943
>
> 0545 V Heavy fog set in, started SJ radar.
>
> 0645 V SJ radar contact bearing dead ahead, range 8,900 yards.
>Started
> TDC and got him on course 304 T. Speed 9. We were only 100 yards off
> track so changed course to open.
>
> 0654 V Sighted merchantman in fog range 800 yards; exchanged
>recognition
> signals.
>
> 0656 V In latitude 44-21N, longitude 139-45W passed him 350 yards
>abeam.
>
> May 23 to May 25, 1943
>
> On May 23 received message from Cominseafrom to Cominshore patrol, San
> Francisco, requesting destroyer rendezvous at 0600 Z May 25, 1943. At
> 0600 May 25, 1943, made rendezvous with escort and proceeded to MARE
> ISLAND. 1200 T May 25, 1943, arrived MARE ISLAND.

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Light shipboard AA guns necessary? … and AA philsophies.

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Mon May 26 20:08:12 1997
>Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:07:33 -0500
>From: Brooks A Rowlett
>Reply-To: brooksar@indy.net
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0 (Macintosh; I; PPC)
>To: swrctmo@iAmerica.net
>CC: mahan@microwrks.com
>Subject: Re: Light shipboard AA guns necessary? … and AA philsophies.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>TMO/TX wrote:
> in a long thread triggered by :
>
> > > >Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> > In regards to the British v. US experience…..
> > The US was led to maximizing the number of barrels of all calibers by a
> > simple (but so long ago as to have been forgotten) factor…the
> > potential number of attacking a/c arriving at the same time. Indelibly
> > marked by the Pearl Harbor experience, the tattoo even more deeply
> > colored in engagements against Japaneses carrier and landbased a/c in
> > substantial numbers thru ’42, we wanted “an impenetrable carpet of flak”
> > to steal a German concept. Dealing with fewer attackers (but more often
> > multi-engine or single engine a/c with some armor, both more damage
> > resistant than the lightly constructed Nipponese a/c), the British
> > perspective may have been quite different. The principal difference may
> > have been even more simply explained…a shortage of German a/c
> > carriers.
> > —
> > Kestrel Syndicate – Oliver Associates – Southwest Regional Council
> > “Quid consilium cepit…”
>
>I think he’s put his finger on it. Secondly, I also think the RN was
>more sensitive to topweight. We should also point out that the average
>USN DD probably ran somewhat heavier than its RN counterpart expecially
>175 FLETCHER class (plus 100 or so BENSON/LIVERMORE/BRISTOL which are
>more directly comparable to the equivalent Britsh War Emergency type).
>And with more fleet oilers and more practice at UNREP the USN was
>willing to accept topweight that might not be compensated for in
>theroetical fuel – that is, because the US was able and willing to UNREP
>more often, they might have calculated stability always on the basis of
>assuming a certain % of fuel available which the RN might no9t have been
>willing to. In practice though, I don’t think that’s right, because i
>seem to recall something about the US trying to calculate stability with
>a LOWER fuel load than anyone else. At any rate, I strongly suspect
>that the numbers of individual attackers in the PAC being higher than
>was expected in Europe is the real key to this, with the stability
>factor that the USN chose to carry more – either being capable of at
>similar stability, or being willing to accept lower stability –
>contributing to the fact. Certainly late war AA fire control was still
>in the USN favor, with lots of small directors, including gyro sights on
>mount for the 20mm and individual directors for EVERY 40mm quad….the
>RN made a stabilized controlled 40mm single, the STAAG mounting.
>Another point possibly relevant is that the RN 2lbr octuple and quad
>were a shorter calibre than the 40mm Bofors which led to reduced range
>and accuracy and possibly more intent to use them in barrage mode.
>Certainly Martin Middlebrooks BATTLESHIP describes that the octuple 2
>pdrs on PRINCE OF WALES were unable to satisfactorily engage the IJNAF
>’Betty’ and ‘Nell” bombers before they dropped their torpedoes; they
>finally turned to using them in revenge mode against planes that had
>already dropped and were flying overhead, which is how they actually
>succeeded in shooting some down.
>
>Some Refs; Campbell’s NAVAL WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II, Friedman and Peter
>Hodges’ DESTOYER WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR 2.
>
>Some other points; The popular OTO Melara 76mm Compact mentioned is a
>
>62 calibre-long weapon. I can’t swear that the US did pay license fees
>to Bofors for manufacture of the 40mm during WWII – the History of the
>Bureau of Ordnance probably has that information – but they did get
>permission to manufacture and bought drawings from them so I presume
>the US did. (Original production was apparently reverse-engineered from
>samples on the Dutch cruiser JACOB VAN HEEMSKECK). The Japanese 40mm
>and also the Italian, were based on the Vickers 2 pdr, not the Bofors
>40. The late war German 40 was the Bofors, but I think I recall that
>the Germans may NOT have paid Bofors any license fees…unless that is
>postwar propaganda -“We Good Allies paid our license fees but the nasty
>Germans didn’t”.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

6-7 June ’97, IlliniCon’97, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois … CHEAP! :-)

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Tue May 27 20:31:31 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 22:30:49 -0500 (CDT)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.com
>cc: “Louis R. Coatney” , greggh@uiuc.edu
>Subject: 6-7 June ’97, IlliniCon’97, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois … CHEAP! ๐Ÿ™‚
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>
>Weekend Badge $5.00 !! … at the Hedrick House, $20.00 a night!
>
>I’m going to try to be there … at *those* prices!
>
>I’m thinking about a 1:700 “Naval Action” naval miniatures game,
> a 1ST ALAMEIN tournament, and maybe a tournament-demo of my new
> Russian Front game? … assuming space and schedule permit.
>
>Sponsor is the Urbana Gaming House and the Hedrick House.
>
>Champaign-Urbana is the junction of I-57 (Chicago to St. Louis or
> Memphis) and I-74 (Iowa City or Quad Cities to Indianapolis).
>
>Check with Gregg Homerding … greggh@uiuc.edu … for details.
> 217-328-8000
>
>Hey, Gregg! Is there going to be an auction? … and when?
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
> Would someone please put this up on rec.games.board.etc?

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

(Fwd) Re: CSS Hunley

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed May 28 16:21:19 1997
>Comments: Authenticated sender is >From: “Patrick McSherry” >To: mahan@microwrks.com
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 06:22:27 +0000
>Subject: (Fwd) Re: CSS Hunley
>Priority: normal
>X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.01)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>Hello Folks.
>
>This appeared on the Titanic List. I was not aware of an effort to
>raise the Hunley. Does anyone know anything else about it?
>
>
>——- Forwarded Message Follows ——-
>Date: Wed, 28 May 1997
>From: JETINC1528@aol.com
>Subject: Re: Hunley
>
>
>yes there are plans to raise her, and I cant wait. I am a big fan of the
>hunley among other ships. That web site is great and there are also many
>more. just browse under c.s.s. hunley. i hope i can be there when they raise
>it. i’m thinking about catchin a bus down there and then watching them bring
>it into the harbor. There were two great documentaries on the ship. One
>about the ship itself was on the dscvry chnl and the other on raising her was
>on tlc.
>hope this helped.
>
>Tim

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

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The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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